

# IRAN MIGRATION OUTLOOK

2nd Edition - 2021





# Iran Migration Outlook

2 0 2 1

Iran Migration Observatory  
Sharif Policy Research Institute  
Sharif University of Technology



## Iran Migration Outlook

Editor: Dr. Bahram Salavati

Publisher: Danesh-Bonyan Fanavar

ISBN: 978-622-6905-54-1

Circulation: 1000 Pieces

2021

سرشناسه: صلواتی، بهرام، ۱۳۵۸ -

عنوان و نام پدیدآور: سالنامه مهاجرتی ایران ۱۴۰۰ = Iran migration outlook / ۲۰۲۱ / تدوین بهرام صلواتی؛ تهیه و تدوین رصدخانه مهاجرت ایران (پژوهشکده سیاستگذاری دانشگاه صنعتی شریف)؛ [برای] ستاد فرهنگسازی اقتصاد دانش بنیان معاونت علمی و فناوری ریاست جمهوری، پژوهشکده سیاستگذاری دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، رصدخانه مهاجرت ایران.

مشخصات نشر: تهران: ریاست جمهوری، معاونت علمی و فناوری، مرکز ارتباطات و اطلاع‌رسانی، دانش بنیان فناوری، ۱۴۰۰.

مشخصات ظاهری: ۲۹۷ ص: مصور(رنگی)، جدول(رنگی)، نمودار(رنگی).

شابک: ۹۷۸-۶۲۲-۶۹۰۵-۵۴-۱

وضعیت فهرست نویسی: فیا

یادداشت: کتابنامه: ص. ۲۸۱ - ۲۸۷.

موضوع: ایران -- مهاجرت -- سالنامه‌ها

موضوع: Iran -- Emigration and immigration -- Yearbooks

موضوع: مهاجران -- ایران -- آمار

موضوع: Immigrants -- Iran -- Statistics

موضوع: دانشجویان ایرانی -- کشورهای خارجی

موضوع: Iranian students -- Foreign countries

موضوع: مهاجرت اجباری -- ایران

موضوع: Forced migration -- Iran

موضوع: مهاجرت -- آمار

موضوع: Emigration and immigration -- Statistics

موضوع: مهاجرت دانشجویان -- ایران

موضوع: College student mobility -- Iran

موضوع: ایران -- مهاجرت

موضوع: Iran -- Emigration and immigration

شناسه افزوده: ایران. ریاست جمهوری، معاونت علمی و فناوری، انتشارات دانش بنیان فناوری

شناسه افزوده: رصدخانه مهاجرت ایران

شناسه افزوده: ایران. ریاست جمهوری، ستاد فرهنگسازی اقتصاد دانش بنیان

شناسه افزوده: دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، پژوهشکده سیاست‌گذاری علم، فناوری و صنعت، گروه

پژوهشی سیاست‌گذاری مهاجرت

رده بندی گنگره: JVA۷۴۱

رده بندی دیویی: ۸۱۰۹۵۵/۳۰۴

شماره کتابشناسی ملی: ۸۴۳۴۶۰۴

اطلاعات رکورد کتابشناسی: فیا



Soft Technologies and Creative  
Industries Development Council

## Iran Migration Outlook 2021

**Prepared and edited by:**

Iran Migration Observatory  
Sharif Policy Research Institute  
Tehran, Iran, 2021

**Editor and corresponding author:**

Dr. Bahram Salavati

**Executive Secretary:**

Roghayyeh Samadi

**Economic and labor migration**

**Editor:** Fahimeh Behzadi

**Colleague:** Fatemeh Sourì , Ashkan Farahani

**International Student mobility**

**Editor:** Mohammad Amin Mowla

**Asylum-seeking and forced migration:**

**Editor:** Dr. Davood Eyvazlu,

**Colleague:** Roghayyeh Samadi, Ameneh Mirzayi

**Return migration**

**Editor:** Zohreh Rabiee

**Graphic Designer:**

Milad Mohammadi Balesini

All rights of this reports are reserved by Iran Migration  
Observatory (IMO)



## Preface

Planning and policy-making in different fields necessitate generating accurate and methodical data with fixed frequency to provide information required to analyze different situations and develop plans and policies. The significance of generated data is even more highlighted in terms of international migrations, on which inaccurate information and news mixed with errors are frequent. Accordingly, the Vice-presidency for Science and Technology in Iran has spared many efforts to institutionalize and provide the ground for accurate and meticulous planning by making contributions in setting laws on the formation of the National Organization for Brain Circulation in the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, supporting the formation of Iran Migration Observatory in an academic and research context, and facilitating the development of accurate reports and statistical data and periodic surveys.

Nowadays, the increasing significance of policy-making in developmental planning and the provision of the accurate portrayal of a country on a global scale makes directly-involved institutions be more active and exhibit more sensitivity to development of this field. Nevertheless, there is no formal migration custodian in Iran, and the responsibilities and authorities have been diffused and distributed across different organizations; thus, coherent and dynamic policymaking and planning tailored to domestic and international developments seem to be somehow idealistic.

The publication of the second edition of Iran Migration Outlook by Iran Migration Observatory indicates the importance of faithfulness to generation authentic and reliable information in different policy fields, including migration, for this vice-presidency. Iran Migration Outlook not only encompasses a collection of data and information extracted from different statistical sources to show the migration status of the Iranians in different groups such as students, asylum-seekers, and economic migrants but also reports the population of the Iranians in major destination countries and their migration channels and flows.

This edition, for the first time, provides an estimate of the frequencies of migration of talented and highly educated people and the migration of those eligible to the Iranian National Elites Foundation along with their migration patterns in different scientific groups. Moreover, the data on the return migration of highly-educated Iranians via "the program of cooperation with non-resident specialists" as well as the return migration patterns in Iran have been discussed as a fundamental aspect of the Brain Circulation policy approach to human mobility.

The researchers hope to encourage the endeavors of institutions directly involved in this field to meet different statistical and information needs regarding international migrations accurately and completely.

Sorena Sattari

Iranian Vice-president for Science and Technology

Head of the Iranian National Elite Foundation



While the second edition of Iran Migration Outlook is under publication, international migration trends are still increasing across the globe and in Iran. During the COVID19- pandemic, which imposed unprecedented restrictions on the international mobility, the continuous and increased migration trend reveals a dominant, undeniable, and unstoppable phenomenon worldwide. Accordingly, detecting the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of migration and its roots and causes, reducing its undesirable side effects, and exploiting migration-inducing opportunities are some realistic approaches to this global phenomenon.

Accordingly, migration is a complex phenomenon with a variety of economic and social aspects. The effects of various factors on this phenomenon can be identified by extracting data and drawing a regular annual picture of migration trends. For example, an investigation of the migration trends in the past few years indicates that after signing the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) in 2015 and the promising economic development of the country, the number of Iranian international students and graduates declined. Moreover, the return migration of highly- educated Iranians increased significantly during the same period. However, by re-imposition of the economic sanctions against Iran, Iranian's desire to migrate has been raised again. Accordingly, access to accurate migration statistics can help us to discover the main causes and roots of this phenomenon.

Moreover, migration is the result of the interaction between the national and international push-pull factors. Accordingly, the effects of those factors should be considered in migration analysis and management. If the external conditions are not considered, no country can plan for migration. For example, many countries are presenting various highly attractive educational, labor and investment, sport, and artistic incentives to attract the human and financial resources from the other countries as such it is not possible to control this phenomenon only by promoting economic and social facilities or internal conditions. The qualitative and quantitative aspects of migration in a country and the attractiveness and efficiency of the programs and policies adopted to control and manage the migration phenomenon should be assessed and evaluated in comparison to other countries. Consequently, the intense global competition to attract and retain human resources has posed many challenges in terms of international migration management. Accordingly, ignoring the effects of push-pull factors of global migration may offer undesirable consequences and losses for the countries.

According to the aforementioned points, one of the main benefits of migration outlooks is providing accurate statistics and information for migration governance and policy-making. Referring to credible reliable data enriches the policies adopted in the field of migration and makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of these policies in the economic and social sectors both in sending and receiving countries.

Iran Migration Outlook 2021 is an attempt to improve the qualitative and quantitative level of the data presented in the previous outlook. The present outlook, for the first time, has provided the grounds to observe and survey migration trends over the past two consecutive years. Moreover, the results of various qualitative and quantitative surveys and studies have been implemented to analyze the migration trends in Iran and worldwide. For the first time, the trends of retention, migration, and return of the top ranks of the university entrance exam and the student Olympiad medalists have been reported in the present outlook. Moreover, the most critical policies in the fields of international student mobility, labor/economic migration, and forced migration have been discussed briefly.

Bahram Salavati

Director of the Iran Migration Observatory

Sharif Policy Research Institute



## Acknowledgments

Iran Migration Outlook 2021 is the result of the Iran Migration Observatory's endeavor in collaboration with numerous researchers, practitioners, and individuals involved in different migration sectors, whose efforts are appreciated deeply. The compilation and publication of this outlook were undoubtedly impossible without the kind support of the Vice-presidency of Science and Technology and the Center for International Exchanges in Science and Technology. Iran Migration Observatory and the Sharif Policy Research Institute appreciate the material and spiritual support provided by the aforementioned institutions and the efforts of organizations and public/private centers that enriched the present outlook by providing valuable information and data. Accordingly, the statistical assistance by the Iran Knowledge international institute, the National Elite Foundation, the Islamic Azad University, the Research and Planning Institute in the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, and the educational service centers affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Medical Education is appreciated.

Moreover, Iran Migration Observatory appreciates the collaboration of Iran Knowledge Institute, Iran Startup Group, TechRasa group, Iranian students, and all participants in conducting the surveys in order to understanding the roots and different economic and social factors affecting Iranian individuals' decisions and desire to migrate.

The authors of Iran Migration Outlook 2021 hope to provide a clear picture of Iran's status in terms of international migration and the latest trends of international migration in the world

<b>Statistical considerations .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>An overview of Iran Migration Outlook 2021 .....</b>	<b>25</b>
The status of Iran in the key indicators of international migration .....	26
The population of Iranian migrants in the world .....	26
The status of labor and economic migration in Iran and worldwide: .....	16
The status of students' international mobility in the world and Iran.....	18
The general status of permanent residency, migration, and return for Olympiad champions and the top ranks of the Iranian university entrance exam .....	27
The status of forced migration and asylum-seeking in Iran and worldwide .....	21
The status of Iran in terms of return migration (reverse migration) .....	23
The status of Iran in terms of the Global Talent Competitiveness Index (GTCI) .....	23
The status of Iran in terms of the Potential Net Migration Index.....	24
The status of Iran in terms of the Visa-free Score .....	25
Conclusion.....	26
<b>Part 1: A Review of the Trends of International Migrations around the Globe .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Chapter One: The International Mobility of Students around the Globe .....</b>	<b>36</b>
The status of Iran in terms of the key indicators of international migration .....	26
Population of Iranian migrants in the world .....	26
The status of labor and economic migration in Iran and worldwide .....	30
The status of Iran.....	30
The status of students' international mobility in the world and Iran .....	31
The status of Iran (Iranian international students) .....	31
The status of Iran (foreign students in Iran) .....	31
The general status of permanent residency, migration, and return for Olympiad champions and the top ranks of the Iranian university entrance exam.....	32
The status of Iran in the market of students' international mobility (the net index of international students' circulation) .....	33
The population of Iranian students in the top universities of the U.S. and the world.....	36
Distribution of Iranian students around the globe.....	38
The status of forced migration and asylum-seeking in Iran and worldwide .....	40
The global status .....	40
The status of Iran in terms of return migration (reverse migration) .....	43
The status of Iran in terms of the Global Talent Competitiveness Index (GTC) .....	45
The status of Iran in terms of the Potential Net Migration Index.....	46
The status of Iran in terms of the Visa-free Score .....	50
Conclusion .....	51
<b>Part 1: A Review of the Trends of International Migrations around the Globe .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Chapter One: The International Mobility of Students around the Globe .....</b>	<b>61</b>
The International Mobility of Students around the Globe .....	62
The mobility of international students on a global scale .....	64
Leading sending and receiving countries of international students .....	64
Major sending countries of international students .....	65
Major receiving countries of international students.....	65
<b>Chapter 2: migrant workers and economic migration in the world.....</b>	<b>71</b>
a. The population of migrants and labor migrants in the world .....	72
The impact of the COVID19-outbreak on the global labor force .....	78
Three percent reduction of the global economy due to the COVID19- pandemic The coronavirus outbreak.....	79
Major migration trends in Asia .....	80
The reduced flow of labor migrants from Asian countries.....	82
Migrants and remittances.....	83
The reduction of remittances and its impact on the GDP .....	83
Remittance recipients in the Middle East and North Africa .....	86
The policies of countries to reduce the impact of the corona on migrant workers.....	87
The challenges faced by different types of migrant worker .....	88
The policies of countries on labor migrants .....	89
Increasing the ratio of native labor force to migrant workers .....	89
Income support for labor migrants .....	89
Renewing the residency permits of labor migrants 89 Support to labor migrants from their countries of origin .....	89
b. The migration of healthcare workers during the Covid19-pandemic .....	90
Labor force gap in the healthcare sector.....	92
The international mobility of healthcare workers.....	93
The impact of the Covid19-pandemic on the exhaustion and reduction of healthcare workers .....	93
Migration plans and policies regarding to healthcare workers during the Covid19- pandemic.....	93
Adopting the policy of reserved health care workers by sending countries.....	96



Designing quick and flexible ways to recruit healthcare workers by receiving countries.....	96
<b>Chapter 3: Forced Migration.....</b>	<b>99</b>
Designing quick and flexible ways to recruit healthcare workers by receiving countries.....	96
Forced Migration .....	100
Number of refugees worldwide .....	100
Number of asylum-seekers worldwide.....	103
New asylum applicants in 2020.....	104
Number of asylum-seekers worldwide .....	106
Resettlement of refugees.....	106
Naturalization of refugees.....	109
Irregular migrant deaths .....	110
New internally displaced people (IDP).....	111
<b>Chapter 4: Return migration .....</b>	<b>113</b>
Return migration worldwide .....	114
Classifying countries according to the return migration.....	115
China as the most successful country in terms of return migration .....	117
<b>Part 2: A review of the trends of international migration around the globe.....</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>Chapter 5: The status and rank of Iran in terms of the international mobility of students .....</b>	<b>119</b>
The status and rank of Iran in terms of the international mobility of students.....	120
a. The Iranian international students.....	121
The main destinations of Iranian students .....	122
The population of Iranian students in a selected group of countries .....	123
The population of Iranian students in Turkey.....	128
The population of Iranian students in Germany.....	129
The population of Iranian students in Italy.....	131
The population of Iranian students in Canada .....	132
The population of Iranian students in Australia .....	134
The population of Iranian students in Hungary .....	135
The population of Iranian students in India .....	137
The population of Iranian students in France .....	138
The population of Iranian students in Austria .....	140
b. International students in Iran.....	142
Conclusions .....	145
<b>Section two: A review of the status of Iran in terms of international migration.....</b>	<b>147</b>
<b>Chapter 6: The status of Iranian migrants in the main receiving countries .....</b>	<b>147</b>
The status of Iranian migrants in the main receiving countries.....	148
Iranians in North America.....	148
Iranians in the U.S.....	148
Naturalization and resident permits.....	150
Iranians in the U.S. labor market.....	153
Iranians' overstay in the U.S.....	154
Iranians in Canada.....	158
Iranians in Europe .....	161
Iranians in the European Union .....	161
The Schengen visa .....	168
Iranians in the U.K.....	170
Iranians in Germany .....	175
Iranians in Turkey.....	179
Iranians in Australia.....	182
Temporary resident permits in Australia .....	182
Tempotary skilled visas in Australia .....	184
The temporary visa for other forms of employment .....	185
Tested Skilled Migration Australian permanent visas .....	188
The permanent resident visas for innovation in business and investment.....	190
The status of iranian migrants in the migrants' communities of the destination countries.....	190
Conclusion .....	191
<b>Chapter 7: The status of Iran in terms of forced and asylum related migration .....</b>	<b>193</b>
Forced and asylum related migration .....	194
Number of Iranian refugees worldwide .....	195
The total number of Iranian asylum-seekers worldwide .....	195
The registration of new Iranian asylum-seekers .....	196
The registration of new Iranian asylum-seekers in the E.U. and EFTA countries .....	198

Iranian new asylum- seekers in the European countries (by sex).....	199
Iranian new asylum-seekers in the European countries (by age group).....	200
Unaccompanied Iranian asylum-seekers (minors) in the European countries.....	201
The ratio of Iranian asylum-seekers to the total number of asylum- seekers in Europe.....	202
Iranian new asylum- seekers in the OECD countries.....	203
The decisions on Iranians asylum applications in the E.U. and EFTA countries.....	204
Iranian irregular migrants in the E.U. and EFTA countries.....	206
The order to leave the country for the undocumented Iranian migrants in the E.U. and EFTA countries.....	208
The number of undocumented Iranians leaving the E.U. and EFTA countries following the order to leave	208
Iranian refugee returnees.....	210
The resettlement of Iranian migrants across the world.....	210
The naturalization of Iranian refugees in destination countries.....	211
b. Foreign nationals in Iran.....	212
Afghan and Iraqi nationals in the provinces of Iran.....	215
Afghan and Iraqi nationals in rural and urban areas.....	216
The employment status of foreign nationals in Iran.....	219
The temporary work cards for foreign nationals.....	220
Penalty charges against the employers who employ undocumented foreign nationals.....	220
Inspecting workshops and the identified undocumented foreign nationals.....	221
The population of refugees in Iran.....	222
The population of refugees in the Iranian.....	223
The population of asylum-seekers in Iran.....	224
The return of Afghan migrants from Iran.....	225
The return migration of the undocumented Afghan migrants from Iran.....	227
The statistics on the return of Afghan refugees.....	227
The tendency to migrate among the Afghan migrants in Iran.....	228
The tendency to migrate among the Afghan migrants in Iran.....	229
Planning to return among the Afghan migrants.....	231
Planning to migrate to European countries.....	232
The resettlement of Afghan refugees in the world.....	234
The resettlement of Afghan refugees in the third countries.....	235
Conclusion.....	236
<b>Section two: A review of the status of Iran in the global migration.....</b>	<b>239</b>
<b>Chapter 8: The status of Iran in terms of the return migration.....</b>	<b>239</b>
The status of Iran in terms of the return migration.....	240
The achievements of the program of cooperation with the Iranian specialists and scientists.....	240
The highly- educated return migrant's facilities.....	242
The major countries from which Iranian highly- educated migrants have returned.....	243
The distribution of the returned highly- educated Iranians according to the university rankings.....	243
The academic fields of the Iranian highly- educated returnees.....	244
The effects of the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists.....	246
The return migration drivers.....	246
Conclusion.....	248
<b>Section two: A review of the status of Iran in terms of the international migrations.....</b>	<b>251</b>
<b>Chapter 9: Retention, migration and return migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalist in Iran.....</b>	<b>251</b>
Retention, migration and return migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalist in Iran.....	252
The overall status of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and the Olympiad medalists: retention, migration, and return migration.....	253
The age class of the Olympiad medalists and the top ranks of national university entrance exam migrants.....	254
Migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalists.....	257
Migration among the top ranks of national university entrance exam (eligible to the National Elite Foundation) during 2001-2015.....	258
Migration of the top ranks (1-1000) of national university entrance exam during 2001-2015.....	259
The exit status of Olympiad medalists during 2001-2012.....	260
An outlook of the overall retention and migration status of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalists.....	262
<b>Chapter 10: Policy recommendations for Iran.....</b>	<b>263</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>281</b>
<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>293</b>

Table 1- Iran's position in key indicators of international migration .....	26
Table 2- Iranian immigrant population compared to global averages.....	27
Table 3- Iranian migrants stock in the world.....	28
Table 4- Status of Stay, departure and return of the selected entrance exams (2001-2015) and Olympiads.....	33
Table 5- Status of Student migration in Iran based on various Statistical indicators.....	34
Table 6- Number of Iranian Students in top universities in the United States and the world.....	36
Table 7- Iran's rank in the global forced migration in 2020.....	41
Table 8- cumulative frequency of Iranian return specialists and.....	43
Table 9- Ranking of the top ten countries in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index in 2020.....	45
Table 10- Iran's position in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index from 2013 to 2020.....	46
Table 11- Iran ranks in the Potential Net Migration Index.....	49
Table 12- The Global Passport Ranking.....	50
Table 13- Comparison of top 20 host countries of international students in 2017 and 2018.....	67
Table 14- Comparison of top 20 origin countries of international students in 2017 and 2018.....	68
Table 15: Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low- and MiddleIncome Regions.....	84
Table 16: Labour migrants challenges.....	88
Table 17- Overall situation of Iran in student and education migration.....	121
Table 18- Comparison of the number of Iranian students in the United States during the years 1950-2020.....	124
Table 19- Top 20 countries with temporary doctoral visa holders in the United States in 2019.....	127
Table 20- Nonimmigrant Business or Pleasure Overstay Rates of Iranians in US.....	155
Table 21: Nonimmigrant Student and Exchange Visitors Overstay Rates in US (2016-2019).....	156
Table 22: Overstay Rates of Iranians for All Other In-scope Classes of Admission (2016-2019).....	157
Table 23 : Number and rank of Iranian immigrants in the top ten destination .....	191
Table 24- Major countries hosting Iranian refugees in the world .....	195
Table 25- Major countries hosting Iranian asylum seekers in the world .....	195
Table 26- The number of Iranian first time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries.....	198
Table 27- Share of Iranian and selected nationals' asylum applicants in total asylum applicants in the EU 28 & EFTA countries EU28 & EFTA .....	202
Table 28- Major source countries of asylum applicants in the OECD countries (2015-2019).....	203
Table 29- The number of Iranian asylum applicants in the selected OECD countries.....	204
Table 30- First instance decisions on Iranian asylum applications in the EU 28 & EFTA countries.....	205
Table 31- The number of Iranian refugees resettled in the third countries (by destination) (2000-2020.....)	212
Table 32- Major provinces hosting foreign nationals in Iran by nationality- 2016 .....	216
Table 33- The number of asylum seekers in Iran (by nationality) - (2005-2019).....	225
Table 34- Return drivers between Iranian migrants (2014, 2017, 2021) .....	247
Table 35- Status of stay, departure and return of the selected entrance exams (2001-2015) and Olympiads (2001-2012).....	254

## List of charts

Chart 1- Increasing trend of Iranian outbound Students in some selected countries in 2000-2018.....	35
Chart 2- Declining trend of Iranian outbound Students in some selected countries from 2000-2020.....	35
Chart 3- Student-sending countries' ranking based on the number of students in the top 10 US universities....	37
Chart 4- Student-sending countries' ranking based on the share of Students in the top 10 US universities to their outflow Student population.....	38
Chart 5- Comparison of Iran with selected countries in the Mena region in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index in 2020.....	47
Chart 6- Number of international students during the period 2000 to 2018.....	65
chart 7- Comparison of the main host regions of international students in 2000, 2010 and 2018.....	66
chart 8- Comparison of the main origin regions of international students in 2000, 2010 and 2018.....	66
chart 9- Share of major host countries in the international student mobility market in 2018 (percentage).....	67
chart 10- Share of major countries of origin of international students of the international student mobility market in 2018 (percentage).....	68
chart 11- Top ten host countries for international students in 2020.....	69
Chart 12- Top ten origin countries of international students in 2018.....	69
Chart 13- age and sex composition of migrant population vs world population.....	72
Chart 14- Global distribution of international migrant workers by sex, 2019.....	74
Chart 15- Global distribution of international migrant workers by sex, 2019.....	75
Chart 16- Global age composition of international migrant workers, 2019.....	75
Chart 17- Global distribution of international migrant workers by broad category of economic activity, 2019.....	76
Chart 18- International migrant workers by income level of countries, 2019.....	77
Chart 19- Distribution of international migrant workers by broad subregion, 2019.....	77
Chart 20- Decrease in real GDP growth (Annual percent change) in 2020.....	79
Chart 21- Decline in Labour Migration Inflows to Asian Destination Economies,thousands.....	81
Chart 22- Changes in Stock of Foreign Workers,2019-2020.....	81
Chart 23- Changes in outgoing deployment of migrant workers from Asian Economies,2019-2020.....	83
Chart 24- Outward remittance flows from top ten countries and in 2019 and 2020 and its growth rate.....	85
Chart 25- Top ten remittance recipients in 2019 and 2020 and its growth rate.....	85
Chart 26- Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa, (billion \$,2020).....	86
Chart 27- Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa, 2020 (percentage of GDP,2020).....	86
Chart 28- Share of migrant workers in the essential workforce in European countries.....	91
Chart 29- Total number of refugees in the world (2010-2020).....	101
Chart 30- Major countries hosting refugees and Venezuelan displaced person- 2020.....	102
Chart 31- Major source countries of refugees- 2020.....	102
Chart 32- Total number of asylum seekers in the world (2010-2020).....	103
Chart 33- Major countries hosting asylum seekers- 2020.....	103
Chart 34- Major source countries of asylum seekers- 2020.....	104
Chart 35- Major countries for individual registration of new asylum-seekers- 2020.....	105
Chart 36- Major source countries of new asylum applications- 2020.....	105
Chart 37- The number of refugee returnees to the origin countries (2010-2020).....	106
Chart 38- Refugees resettled in the third countries (2016-2020).....	107
Chart 39- Major source countries of refugees resettled in 2020.....	108
Chart 41- Undocumented migrant deaths in the process of migration towards an international destination (2014-2020).....	109
Chart 42- Internally displaced people by conflict and disaster (2011-2020).....	110
Chart 43- Number of international Students in China, Chinese Students abroad and Chinese specialists returning home (2008-2019).....	117
Chart 44- Population (cumulative) of Iranian students abroad from 2000-2018.....	121
Chart 45- Iran global rank in outbound student mobility.....	122
Chart 46- Top ten destinations of Iranian students in 2018.....	122
Chart 47- Top ten destinations of Iranian students based on the latest available data.....	123
Chart 48- Student sending share of selected countries in the US international student market in 2019-2020 (percentage).....	123
Chart 49- Population of Iranian students in the United States in the period 2000-2019.....	124
Chart 50- Rank of Iran sending students to the United States in the period 2011-2019.....	125
Chart 51- Iranian students in the United States by degree (percentage).....	125
Chart 52- Academic profile of Iranian students in different fields in American universities (percentage).....	126
Chart 53- Top Ten Countries Receiving US temporary Doctoral Visa During 2010-2019.....	126
Chart 54- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Turkey in 2018 (percentage).....	128
Chart 55- Number of Iranian students in Turkey during the years 2000-2018.....	128
Chart 56- The top five sending student countries to Turkey in 2018.....	129
Chart 57- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of	


Germany in 2018 (percentage).....	129
Chart 58- Number of Iranian students in Germany from 2013 to 2018.....	130
Chart 59- The top five sending student countries to Germany in 2018.....	130
Chart 60- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Italy in 2018 (percentage).....	131
Chart 61- Number of Iranian students in Italy from 2000 to 2018.....	131
Chart 62- The top five sending student countries to Italy in 2018.....	132
Chart 63- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Canada in 2018 (percentage).....	132
Chart 64- Number of Iranian students in Canada from 2000 to 2018.....	133
Chart 65- The top ten sending student countries to Canada in 2018.....	133
Chart 66- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Australia in 2018 (percentage).....	134
Chart 67- Number of Iranian students in Australia from 2002 to 2018.....	134
Chart 68- The top five sending student countries to Australia in 2018.....	135
Chart 69- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Hungary in 2018 (percentage).....	135
Chart 70- Number of Iranian students in Hungary from 2001 to 2018.....	136
Chart 71- The top five sending student countries to Hungary in 2018.....	136
Chart 72- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of India in 2018 (percentage).....	137
Chart 73- Number of Iranian students in India from 2000 to 2019.....	137
Chart 74- The top ten sending student countries to India in 2018.....	138
Chart 75- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of France in 2018 (percentage).....	138
Chart 76- Number of Iranian students in France from 2000 to 2018.....	139
Chart 77 - The top five sending student countries to France in 2018.....	139
Chart 78- The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Austria in 2018 (percentage).....	140
Chart 79- Number of Iranian students in Austria from 2000 to 2018.....	141
Chart 80- The top ten sending student countries to Austria in 2018.....	141
Chart 81- Number of foreign students in Iran during 2010-2019.....	142
Chart 82- Number of foreign students in Iran by country of origin in 2019 (percentage).....	143
Chart 83- Comparison of the population of foreign students in Iran based on the degree in 2018 and 2019.....	143
Chart 84- Population of foreign students in Iran based on the type of university affiliation in 2019.....	144
Chart 85- Iranian population in USA by country of birth and ancestry (2010-2019).....	149
Chart 86- Iranian population in USA by age categories (2010-2019).....	149
Chart 87- Iranian population in USA by age categories (2010-2019).....	150
Chart 88- Temporary & permanent residence granted and naturalization acquisition by Iranians in USA (2010-2019).....	151
Chart 89- Temporary & permanent residence granted and naturalization acquisition by Iranians in USA (2010-2019).....	152
Chart 90- Iranian (by nationality) nonimmigrant admissions (1-94 only) by selected category of admission (2010-2019).....	152
Chart 91- Iranian occupation in US (16 years and over) 2018 - 2019.....	153
chart 92- Industry employed of Iranian population in US (16 Years and over)-2018 - 2019.....	153
Chart 93- Class of Iranian workers in US-2018 - 2019.....	154
Chart 94- Nonimmigrant Business or Pleasure Overstay Rate of Iranians in US(2016-2019).....	155
Chart 95- Nonimmigrant Student and Exchange Visitors Overstay Rates in US (2016-2019).....	156
Chart 96- Overstay Rate of Iranians for All Other In-scope Classes of Admission (2016-2019).....	157
Chart 97: Overstay rates of Iranians in US by reason (2016-2019).....	158
Chart 98- Iranian population (by place of birth) in Canada (1990- 2020).....	159
Chart 99- Iranian population in Canada by sex (1990-2020).....	159
Chart 100- temporary and permanent residence permits granted for Iranians in Canada (2015-March2021).....	160
Chart 101- the number of granted temporary visas (2015- March 2021).....	160
Chart 102- Iranian population (by country of birth) in Top 5 Iranian destination in Europe (1990-2020).....	161
Chart 103- Iranian population (by citizenship) in Top three Iranian destination in Europe (2009-2020).....	162
Chart 104- Iranian population (by citizenship) by gender in Top three Iranian destination in Europe (2019).....	162
Chart 105- Iranians (by citizenship) with all valid permits in the first 5 European Union countries (2010-2019).....	163
Chart 106- Iranians with all valid permits in European Union (2010-2019).....	164
Chart 107- Iranians with valid permit in 4 first European Union countries of destination by permit reason (2019).....	164
Chart 108- Iranians with valid permit in 4 first European countries of destination by Stay Duration (2019).....	165
Chart 109- Iranian with long term residence permit in European Union 2019.....	165
Chart 110- Iranian with long term residence permit in 4 first European countries of destination (2010-2019).....	166

Chart 111- Iranian with valid work permit in European Union (2011-2019).....	167
Chart 112- Iranian with work valid permit in 4 first European Union countries of destination (2010-2019).....	167
Chart 113- Iranian with work valid permit in 4 first European Union countries of destination by duration of stay.....	168
Chart 114- Application for Schengen visas from Iranians in first 10 countries (2018-2020).....	169
Chart 115- Schengen Visas issued for Iranians in first 10 countries (2018-2020).....	169
Chart 116- Iranian population(by place of birth) in UK (1990-2020).....	170
Chart 117- Citizenship applications from and Citizenship grants for Iranians in UK (2010-2020).....	171
Chart 118- Total entry Visas Issued for Iranians in UK (2010-2020).....	171
Chart 119- Entry clearance visas granted for Iranian by purpose in UK (2010-2021).....	172
Chart 120- Entry clearance Work visas granted for Iranians in UK (2010-2020).....	173
Chart 121- Entry clearance work visas granted for Iranians by main applicants and dependents(2010-2021).....	173
Chart 122- Entry clearance Work visas granted for Iranians in UK by categories (2010-2021).....	174
Chart 123- Grants of settlement for Iranians in UK (2004-2019).....	174
Chart 124- Iranian population (by place of birth) in Germany (1990-2020).....	175
Chart 125- Iranian citizens Naturalized in Germany (2010-2019).....	176
Chart 126- Total immigrants naturalized in Germany (2010-2019).....	177
Chart 127- Iranian with Limited and Unlimited residence permit in Germany (2010-2019).....	178
Chart 128- Iranians Temporary residence permit holders in Germany by types of permit(2010-2019).....	178
Chart 129- Iranian population (by place of birth) in Turkey (1990-2020).....	179
Chart 130- Iranian citizens Immigration to Turkey (2016-2019).....	180
Chart 131- Iranian citizens Emigration from Turkey (2016-2019).....	180
Chart 132- Iranian population(by citizenship) by firSt year of residence in Turkey (2014-2019).....	181
Chart 133- Iranian population( by place of birth)in AuStalia(2010-2020 .....)	182
Chart 134- Iranian Temporary visa holders(2012-2020).....	183
Chart 135- Iranian Temporary visa holders in AuStralia by type of visas (2012- 2020).....	183
Chart 136- Skilled Employment 457,482 Visa Granted for Iranians compared to Total in AuStralia(2010-2019).....	184
Chart 137- Iranian Skilled Employment 457,482 Visa Holders in AuStralia compared to Total (2010-2020).....	185
Chart 138- Iranian Other Employment Visa holders in AuStralia compared to Total (2012-2019).....	185
Chart 139- Temporary skilled Employment and Other Temporary Employment Iranian visa holders in Australia (2012-2020).....	186
Chart 140- Tested Skilled Migration Australian,permanent visas issued for Iranians by categories.....	188
Tested Skilled Migration Australian,permanent visas issued for all immigrants.....	189
Chart 142- AuStralis Business Innovation and InveStment visas Issued for Iranian(2010-2019).....	190
Chart 143- The number of Iranian firSt time asylum applicants and their share in the world.....	197
Chart 144- Top deStination countries of Iranian firSt time asylum applicants.....	197
Chart 145- Top deStination countries of Iranian firSt time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries- 2020.....	199
Chart 146- The number of Iranian firSt time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries- 2020.....	199
Chart 147- The number of Iranian firSt time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries (by age) - 2020.....	200
Chart 148- The number of Iranian unaccompanied minor asylum applicants in the EU & EFTA countries (2011-2020).....	201
Chart 149- Share of Iranian and selected nationals' asylum applicants in total asylum applicants in the EU 28 & EFTA countries.....	202
Chart 150- Total positive decisions on Iranian asylum applications in the EU 28 & EFTA countries (%).....	206
Chart 151- Iranian nationals found to be illegally present in the EU28 & EFTA countries.....	207
Chart 153- Iranian ntionals ordered to leave EU 27 & EFTA countries- (by major countries of destinations).....	208
Chart 154- Iranian nationals returned following an order to leave EU28 & EFTA countries (2011-2020).....	209
Chart 155- Iranian nationals returned following an order to leave EU27 & EFTA countries (by major countries of deStinations).....	209
Chart 156- The number of Iranian refugees returned home (2010-2020).....	210
Chart 157- The number of Iranian refugees resettled in the third countries (2000-2020).....	211
Chart 158- The number of Iranian refugees naturalized in other countries (2000-2020).....	213
Chart 159- The number of foreign nationals in Iran by nationality- 2016.....	214
Chart 160- The number of foreign nationals in Iran (by nationality & sex) - 2016.....	214
Chart 161- The number of foreign nationals in Iran (by nationality & age groups) - 2016.....	215
Chart 162- The number of Afghans living in urban and rural areas in Iran (by province) - 2016.....	217
Chart 163- The number of Iraqis living in urban and rural areas in Iran (by province) - 2016.....	218
Chart 164- Employment and unemployment status of foreign nationals in Iran- 2016.....	219
Chart 165- Afghans' temporary work permits in Iran (issued and extended) - (2012- 2019).....	220
Chart 166- the number of employers fined and the amount received as fine due to the hiring of unauthorized laborforce (million Rials).....	221
Chart 167- The number of unauthorized employed foreign nationals to be identified in Iran (2005- 2019).....	222
Chart 168- The number of Afghan and Iraqi refugees in Iran (1980-2020).....	223
Chart 169- The number of refugees living in the Guest Cities in Iran (by sex) - 2018.....	224
Chart 170- The number of refugees living in the Guest Cities in Iran (by provinces) - 2018.....	224

Chart 171- The number of undocumented Afghan returnees from Iran (2012-2020) .....	228
Chart 172- The number of Afghan refugee returnees from Iran (2012-2020) .....	229
Chart 173- Afghan respondents who would like to go back to Afghanistan (%) .....	230
Chart 174- Afghan respondents who plan to return to Afghanistan (%) .....	231
Chart 175- Afghan respondents planning to migrate to European countries (%) .....	232
Chart 176- Afghan refugee resettlements (submissions and departures) (2003-2020) .....	234
Chart 177- Afghan refugee resettlements in the third countries by the third country (2003-2020) .....	235
Chart 178- Absolute frequency and cumulative frequency of Iranian return specialists and scientists (2015-2021) .....	241
Chart 179- Beneficiaries of the Cooperation Plan with Non-resident Iranian Specialists and Scientists (2015-2021) .....	241
Chart 180- Facilities allocated to Iranian return specialists and scientists .....	242
Chart 181- Different fields of Iranian return specialists and scientists (2015-2021) .....	244
Chart 182- Different fields of study of Iranian return specialists and scientists (2015-2021) .....	244
Chart 183 - Distribution of departure age of people covered by the National Elite Foundation by different educational groups .....	256
Chart 184- Distribution of departure age ranks 1 to 1000 entrance exams by different educational groups .....	256
Figure 185- Distribution of the departure age of the selected Student Olympiads .....	257
Chart 186- departure Status of people covered by the National Elite Foundation by different educational groups during the years 2001 to 2015 .....	258
Chart 187- departure status of the ranks of 1 to 1000 entrance exams by different educational groups in the period 2001-2015 .....	259
chart 188- The share of different educational groups from the departure rate in the ranks of 1 to 1000 in the entrance exams from 2001 to 2015 .....	260
chart 189- Comparison of the departure rates of the top winners of the Olympiad in different educational groups in the period 2001-2012 .....	260
Chart 190- Average annual departure rate of Olympiad winners in all fields from 2001 to 2012 .....	261
Chart 191- The overall situation of departure and retention of ranks 1 to 1000 in all groups of entrance exams from 2001 to 2015 .....	262
Chart 192 - The overall situation of departure and retention of all groups of student olympiads from 2001 to 2012 .....	262

Figure 1- distribution of Iranian immigrants in top 10 destination countries.....	29
Figure 2- DiStribution of the Iranian Student population in the world based on the top ten deStination.....	39
Figure 3- Major countries for individual registration of Iranian new asylum-seekers- 202.....	42
Figure 4-: top 10 deStination country of Iranian specialists returning home.....	44
Figure 5- Global estimates of the stock of international migrants and migrant workers, 2020.....	73
Figure 6- Estimates of the working hours, employment and labour income lost in 2020, and projections for 2021.....	78
Figure 7- Categorization of countries' return migration approaches.....	116
Figure 8- Immigrants with resident title in Germany.....	177
Figure 9- AuStralia permanent migration visa types.....	187
Figure 10- Share of Iranian return specialists and scientists by university ranking.....	243







# Statistical considerations

## Statistical considerations

In general, the nature of international mobility and migration places international migrants' statistics and information among the most expensive and unreachable international data, and researchers in the field face a lot of structural and content issues in this regard. Accordingly, it is quite difficult and complicated to compile such statistics and record changes in the field of international migration. In other words, because of humans' mobility across borders, changes in the places of residence, variations in the reasons of residency (e.g., from educational to labor-related motivations), changes in the residency duration (e.g., from temporary to permanent), changes in citizenship status, and other variations and developments, collecting regular and codified statistics and information is difficult in this field.

Another reason for the swings or complexities of compiling data on international migrations is referring to different sources and considering multiple and diverse indicators in different countries to define different migrant groups. For example, some countries use the country of origin (birthplace) as the criterion to distinguish natives from migrants; however, others rely on ethnic and blood/family origins. Consequently, these fundamental differences can significantly swing migrants' statistics and information in different countries.

Another main consideration is time lag in compiling and publishing the statistics and information about international migrations. It is important to note that unlike other indicators of the global population, little (or no) attention has been paid to developing organized databanks and statistics on international migrations at either national or international levels. Accordingly,

migration statistics are usually extracted as the by-product of the basic statistics compiled by national censuses. However, since migrant communities are not usually well-represented in the reference samples of national censuses, the samples do not present a complete picture of the international migrants' community. Moreover, the difficulty of access to migrants' statistics in national censuses and the considerable time needed to integrate and normalize data obtained from multiple sources typically results in a 1-2-year time lag in the compilation and publication of global migration statistics. As a result, the international migration outlook 2021 include the data and information obtained by the end of 2018 or even before that date.

The above considerations have caused difficulty in accessing international migrants' statistics in Iran and across the globe. The lack of a specialized migration databank in Iran made the present outlook remarkably rely on international statistical sources. Nevertheless, Iran Migration Observatory has spared efforts to implement the limited domestic sources and conduct national surveys to complement a picture created by the international data sources. Some vital technical considerations regarding the manner of reading and interpreting migrants' statistical data presented below.

### **Types of statistical sources used to estimate the number of Iranian migrants worldwide**

- Census data are the main statistical sources in estimating number of migrants worldwide, which indicate the number of migrants in each country in terms of

their country of origin and some other parameters (in some countries), including citizenship status, ethnicity, origin, and the last country of residency. The other demographic and occupational features of migrants can also be extracted from census data depending on the comprehensiveness of a census

- Another important statistical source playing a significant role in understanding migrants' conditions is censuses among the labor force, which can be used and referenced separately for migrant communities depending on their comprehensiveness and optimality. According to the statistics extracted from such schemes, migrants' occupational characteristics are generally referenced in many countries. However, only a few countries compile statistical samples that have been optimized and attested based on migrants' country of origin (in terms of their birthplace or citizenship).
- Other information sources applied in the field include the documented statistics of migration, encompassing statistics on the number of naturalization cases, short-term and long-term residency permits for labor, student, or family reunification migrations, and the number of issued visas. Several factors are used to define short- and long-term permits in different countries. For example, a valid long-term permit in the E.U. only includes permits for more than five years, called a "permanent residency permit" in Canada.
- Furthermore, a prominent consideration is that the recorded statistics and information about individuals with short- or long-term permits for residency are not the same as the statistics obtained from censuses. This is because censuses are usually based on individuals' reported places of residence,

### **\*Types of statistical sources used to estimate the number of Iranian international students**

- The present report used reliable international and national sources and reports to collect the data on international students. The data indicate the total number of students at college or university (either higher education or tertiary education) levels.
  - For example, UNESCO defines tertiary education as educational activities on the particular areas of learning, which aims to teach a higher level of complexity and expertise. It addressed areas typically dealing with the academic education components; however, it may consist of technical and vocational training. Furthermore, the World Bank defines higher education (called "tertiary education" in some countries) as all forms of education coming after high school and includes state/private universities, colleges, institutions for technical training, and schools for vocational training.
- Iran Migration Observatory relied on the following major sources to compile the data on Iranian international students and foreign students studying in Iran:

1. The UNESCO institute for statistics (ISU);
2. The Institute of International Education;
3. The Iranian Institute for Research and

Planning in Higher Education:

4. The Islamic Azad University (Iran); and
5. Iran Migration Observatory's surveys.

## Types of statistical sources used to estimate the number of forced migrants (asylum-seekers) in the world and Iran

- Data related to forced migration and asylum-seeking worldwide can be analyzed under two major headings: asylum-seekers/refugees and internally displaced people (IDP). The present report focuses on migrants who cross their countries' borders and seek asylum in other countries. Moreover, some countries present statistics on irregular migrants, as addressed in this section.
- The data obtained for asylum-seekers and refugees differ depending on destination countries as some countries provide different definitions of asylum-seekers' status at different stages ranging from submitting requests to checking them and reporting the results. In general, migrants having already submitted their asylum applications are considered asylum-seekers, while migrants with approved applications are introduced as refugees.
- The data on asylum-seekers and refugees are mainly collected by international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Although the destination countries assist in collecting the data and registering asylum-seekers, the statistics are presented by state institutions in some countries.
- The Eurostat and OECD stats databases were applied to detect the number of Iranian asylum-seekers in other countries.

which are different from the recorded statistics on the number of issued short- and long-term permits.

Since the data on the U.K. was not available in Eurostat due to BREXIT, they were extracted from the country's state and official sources. Consequently, in the statistics on Eurostat, EU28 describes a situation where the data refers to the U.K. On the other hand, EU27 indicates that the U.K. statistics have been left out. In this regard, EFTA refers to Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.

-The statistics obtained from the Iranian Population and Housing Census formed the primary basis for collecting data on the presence of foreign nationals in the country. In this case, the census data in Iran are collected as a self-report and encompasses all migrants residing in the country, including refugees, regular migrants (i.e., passport holders with valid Iranian visas), and irregular migrants (undocumented migrants or those with invalid and expired visas or resident permits). However, the Iranian censuses have failed to provide a full picture of foreign nationals - particularly undocumented migrants - across the country. Since the data related to refugees are not available separately for each province of Iran, census data were regarded as the primary source of investigation (General data on the status of refugees in Iran and guest cities are available in the UNHCR's reports). Further, the UNHCR's statistics on refugees in Iran have been included in census statistics. Accordingly, the statistics of foreign nationals presented in the census data also include refugees. The reports issued by the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare on the employment

status of foreign nationals in Iran were applied to analyze their socio-economic indicators. Considering the returned Afghan migrants and refugees repatriated to their country from Iran, the IOM reports and data collected since the 2010s were implemented.

-Another part of the data on forced migration and asylum-seeking was obtained from two surveys conducted among Afghan migrants in 2017 and 2019, some findings of which are presented in the present report. The former was a joint project between the Department of Human Geography of the Shahid Beheshti University (Iran) and the University of Turku (Finland), and the latter was the result of joint project of Sharif Policy Research Institute (Iran Migration Observatory) and the Department of Geography at the University of Turku.

### **Types of statistical sources used to estimate the number of return migration of highly-educated specialists in the world and Iran**

-The issue of return migration has recently attracted much attention in the international migration fields; however, there is no comprehensive and credible statistics at both global and national levels. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to estimate the return migration of highly-educated specialists to China (as the most successful instance in the world) and Iran.

-All statistics on returned highly-educated migrants are obtained for students

and graduates who returned to their homelands following their education or employment in a foreign country.

-The data on the returned Chinese students and graduates were collected using Chinese sources and reports presented by the Chinese Ministry of Science.

-The data on Iranian returned students and graduates were collected using the data obtained from the Vice-presidency for Science and Technology and the International Institute for Future Knowledge Development of Iranians (Iran Knowledge Institute). Moreover, some data were also collected for the Iranian migrants returned to the country via the Program of Cooperation with Non-resident Iranian Specialists and Scientists.

-The data was partly collected from two surveys conducted to investigate Iranian migrants in 2014 and 2017, some sections of which are presented in the present report. The former was conducted by Iranian students and researchers in foreign universities; the latter was a joint project by the Sharif Policy Research Institute (SPRI) of Sharif University of Technology (SUT) and the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

-Moreover, some data on returned migrants were obtained from two surveys on Iranian students and graduates in the country during 2018-2020. Some sections of which are presented in this study. Both surveys were conducted by Iran Migration Observatory.

## Primary National and international sources applied in Iran Migration Outlook 2021

Statistical Center of Iran

International Affairs & Technological Exchange Center  
(Iranian Vice-presidency for Science and Technology)

Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education  
(Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology)

Center of Strategic Statistics and Information  
(Ministry of Cooperation, Labor, and Social Welfare)

Iran Knowledge Institute

The Office of Vice-chancellor for International Students and Non-Iranian Students

National

International Organization for Migration -IOM

World Bank

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD.Stat

UNESCO Institute for Statistics

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - UNHCR Data Finder

United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs - UN DESA

International Labor Organization

Eurostat

Asian Development Bank

National Science Foundation

Institute of International Education

Home Office-UK

Australian Trade and Investment Commission

Homeland Security Department

United States Census Bureau

China's Ministry of Education

Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada

DESTATIS

BAMF

Australian Bureau of Statistics

Australian Government Department of Home Affairs

Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre –IDMC

International

(National Science Foundation)	International
(Institute of International Education)	
(Home Office-UK)	
(The Australian Trade and Investment Commission)	
(Homeland Security Department)	
(United States Census Bureau)	
(China's Ministry of Education)	
(Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada)	
(DESTATIS)	
(BAMF)	
(Australian Bureau of Statistics)	
(Australian Government Department of Home Affairs)	
Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development	
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre –IDMC)	







**An overview  
of Iran Migration Outlook  
2021**

## The status of Iran in the key indicators of international migration

The table below shows Iran's ranking and position in the world based on key indicators of international migration.

Table 1 - Iran's rank in the key indicators of international migration

	Rank (Among other countries)	Source
Iran's rank in migrant stock in the world (2020)	54 (of 232)	(UNDESA, 2020)
Iran's rank in hosting international migrants (2020)	23 (of 232)	(UNDESA, 2021)
Iran's rank in inbound international students (2018)	19 (of 241)	(UIS, 2021)
Student Receiving Index (2015-2017)	31 (of 241)	(UIS, 2021)
Potential Net Migration Index (2015-2017)	87 (of 150)	(GALLUP WORLD POLL, 2015-2017)
Potential Net Brain Gain Index (2015-2017)	78 (of 150)	(GALLUP WORLD POLL, 2015-2017)
Potential Net Youth Migration Index (2015-2017)	77 (of 150)	(GALLUP WORLD POLL, 2015-2017)
Global Talent Competitiveness Index (2020)	102 (of 132)	(GTCI, 2020)
Iranian asylum seeker stock in the world (2020)	14 (of 195)	(UNHCR Data Finder, 2021)
Iranian refugee stock in the world (2020)	22 (of 194)	(UNHCR Data Finder, 2021)
Iran's rank in hosting international refugees (2020)	10 (of 169)	(UNHCR Data Finder, 2021)
Iran's rank in the Henley passport index (2020)	183 (of 199)	(Henleyglobal, 2021)

## Population of Iranian migrants in the world

- According to the latest available data (2021), the population of global migrants was 281 million persons in 2020 accounting for 3.6% of the world population.
- According to the latest data (2020), 1.8

million Iranians (2.23% of the country's population) live abroad. Although, the number of Iranian migrants is estimated to be 4.04 million by national statistics (the High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad), the

The number of foreign students in Iran is based on the statistics received from the the Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education and the Islamic Azad University in 1400. Iran's student enrollment rank is also obtained by comparing this number with the number of foreign students in other countries, which can be seen in the UNESCO database.

international sources do not confirm it.

- The number of Iranian migrants was 820,000 persons in 1990, and, it reached 1.8 million in 2020. The population of Iranian migrants in abroad has increased by 2.2 times over the past 30 years.
- Although about 1.07% of the world population are Iranians, the ratio of its migrants of the global migration increased from 0.54% in 1990 to 0.70% in 2020 (still below the ratio of Iranians to the world population). Considering the index of "the ratio of Iranians to the world population," the ratio of Iranian migrants to global migrants has always been below 1% over the past 30 years.
- The number of global migrants differs in terms of country of birth and citizenship. According to the U.N. statistics, four E.U. countries (namely Germany, Sweden, the

Netherlands, and France) are now the major hosts of the migrants born in Iran. According to these statistics, Germany ranked first by hosting 152,590 migrants born in Iran in 2020, with Sweden, the Netherlands, and France being ranked next by hosting 79,363, 34,809, and 26,069 Iranian migrants, respectively.

- In 2020, Germany, France, and Italy were the European countries receiving a majority of visa applications from Iranian migrants and issuing the highest number of Schengen visas for them.
- The U.K. with about 83,531 Iranian residents is the second non-European destination for Iranian migrants.
- Australia is a major destination for Iranian migrants in all categories (including labor migration), and the total number of Iranians residing in Australia has revealed an increasing trend over the past few years.

Table 2: Iranian immigrant population compared to global averages

Iranian migrants stock in the world	International sources						Domestic sources
	1990	2000	2010	2017	2019	2020	2020
Iranian migrant stock in the world (million)	0.82	1.15	1.49	1.8	1.9	1.87	4.04
Population of Iran (million)	56.4	65.6	73.8	80.7	82.9	83.99	83.99
Share of Iranian migrants abroad in total population of Iran (%)	1.45	1.75	2.02	2.23	2.29	2.23	4.81
Population of international migrants (million)	152.5	173.3	220.8	257.7	271.6	280.6	280.6
World population(million)	5327.2	6141.5	6956.8	7546.9	7713.5	7794.80	-
Share of international migrants in total population of the world (%)	2.86	2.83	31.74	3.41	3.52	3.60	-
Share of Iran population in total population in the world (%)	1.06	1.07	1.06	1.07	1.07	1.07	-
Share of Iranian migrants abroad in total international migrants (%)	0.54	0.66	0.67	0.70	0.70	0.70	44/1

Table 3 has been designed by calculating the number of Iranian migrants according to international and national statistical sources. Since the data presented by the High council of Iranian Affairs Abroad were not compatible with international data, the two sources were presented distinctly for comparison.

The statistics by the World Bank and the E.U. were combined, and the World Bank's data were used in cases where no E.U. data were available. Combining the international data sources indicated that the number of Iranian migrants was 1,869,000 persons worldwide.

The status of labor and economic migration in Iran and worldwide:

Table 3: Iranian migrants stock in the world

Iranian migrant stock in the world					
International sources (UNDESA , World Bank)			Domestic sources		
1	The United Arab Emirates *	454,000	1	The United States	1,500,000
2	The United States	387,246	2	Canada	400,000
3	Canada	166,294	3	The United Kingdom	400,000
4	Germany	152,590	4	The United Arab Emirates	357,000
5	Turkey	84,270	5	Germany	319,000
6	The United Kingdom	83,531	6	Turkey	126,640
7	Sweden	79,363	7	Australia	120,000
8	Australia	74,322	8	Sweden	116,640
9	Israel	50,808	9	Iraq	110,920
10	Kuwait *	46,419	10	France	90,000
11	The Netherlands	34,809	11	The Netherlands	52,000
12	Qatar *	30,000	12	Austria	40,000
13	France	26,069	13	Kuwait	380,000
14	Austria	24,092	14	Malaysia	30,000
15	Italy	18,529	15	Denmark	28,700
16	Norway	18,379	16	Belgium	20,000
17	Denmark	17,125	17	Norway	20,000
18	Iraq	14,540	18	Qatar	20,000
19	Switzerland	13,094	19	Switzerland	20,000
20	Belgium	11,918	20	Georgia	16,500
-	Other countries	81,823	-	Other countries	211,728
Iranian immigrant Stock		1,869,221	Iranian immigrant Stock		4,037,258

Source: (UNDESA, 2020) (World Bank, 2017) (Supreme Council of Iranians- 1399)

\* Starred data is extracted from a World Bank source.




Figure 1- distribution of Iranian immigrants in top 10 destination countries

## The status of labor and economic migration in Iran and worldwide:

### The global status:

- According to the data presented by ILO, the number of labor migrants in 2019 was estimated to be 169 million, of which 41.5% were women and 58.5% were men.
- In labor markets, the ratio of migrant workers to individuals native to a particular country is higher. Accordingly, migrants' share of labor markets was 69%, 70% and 72.5% respectively in 2019, 2017, and 2013.
- The percentages of international labor migrants employed in the service, industry, and agriculture sectors are 66.2, 26.7%, and 7.1%, respectively.
- Three major regions, including the north, south, and west of Europe, North America, and Arab countries, are the primary receiving countries for labor migrants, of whom 60.6% are employed.
- High-income countries host 67.4% of labor migrants.
- Global markets, particularly the market of labor migrants, have dramatically been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
- According to ILO, 255 million full-time jobs were estimated to be lost in 2020 including reduced work hours.
- In 2020, labor migrants' income shrank by 4.4% of the global GDP in 2019.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the actual growth rate of the global GDP in 2020 to be -3.3%.
- The number of new labor migrants significantly decreased in many Asian countries due to the Coronavirus outbreak and measures adopted against the pandemic.
- Migrants' remittances decreased by 2.4% in 2020 compared to 2019.
- The policies on labor force migration were

affected in many sending and receiving countries during the pandemic. In this regard, some policy reactions of the receiving countries to their migrant labor force were increasing the ratio of native workers to migrant workers in Arab countries, providing financial support for labor migrants in New Zealand and Thailand, and renewing the residency permits of labor migrants in Russia and Japan. Moreover, supporting labor migrants' families can be considered as an instance of responses adopted by the countries of origin to support their international workforce. In this regard, the Philippines was among the countries formulating it.

- A part of labor migrants employed in critical positions with a prominent role in the fight against the pandemic (e.g., healthcare workers) gained prime importance in host countries.
- Host countries adopted flexible plans and policies to maintain and recruit healthcare workers.

### The status of Iran

- Economic and labor migrations are major migration types and channels for Iranians. Surveys by Iran Migration Observatory (IMO) indicate that significant number of Iranian international students and asylum-seekers migrated due to economic reasons or incentives.
- The data extracted from the surveys by IMO indicate that migration tendency has increased among professional groups and start-up activists over the past few years, and the economic conditions of the recent years have also intensified their desire to migrate.
- Information on the temporary or permanent visas obtained by Iranians in destination countries shows the priority of educational, family reunification, and humanitarian visas in ranking over employment-based visas

in the U.S., Canada, the E.U., and Australia. This discrepancy between the reasons and motivations of migrations and channels to actualize it indicates Iranians' limitation of migration channels.

## The status of students' international mobility in the world and Iran

### The global status

- The total number of global students in higher education was 227 million persons in 2018, with international students only forming 2.4% of this population.
- Global data indicate that the number of international students increased from 2 million persons in 2000 to 5.5 million in 2018.
- The number of international students increased by 67% from 2008 to 2018. The population of international students is predicted to be doubled by 2030 and reach 10.2 million persons if the same annual growth rate (5.1%) is constant (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2021).
- Over the past few years, the Coronavirus outbreak was a global shock and slowed students' international mobility. Accordingly, the rate of international students' registration decreased, and universities heavily relying on their international students suffered significant financial losses.
- North America and Western Europe have historically been popular destinations for international students as 51% of international students selected these regions as their destination countries in 2018.
- Students' international mobility trend over the past 10-15 years indicates that Western countries are no longer the sole popular destination for international students. Factors such as nationalist movements, stricter anti-immigration laws in destination countries, the increased significance of cultural and geographical proximities,

and importance of economic costs for international students have led to the emergence of new educational destinations in Asia, (such as China).

-The U.S., the U.K., Canada, China, and Australia were ranked as the five top destinations for international students in 2020.

-Since the countries with the highest population of migrant students are in Asia (i.e., China and India), 27% of the total population of international students (around 1.5 million) originated from Asia and Oceania.

-China, India, Germany, Vietnam, and South Korea were ranked as the five top sending countries for international students in 2018.

### The status of Iran (Iranian international students)

- The number of Iranian international students along with the total number of Iranian students and the population of international students has gradually increased from 19,000 students in 2003 to 56,000 students in 2018.
- The growth rate of Iranian migrant students has been slower than that of international students. Accordingly, the ratio of Iranian migrant students to total international students decreased from about 1.3% in 2012 to about 1% in 2018.
- The ratio of Iranian migrant students to the total population of Iranian students in domestic universities did not significantly change from 2000 to 2018 (despite the significant increase in the total population of Iranian students) and increased from about 1% in 2000 to about 1.5% in 2018.
- Regarding the number of international students, the global rank of Iran jumped from 29 in 2003 to 11 in 2012, which is the most significant leap regarding the status of Iran in terms of sending international students over the past two decades.



- During 2012-2018, the population of migrant Iranian students was fixed to be 50,000 students. Due to such small changes, Iran was ranked 19 regarding the number of migrant students.
- Factors such as the Rials devaluation in compare to USD and the consequent increase in the costs of educational migration, limitations in the issuance of visas by the U.S. government for Iranian students, and the COVID-19 pandemic had fixed the number of Iranian international students over the past few years. It should be noted that the aforementioned factors increased the number of Iranian students in countries with more lenient visa regulations such as Turkey, Germany, Canada, and Italy.
- The U.S., Turkey, Germany, Italy, and Canada were the five top destinations for Iranian students.
- The number of Iranian students in the U.S. was 11,451 in 2019, was accounting for 1% of the total international student in the US.
- Most Iranian students (around 75%) in U.S. universities study in post-graduate (master's and Ph.D.) programs and more than half of these students' study engineering.

### **The general status of permanent residency, migration, and return for Olympiad champions and the top ranks of the Iranian university entrance exam**

Analyzing the data obtained from the Iranian Department of Immigration and Passports indicates that 56.6% of the medalists in student Olympiads, 69.1% of Iran's National Elites Foundation members, and 78.3% of those with top ranks (1-1000) of the national university entrance exam were residing in Iran between 2001- 2020.

Among the investigated groups, the Olympiad medalists formed the largest

population of migrants (37.2%), while Iran's National Elites Foundation members and the top ranks of the national university entrance exam ranked next by 25.5% and 15.4%, respectively.

Moreover, 4.4% of the Olympiad medalists, 3.7% of Iran's National Elites Foundation members, and 2.6% of the top ranks of the national university entrance exam have returned to Iran.

### **The status of Iran (foreign students in Iran)**

- Although the population of international students has increased in Iran over the past decade, the current population of foreign students in the country and the registration of 75,000 foreign students do not meet the goals of the Sixth Iranian Development Plan.
- The number of foreign students increased by eight times during 2011-2021, with an increase from 5,485 students in 2011 to 44,350 in 2021.
- The ratio of foreign students to the total population of students in Iran increased from 0.15% in 2011 to 1.39% in 2021.
- Afghan and Iraqi students comprised the largest populations of foreign students in Iran by 46% and 24%, respectively. Students from these two countries accounted for 69% of the total population of international students in Iran in 2019. Moreover, Lebanon (3%), Syria, and China (2%) ranked next.
- The majority of foreign students in Iranian universities studied in bachelor's and master's programs. In 2019, 55% and 31% of these individuals studied in bachelor's and master's degrees, respectively.
- The international students in Iran registered at the Islamic Azad University (43%), the universities of the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology (31%), private higher education institutions (9%), and the universities of the Ministry of Health and Higher Education (8%).

Table 4: Status of stay, departure and return of the selected entrance exams (2001-2015) and Olympiads

	Student Olympiads		Top ranks in the national entrance exam			
			Members of the National Elite Foundation (Rankings 1 to 150 for the entrance exam)		Ranks from 1 to 1000	
Total number of samples	2,765	%100	5,666	%100	53,926	%100
Number of people living inside	1,564	56.6 %	3,913	69.1 %	42,243	78.3 %
Number of people with an exit history	1,080	39.1 %	1,536	27.1 %	8,984	16.7 %
Number of people living abroad	1,029	37.2 %	1,443	25.5 %	8,309	15.4 %
Number of returned migrants	122	4.4 %	208	3.7 %	1,417	%2.6
Number of people with unknown residence status	172	%6.2	310	5.5 %	3,374	%6.3

Source: Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020

### The status of Iran in the market of students' international mobility (the net index of international students' circulation)

According to the latest authentic data vs. international data, the status of Iranian migrant students is illustrated in the table below regarding different indicators.

The return migration of highly-educated Iranians considerably increased from 2015 to 2021. According to the data obtained from

the Iranian Vice-presidency for Science and Technology, the number of highly-educated Iranian returnees from 2016 to spring 2021 was 1,989 people, indicating a significant number over the past few years (despite the economic difficulties during the same period).

The increased number of international students in Iran and the number of highly-educated returned Iranians improved the net index of brain circulation in Iran from 0.39- in 2010 to 0.24- in 2018.



Table 5: Status of student migration in Iran based on various statistical indicators

Year	Number of Iranian students abroad (thousand)	Return of Iranian specialists abroad to the country <sup>1</sup>	Number of international students in Iran (thousand)	Net brain circulation Index <sup>2</sup>	Number of international students in the world (thousand)	Rank of Iranian sending students in the world
2003	19.3	...	...	...	2,653	29
2004	20.9	...	...	...	2,696	28
2005	23.4	...	...	...	2,824	26
2006	25.1	...	...	...	2,910	22
2007	29.5	...	...	...	3,097	20
2008	33.2	...	...	...	3,323	18
2009	39.7	...	...	...	3,539	15
2010	44.5	...	5.5	0.39-	3,777	13
2011	50.4	...	8.9	0.4-	3,989	12
2012	54.6	...	12.9	41/0-	4,060	11
2013	49.5	...	16.6	0.32-	4,231	14
2014	50.8	...	22.6	0.28-	4,495	15
2015	51.1	113	23.7	0.27-	4,786	16
2016	52.8	376	25.7	0.26	5,092	17
2017	53.2	806	26.9	0.25-	5,309	20
2018	56.4	1,097	30.9	0.24-	5,571	19
2019	...	1,560	...	...	...	...
2020	...	1,942	...	...	...	...
2021	...	1,988 <sup>3</sup>	...	...	...	...

Source: (UIS, 2021) (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021) (Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education, 2021) (Islamic Azad University, 2021)

1.Refers to the return of Iranian specialists and graduates abroad.

2. This index is obtained from the difference between the departure of Iranian students and the total enrollment of international students and the return of Iranian specialists abroad in a population of 100,000. It should be noted that this index ignores the quality level of incoming, outgoing and returning students.

3.The data of returnees in 2021 is based on the latest available data of the Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology until April 2021.

### Increasing trend of Iranian outbound students in some selected countries




Chart 1: Increasing trend of Iranian outbound students in some selected countries in 2000-2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

### Declining trend of Iranian outbound Students in some selected countries




Chart 2: Declining trend of Iranian outbound students in some selected countries from 2000-2020  
Source: (UIS, 2021) (Austrade, 2021) (open doors, 2021)

## The population of Iranian students in the top universities of the U.S. and the world

The quality of Iranian international students and specialists is a topic, which constantly explored in discussions as to international migrations in Iran and some experts have criticized the quantitative views towards this. According to the international migration data, an index to assess the quality of migrant Iranian students according to the international migration data is the ratio of Iranian students to the total number of students in the top universities of the world. Accordingly, the number and the ratio of Iranian students in the 10 top universities of the U.S., which

are among the top 20 universities of the world (based on QS 2020 ranking); can somehow elucidate the qualitative status of Iranian students abroad. The following table illustrates the distribution of Iranian students in the top universities of the U.S., which are among the 20 top universities in the world. The number of Iranian students at the 10 top universities of the U.S. increased slightly from 201 students in 2013 to 240 students in 2015. However, the number decreased slightly from 2015 (240 students) to 2018 (229 students).

Table 6: Number of Iranian students in top universities in the United States and the world

University	USA Rating	World Rating	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Massachusetts	1	1	37	38	37	38	33	33
Stanford	2	2	64	63	63	58	53	53
Harvard	3	3	16	21	24	23	26	28
California	4	5	7	13	15	12	11	12
Chicago	5	10	12	16	19	17	15	17
Princeton	6	13	17	19	20	24	20	21
Kernel	7	14	20	24	27	23	22	23
Pennsylvania	8	15	23	25	28	28	27	28
Yale	9	17	5	6	7	13	14	14
Columbia	10	18	23	26	27	29	26	27
Total			201	225	240	236	221	229

Source: (College Factual, 2020)

The following Figures illustrate the population of Iranian students in the U.S. top universities compared to students from a selected group of countries. Regarding “the number of students at the 10 top universities of the U.S.”, Iran ranked as the 10th country in sending students to the U.S.; China, India, and South Korea rank first to third. Moreover, considering “the ratio of the students in the U.S. 10 top universities to the total population of international students”, below 0.5% of migrant Iranian students are studying in the top universities of the U.S. and the world (making Iran the 10th country in the world in terms of sending international students).

The ratio of the Iranian students in the top universities of the world to the total population of migrant students was almost constant from 2014 to 2018 and decreased from about 0.5% in 2014 to about 0.45% in 2018. However, the same index increased slightly in China with its considerable number of migrant students (above 900,000 students) and increased from 1.6% in 2014 to 1.66% in 2018. The analysis of the index showed that South Korea, the U.K., and Australia have the largest populations of international students in the concerned U.S. universities.




Chart 3: Student-sending countries' ranking based on the number of students in the top 10 US universities  
Source: (College Factual, 2020)




Chart 4: student-sending countries' ranking based on the share of students in the top 10 US universities to their outflow student population

Source: (College Factual, 2020)

## Distribution of Iranian students around the globe

The following map illustrates the distribution of Iranian students in different countries (10 top destination countries). As it can be noticed, North America, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Oceania are the main destinations of Iranian international students. The U.S. has always been the first choice for Iranian migrant students. More students were expected to register in U.S. universities during the Biden administration because of the removal of limitations

enacted by President Trump. Germany, Turkey, and Canada rank next as the migrant Iranian students' favorite destination countries. Limitations in the issuance of U.S. visas for Iranian students over the past few years, more accessible visa procedures in other destinations, and lower costs of study in countries such as Turkey, Germany, Italy, and Canada are some of the motives for Iranian students to study in non-American universities.




Figure 2: Distribution of the Iranian student population in the world based on the top ten destination in the world based on the top ten destination  
Source: (UIS, 2021) (open doors, 2021)



## The status of forced migration and asylum-seeking in Iran and worldwide

### The global status

- Forced migration/asylum-seeking changed remarkably in 2020. Most displaced individuals were trapped within their national borders due to travel restrictions and border control measures. Accordingly, the number of internally displaced people (IDP) increased considerably in 2020.
- Number of newly-registered asylum seekers in 2020 reduced by half compared to 2019. One-fourth of the newly-registered asylum applicants worldwide were from Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Syria. Moreover, the number of Iranian newly-registered asylum applicants reduced by half in 2020. The fewer number of travel restrictions in the coming year would increase the number of new asylum applicants around the globe.
- The largest populations of global refugees were from Syria (6,690,000 people), Venezuela (4,027,000 people), and Afghanistan (2,595,000 people) by the end of 2020. During the same period, 134,767 Iranian refugees were living in other countries, making Iran the 22nd country in the world in terms of number of refugees (UNHCR Data Finder).
- By the end of 2020, Turkey (3,652,000 persons), Colombia (1,731,000 persons), and Pakistan (1,439,000 persons) were the major hosts of refugees. Iran ranked 10th in the world by hosting above 800,000 refugees (UNHCR Data Finder). The rank of Iran retreated from 6th in 2019 to 10th due to the decreased number of refugees in the country. This reduction was mainly caused by the updated data presented by the Iranian government. Some asylum-seekers have managed to change their refugee status and receive passports over the past few years.

- The largest populations of the world asylum seekers were from Venezuela (851,119 people), Iraq (240,695 people), and Afghanistan (238,791 people) by the end of 2020. Iran with 77,217 asylum seekers ranked 14th in the world (UNHCR Data Finder).
- Due to the security crisis in Afghanistan and the Taliban's control over the country in the first half of 2021, the number of internally displaced people or migrants to neighboring countries (including Iran) or European countries would increase.

### The status of Iran

- In 2020, 15,333 new Iranian asylum seekers were registered in other countries.
- In 2020, 861 Iranian refugees were naturalized in other countries. Moreover, 394 Iranian refugees were resettled in the third countries.
- The rate of positive decisions on Iranians' asylum applicants (First instance decisions) in European countries decreased to the lowest rate of the last six years in 2020. Most asylum applicants whose applications were rejected either continue to live illegally and secretly in destination countries or leave them to other destinations. Accordingly, conducting more studies on the fate of irregular Iranian migrants is essential.
- The number of refugees in Iran decreased from around 200,000 people in 2020 to 800,000 people in 2019. Noteworthy, the number of refugees in Iran has not been updated in the UNHCR database over the last five years. The reduced number of refugees residing in Iran reduced the country's rank in terms of hosting international refugees by 10. Hosting refugees by Iran has always been noted and commended by the

global community over the past 4 decades. However, the number of refugees in Iran has decreased due to changing some refugees' status (e.g., refugee students in higher education) to passport holders.

There are many irregular migrants in Iran, mostly originating from Afghanistan. UNHCR estimates there are more than two million irregular Afghan migrants in Iran.

Table7: Iran's rank in the global forced migration in 2020

	The world	Iran	Iran ranking
The number of asylum seekers	4,138,889	77,217	14
The number of refugees	20,650,304	134,767	22
The number of refugees in Iran	-	800,000	10

Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)






Figure 3 Major countries for individual registration of Iranian new asylum-seekers- 2020  
Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)


## The status of Iran in terms of return migration (reverse migration)

- Since the return migration of highly-educated Iranians had not been formally surveyed before 2015, no accurate and comprehensive data are available. Nevertheless, different opinions have been put forward in this regard\* .
- Over the last decade, the significance of the return migration of highly-educated Iranians was highlighted, and the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists was formally implemented by the Iranian Vice-presidency for Science and Technology and the Center of International Science and Technology Interactions in 2015 to facilitate their return.
- The program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists

made some specialists return and maintain communications with migrant Iranians. The migration of highly-educated Iranians increased sharply from the early days of the program to 2016; however, the increase has been slightly slowed down since then. Accordingly, 1,989 highly-educated Iranian migrants returned to their country by April 2021, who encompassed 330 females. Moreover, the program-maintained communications with 864 highly-educated Iranian migrants.

- The highly-educated Iranians mainly returned from North America and Western Europe, and they mostly majored in engineering fields, particularly in electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering.

Table 8: cumulative frequency of Iranian return specialists and scientists (by gender, facilities allocated, university ranking)



Source: (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021) (Iran Knowledge, 2021)

\* For example, the head of the Center for the Faculty Recruitment of the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology said that 2214 graduates of foreign universities were employed in Iranian universities from April 2004 to April 2021.




Figure 4: top 10 destination country of Iranian specialists returning home  
Source: (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021)

## The status of Iran in terms of the Global Talent Competitiveness Index (GTCI)

The Global Talent Competitiveness Index (GTCI) was introduced in 2013 to compare the competition potentials of countries in terms of talents. Talent competitiveness refers to a set of policies and procedures making a country to develop, recruit, and strengthen the human capital resulting in productivity. The index provides decision-makers and politicians with valuable information and analyses to develop strategies on brain gain, remove the related challenges, and attain competitive advantages in the global market. The report is issued annually by the European Institution of Business Management. The GTCI is an input-output model presenting a hybrid analysis of the

measures each country adopt for its talents (input) and their consequence (output). The input consists of four components: empowerment, recruitment, growth, and maintenance, while the output consists of technical-vocational skills and global knowledge (GTCI, 2020).

According to the results of the GTCI report (2020), more developed and high-income countries have the highest score, and a significant correlation exists between GDP per capita and the GTCI scores. Moreover, European countries still occupy the top ranks because seventeen European countries are among the top 25 countries. Accordingly,

Table 9: Ranking of the top ten countries in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index in 2020

Rank	Country	Score
1	Swiss	26/81
2	USA	09/79
3	Singapore	48/78
4	Sweden	82/75
5	Denmark	18/75
6	The Netherlands	99/74
7	Finland	47/74
8	Luxembourg	94/73
9	Norway	91/72
10	Australia	53/72

Source: (GTCI, 2020)

Switzerland was ranked first, similar to the past few years, followed by the U.S. and Singapore. Moreover, the non-European countries among the top 25 ranks included Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and the UAE. The following table illustrates the 10 top countries by the GTCI 2020 scores.

The results of GTCI 2020 indicated that Iran scored 32.68 and ranked 102 (among 132 countries). More countries have been added to this ranking since 2013 resulting in an improved score for Iran from 2013 to 2020. The following table indicates the status of Iran in terms of GTCI and its sub-indicators during 2013-2020.

Table 10 - Iran's position in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index from 2013 to 2020

Year	Score	Rank	Input				Output	
			Enable	Attract	Grow	Retain	Vocational and technical skills	Global knowledge skills
2013	98.28	(103) 101	101	101	96	81	94	90
2014	32.09	(93) 82	84	91	86	55	86	71
16-2015	36.34	(109) 98	101	108	73	76	96	86
2017	33.54	(118) 103	107	18	93	83	87	77
2018	32.57	(119) 94	107	118	95	79	78	55
2019	31.59	(125) 97	107	123	94	72	78	63
2020	32.68	(132) 102	114	131	101	82	89	65

Source: (GTCI, 2020)

From a regional perspective, Iran ranked seventh among the 10 top countries of Central and Southern Asian countries. Kazakhstan (54), India (54), Sri Lanka (83), Tajikistan (84), Kirgizstan (91), and Bhutan (92) ranked higher than Iran, while Pakistan (106), Nepal (121), and Bangladesh (124) were placed in lower ranks. Moreover, the

comparison of Iran with some countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) reveals the inappropriate status of the country. The following Figure illustrates the overall status of Iran in comparison to some MENA countries regarding the general index and its sub-indicators.




Chart 5 - Comparison of Iran with selected countries in the MENA region in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index in 2020

Source: (GTCL, 2020)

## The status of Iran in terms of the Potential Net Migration Index

- Gallup has regularly conducted surveys to assess the potentials for migration and population variations in 160 countries since 2005. The most recent survey of the institute, with a focus on the potentials for increasing in the number of adult migrants in case of removing all migration restrictions (referred to as Potential Net Migration Index) was published in 2018.
- The Potential Net Migration Index is of paramount importance since it illustrates the attitudes of the citizens of each country concerning migration. Moreover, it assists policymakers to plan for the management of human resources' migration actively and efficiently or provide the grounds for the recruitment of necessary human resources

from other countries. The index is also of significance due to the universality of these data. They have been collected from more than 150 countries which make the comparison of countries feasible.

-The most recent survey of Gallup was conducted using direct or telephone interviews with almost half a million adults in 150 countries during 2015-2017. The obtained data were used to measure the Potential Net Migration Index, and the results were presented on the institute's website. Two other practical and efficient indicators (namely The Potential Net Brain Gain Index and the Potential Net Youth Migration Index) were also introduced and calculated under this general index, with



the former measuring the potential for the migration of educated people (those with bachelor's or higher degrees) and the latter calculating the same index for the youth between 15 and 29.

-The most recent global survey conducted by Gallup indicated that Iran scored -16% for the Potential Net Migration Index, -27% for the Potential Net Brain Gain Index, and -19% for the Potential Net Youth Migration Index. As Iran scored negatively in all these indicators, the total rate of brain drain and the number of its young migrants exceeded the rate of brain gain for the country (assuming the removal of travel restrictions). In other words, if the country's population decreases by 16%, brain drain will be 27%, and the

youth's population will reduce by 19% if travel restrictions are lowered (referring to data for 2015-2017). Like Iran, most countries would face a reduction in their population, the phenomenon of brain drain, and the migration of their youth in case of a decrease in travel restrictions. Moreover, the scores obtained for countries with conditions similar to Iran are pretty close to each other.

- Among 150 countries, Iran ranked 87th for the attraction of foreigners and retaining its citizens. Moreover, the country ranked 78 (in 109 countries) in terms of brain gain and the maintenance of its specialists. However, it ranked 77/150 for the attraction of the foreign youth and the maintenance of its young population.



Table 11- Iran ranks in the Potential Net Migration Index

Potential Net Migration Index			Potential Net Brain Gain Index *			Potential Net Youth Migration Index		
Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	New Zealand	%231	1	Northern Cyprus	%432	1	Iceland	451%
2	Singapore	%225	2	New Zealand	%333	2	Singapore	410%
3	Iceland	%208	3	Iceland	%296	3	Australia	378%
4	Emirates	%204	4	Spain	%187	4	Swiss	372%
5	Swiss	%187	5	Singapore	%185	5	Kuwait	349%
6	Australia	%179	6	Denmark	%169	6	Canada	343%
7	Kuwait	%169	7	Australia	%158	7	Emirates	330%
8	Bhutan	%162	8	Canada	%120	8	Northern Cyprus	255%
9	Canada	%147	9	Swiss	%107	9	Luxembourg	237%
10	Luxembourg	%131	10	Finland	%107	10	New Zealand	222%
82	Ecuador	-15%	73	Armenia	-24%	72	Somali	-18%
83	Kenya	-15%	74	Burkina Faso	-24%	73	Georgia	-18%
84	Financial	-15%	75	Libya	-25%	74	Ecuador	-18%
85	Vietnam	-15%	76	Central African Republic	-26%	75	Kazakhstan	-19%
86	Hungary	-16%	77	Chile	-27%	76	Libya	-19%
87	Iran	-16%	78	Iran	-27%	77	Iran	-19%
88	Kyrgyzstan	-16%	79	Palestine	-27%	78	Mali	-21%
89	Libya	-16%	80	Cameron	-27%	79	Mozambique	-21%
90	Mozambique	-16%	81	Serbia	-27%	80	Chad	-21%
91	Bolivia	-17%	82	Jordan	-29%	81	Kenya	-21%
92	Chad	-17%	83	Mexico	-29%	82	Kyrgyzstan	-22%
141	Senegal	-34%	100	Algeria	-40%	141	Moldova	49%-
142	Guinea	-36%	101	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-42%	142	Macedonia	52%-
143	El Salvador	-40%	102	Iraq	-43%	143	Honduras	53%-
144	Kosovo	-42%	103	Kosovo	-45%	144	Democratic Republic of the Congo	56%-
145	Syria	-44%	104	Ghana	-50%	145	Bosnia and Herzegovina	57%-
146	Nigeria	-46%	105	Albania	-51%	146	Nigeria	57%-
147	Democratic Republic of the Congo	-50%	106	Democratic Republic of the Congo	-56%	147	El Salvador	61%-
148	Liberia	-60%	107	Guinea	-60%	148	Haiti	68%-
149	Haiti	-63%	108	El Salvador	-73%	149	Liberia	70%-
150	Sierra Leone	-70%	109	Sierra Leone	-40%	150	Sierra Leone	78%-

Source: (Gallup,2018)

Data on the willingness of educated people to migrate from 2015 to 2017 are available in only 109 countries.

## The status of Iran in terms of the Visa-free Score

The Visa-free Score indicates the number of countries the passport holder can travel to without any visa requirements.

According to this index, that the most powerful passport in the third season of 2021 belonged to Japan with the Visa-free Score of 193. Furthermore, Singapore ranked second (scoring 192), and Germany and South Korea shared the third rank (scoring 191).

- The U.S. and the U.K. with the Visa-free Score scored 87 shared the seventh rank with Belgium, New Zealand, and Switzerland.

- In the region, the following ranks were obtained: 15 for UAE, 56 for Turkey, 59 for Qatar, 60 for Kuwait, 68 for Bahrain, 70 for Oman, 71 for Saudi Arabia, 80 for Azerbaijan, and 84 for Armenia.

-The index showed that Iran ranked 105th out of 116 passport ranks, being at the same level as Sri Lanka. In other words, Iranians can travel visa-free to 42 countries.

- In general, the visa-free scores of 183 passports (out of 199 investigated passports) are higher than the score obtained by Iran. This means that the citizens of 183 countries can travel (visa-free) to more countries compared to Iranians.

Table 12- The Global Passport Ranking

The most powerful passport	2021 Rank	Visa free destinations	Passport issuing country
0	1	193	Japan
1	2	192	Singapore
2	3	191	Germany, South Korea
4	4	190	Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain
8	5	189	Austria, Denmark
10	6	188	France, Ireland, The Netherlands Portugal, Sweden
15	7	187	Belgium, New Zealand, Switzerland England, USA
20	8	186	Czech Republic, Greece, Malta, Norway
24	9	185	Australia, Canada
26	10	183	Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
-	-	-	Other countries
183	105	42	Sri Lanka, Iran

Source: (Henleyglobal, 2021)

## Conclusion

Iran Migration Outlook 2021 illustrates the latest statistics and information in the field of international migration both in Iran and worldwide. Nevertheless, the exclusive consideration of a statistical and numerical view towards a complicated phenomenon such as migration, which is accelerating everywhere, does not suffice, and the set of considerations summarized below needs to be addressed.

### ▪ Migration in the world

#### The constant acceleration of international migration

The latest migration statistics and indicators indicate that the population of international migrants (primarily first generation) reached 281 million persons in 2020, which was 9 million persons above the value in 2019. Accordingly, even the Coronavirus outbreak and the enforcement of strict and severe restrictions on international mobility could not stop the increasing global migration trend. In this regard, the drivers of international migration are economic factors, particularly poverty and the economic gap between the south and the north, personal social welfare, better future, and further opportunities in a foreign country, and the other factors such as political instabilities, the spread of violence, and insecurity in many regions, particularly the Middle East, still increase the population of migrants and reinforce the "desire to migrate" across the globe.

#### Increasing "desire to migrate" in the world: a product of global communications and uneven development

The main factor affecting the global increase in the "desire to migrate" is the uneven development of northern (developed) and southern (less or underdeveloped) countries. This phenomenon has been associated with higher economic, social, and political prosperity for the developed countries; however, it has deepened the economic and digital gaps between them and the underdeveloped countries. Accordingly, such imbalance and the spread of communication technologies, particularly the Internet and cyberspace, have prompted migrants to send information about educational and occupational opportunities, economic and social (welfare) conveniences, and their host countries' residential and citizenship capacities to their homelands. Greater access to such information and further awareness of migration opportunities would intensify migration waves. In this regard, an example is the refugee crisis 2015.

#### The migration waves in the post- Covid-19 era

The COVID-19 pandemic has seriously affected migration trends and international mobility, and no credible information is available regarding the impacts of the pandemic on this sector. Nevertheless, it is mainly predicted that the world will face significant migration waves in the post-Coronavirus era. That is because the

main drivers of migration, including poverty, hunger and unemployment, prejudice, violence, insecurity, and similar factors, have significantly been strengthened during the pandemic, and an explosion of international migrations is quite likely. The post-coronavirus migration wave can be much bigger and more extensive than the one starting from African and Asian countries towards Europe in 2015.

### **The plans of the developed countries to recruit the healthcare workers of other countries**

Due to the increasing significance of supplying and retaining healthcare workers during the pandemic and consecutive events, the issue has become of significance and a primary priority for many countries. In this regard, the developed countries that have always recruited specialized human resources from other countries to maintain the increasing gradient of their economic growth endeavor to utilize the same formula in supplying their required healthcare personnel both during and after the pandemic. Accordingly, such countries are usually considered migrants' preferred destinations, which spare their efforts to recruit the healthcare workers of the developing countries (including Iran) by introducing and implementing attractive programs and providing comfort, including high-paying job opportunities and the quick and free issuance of visas.

### **The green and red regions during and after the pandemic**

By the procurement and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines, the world is expected to face a situation where different geographical regions are classified into the green and red regions regarding the successful management of the pandemic and access to vaccines. This can continue

until the virus is completely eradicated around the globe and all regions turn into the green ones. Moreover, restrictions such as obliging individuals to apply for health visas or vaccine certificates may allow mobility across the regions. The classification itself can turn into a driver for the intensification of the "desire to migrate" and mobility flow from the red regions to the green ones. That is because the flow of migrants from weak and frail economies towards stronger and developed economies is quite considerable. According to the same mechanism, the mobility flow can be expected from the red regions towards the green ones. Countries should understand the significance of this phenomenon and evaluate the efficiency of their programs to contain the spread of the virus and their citizens' access to COVID-19 vaccines as soon as possible.

### **The conflicting approaches towards migration management**

Although various push-pull factors such as economic, social, and political factors create migration trends worldwide, different (sometimes), conflicting policies and responses can be observed in terms of migration management. On the one hand, major receiving countries are constantly introducing and implementing programs to facilitate the recruitment of talented and specialized human resources from other countries; on the other hand, the same countries are faced with the influx of low-skilled migrants, particularly asylum-seekers, who are usually considered irregular and illegal. These countries typically adopt forceful measures in such situations and make attempts to tighten their control over borders or impose physical barriers such as border walls. Indeed, the receiving countries intend to exploit the benefits and advantages arising from the migration of talented human resources. On the other hand, the main sending countries

usually tackling numerous economic, social, and political issues have insufficient motives to retain and prevent the out-migration of their human resources. Such countries typically suffer from the lack of efficient policies concerning migration management and control and cannot compete with the receiving countries to introduce attractive programs. The human migration from the sending countries intensifies their economic and social issues, deepens the gap between these countries and the receiving countries, and increases the rate of migration. This migration cycle is being increasingly intensified and strengthened across the globe, and migrants (low-skilled or specialized) migrate to other countries hoping for a better life. Some countries that claim to support and protect asylum-seekers or are located on the transit path of major migration trends (e.g., Turkey) use migrants' presence and transit as leverage or scapegoat to attain their political ends or get economic privileges in their interactions with other countries

#### **The lack of international collaboration and a constructive agreement on migration control and management**

As the global community needs the collaboration and commitment of all countries facing significant challenges and issues such as world peace and global warming, international migration still suffers from the non-existence of a comprehensive solution and a global and effective consensus. The leading sending and receiving countries face the problems arising from the lack of a global solution and suffer increasing losses. In 2018, a UN initiative led to a global compact signed to manage and organize international migration regularly and safely. However, since some countries, including the U.S. and Hungary, left the

compact irresponsibly, it became useless in practice. Accordingly, despite the growing increase of migration worldwide, a lack of collaboration or constructive consensus for controlling and managing the phenomenon of migration or at least sharing all countries in exploiting the benefits and advantages of international migration and reducing its harms can be observed.

## **Migration in Iran**

### **The black box of migration in Iran: An uncharted domain in need of severe public and government attention**

The issue of migration has become a public and challenging topic in Iran for a long time. However, migration has seldom been explored scientifically and comprehensively as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, many aspects of which have been left unexplored. This has prevented the formation of a theoretical consensus and constructive discourse on this phenomenon among policymakers, the scientific community, and the public. Due to the lack of such understanding and theoretical consensus, migration has been viewed as a negative phenomenon from the government perspective. Consequently, the opportunities to benefit from its positive aspects have been missed. In other words, the reproduction of the ignorance-lack of the planning-inaction cycle not only reduces or eliminates the negative impacts of migration on the country but also deprives all the benefits that could be gained. Migration is a gray phenomenon associated with multiple positive and negative impacts on sending and receiving countries and the migrants themselves. In other words, policymakers' choices and decisions will highlight the impacts of migration on the sending/

receiving countries or relegate them to the background. Taking such a perspective towards migration in Iran can turn the potential threats of the phenomenon into real opportunities facilitating personal and national growth and excellence.

### **The compression of the "desire to migrate" spring in Iran**

Iranian society has been experiencing one of the most challenging economic and social conditions over the past few decades. The coincidence of difficult economic conditions arising from sanctions, severe economic impulses, considerable oscillations in currency exchange rates, unrestrained inflation, a debilitating economic recession, the increased unemployment rate caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and other economic and social issues have strengthened the drivers and propellers of migration and the tendency for migration. Although such a tendency may not result in actual migration, the imminent risk of the compressed spring of "the tendency for migration" can be felt in different sectors of Iranian society. Accordingly, while attention was typically focused on brain drain and the migration of highly- educated individuals and artistic and athletic elite, the tendency for migration has aroused among different classes of the society, especially the low economic classes).

### **The role of "country perspective and attractiveness" in Iranians' decisions to stay or migrate**

The findings of studies and investigations conducted by the Iran Migration Observatory reveal that "the country's general condition" and "economic factors" are the major causes and motives of different social classes for migration. "The lack of opportunities to play a role," "feeling of uselessness across the country," and "lack of a promising prospective for the future" reinforce the

motives for migration and propel individuals to plan for their migration actively. The findings also indicate that the "desire to migrate" has considerably been increased among different classes following the COVID-19 pandemic, which needs to be investigated more deeply and thoroughly. The increased desire to migrate can provide the ground for individuals to plan and make definitive decisions for migration.

In addition to people who have decided to migrate, a group of people have delayed their migration or have not finalized their decisions. Although "economic condition" acts as "a driver for migration," it may become a barrier against migration. The main factors making migration impossible or delay it are, "increased migration costs" and "not affording migration costs," particularly among students and graduates. Accordingly, if the country's general (mainly economic) condition improves, the economic considerations may have contradictory impacts on migration. On the one hand, individuals who have not made definitive decisions or have delayed their migration may give up the idea of migration due to improvements in economic conditions. On the other hand, reducing migration costs can add to number of people who make serious plans to migrate. Family bonds (residing with the family members) and attempts to develop the country are the primary motives of the people who have decided to stay.

In general, "country prospective and attractiveness" can be considered a combination of factors such as "feeling capable of playing a role in the development of Iran," "being useful and effective in Iran or abroad," "Iranians' sense of belonging to their nationality," and "country's prospective." Such factors play major roles in the "desire to migrate" of different social classes. Accordingly, improving or declining the country's perspective and attractiveness

can change one's tendency to migrate to different social classes.

### **The common belief on the brain drain and the lack of opportunities for highly-educated Iranians to return**

The lack of a coherent policy to establish realistic and opportunity-based migration management and the spread of unauthorized and groundless data on international migrations have formed an unrealistic viewpoint to Iranian society. This image has induced a wrong image among the public and even the authorities, suggesting that Iran has the highest number of international migrants and none of its migrants return to their homeland. Unfortunately, this image is increasingly being reinforced and led to the rejection of realities and the formation of polarized positions thoughts such as "staying vs. migrating with no intention to return." This image is dangerous since it undermines self-confidence and social hope and prevents public acceptance and belief in the return of Iranian migrants and highly-educated individuals. A society whose members always imagine leaving the country does not illustrate a perspective for its migrants' return, the reconstruction of social hope, and economic development. For example, the findings of the Iran Migration Observatory show that more than 2000 highly-educated Iranians have returned over the last five years and are working in the country. Nevertheless, this piece of news is regarded doubtfully by the public, and the message sent by the society to Iranian migrants (whether leaving the country or returning to it) is that it does not welcome them and does not look forward to revisiting them. This lack of interest in the return of highly- educated Iranians is much more dangerous than the mass migration of Iranian youth.

### **The dynamic migration strategies of the countries neighboring Iran**

Nowadays, countries around the globe

- mainly the countries neighboring Iran – attempt to turn threats into opportunities by accurately understanding the dynamism of international migrations. Accordingly, some Arab states of the Persian Gulf region and Turkey rapidly plan and implement cohesive programs to attract investors, creative and innovative human resources, and students/ graduates to fulfill their ambitious economic, social, and political goals in the short- and long-term perspectives. The Golden Visa program recently being introduced by the UAE can be considered an instance in this regard. These countries plan to benefit from human resources of the region maximally, leading to tough competition. Countries such as Iran have static approaches towards migrating their human resources, which will result in irrecoverable losses in the competitive market.

### **The need to change approaches towards the migration of Iranian students and highly- educated people**

Understanding the dynamism of the migration of students and highly- educated people in Iran requires a fundamental paradigm shift. However, most analyses and approaches in this regard have been based on the paradigm of the "exit" (migration) of students and highly- educated people, and most policies and programs have been formed accordingly. The paradigm was popular several decades ago, particularly in the 20th century, and did not efficiently deal with current issues and situations. On the other hand, since the new paradigm of migration deals with the phenomenon of "brain circulation," the country's policies regarding the international mobility of the highly- educated Iranians need to be



attended to and revised. Hence, taking into account the undeniable realities of the field can lead to taking advantage of the positive aspects of the issue.

### **Declining number of international students and enhancing the "international students' net circulation index"**

The latest credible and available statistics indicate that rank of Iran in sending international students has been declining for various reasons over the past few years. According to the traditional paradigm of "the brain drain," this can be interpreted as a fortunate incident. However, such a decline in the market of international students' mobility is worrisome if we understand and recognize the significance of the "brain circulation" approach since a remarkable presence in that market somehow guarantees the flow of scientific and technological interactions between Iran and the world. Accordingly, the declined rank of Iran or its reduced share in the market should be contemplated carefully due to the importance of maintaining such presence and interactions, mainly via the return migration of highly- educated Iranians. While the number of Iranian students in foreign universities has almost been constant over the past few years, the number of international students in Iran has increased significantly during the same period. Such an increase and increase in the return migration rate of highly-educated Iranians have improved the status of Iran in terms of the "net circulation index" of international students.

### **Getting prepared to recruit and utilize international students**

The number of international students increased from 2.1 million in 2000 to 5.6 million in 2018, and countries across the globe adopted ambitious programs

to recruit international students. The number of international students in Iran increased from around 5,500 students in 2011 to around 44,300 students in 2020, indicating that the importance of recruiting international students and actively taking part in this competitive market has been realized. Nevertheless, a gap in the national macro strategies can be observed that acts as a major obstacle against recruiting international students and maximally benefiting the advantages of this market. Due to the lack of preparedness and the incomplete educational infrastructure for international students in the country, the field has been underdeveloped, and no organized plan is available for recruiting and retaining international students or benefiting from their scientific and technological spillover to the country. In this regard, the laws and procedures have to be updated to become user-friendly and competitive. Using an international language as a facilitator instrument, focusing on the recruitment of students from the region, providing opportunities for the employment of international students both during and after their education, facilitating their employment through implementing programs such as start-up visas, and employing them in science and technology parks are plans to be pursued in the country.

### **Enriching migration policy-making by qualitative and quantitative evidence**

The lack of credible data is a major challenge in migration studies. Unfortunately, since there has been no official organization to record and publish migration data, most of the released news and statistics in this regard are inaccurate. Accordingly, the issue of recording and publishing credible migration data is still a priority. However, the exclusive focus on recording and publishing the migration statistics without having any qualitative approach towards the brain drain phenomenon is a big challenge

in the field of migration management. Accordingly, adopting a quantitative approach to migration does not eliminate the problem but also leads to ignoring the necessity for making purposive policies, paying particular attention to the retention of highly- educated human resources, and improving the quality and efficiency of the executive programs intended for the field. We need quantitative and in-depth qualitative studies to understand the roots and causes of migration and the behavior of different migrant groups such as the elites, athletes, artists, doctors, nurses, and others. Accordingly, conducting regular annual surveys on migration is quite essential.

### **"Building domestic capacities" and "return": two policy solutions on the brain drain phenomenon.**

Evidently, Iran is facing a human resources surplus, and the primary issue is how to exploit such human resources according to the needs and necessities of the country. The number of highly- educated people employed in different economic sectors is still low, and this is an issue that cannot be resolved easily. Accordingly, the spillover of such human resources to other countries is inevitable. There are two major policy solutions to respond to this issue:

The first solution is increasing the human employment capacity in domestic sectors. To this end, expanding the "knowledge economy" to benefit from the talents and human resources of the country will prove quite helpful. The role played by the Iranian Vice-presidency for Science and Technology can be pretty significant in this regard. However, this mission cannot be accomplished without the assistance and collaboration of other sectors. That is because executing and implementing programs to support talents by the National Elite Foundation and the Vice-presidency for Science and Technology would partly

solve the brain drain problem. Accordingly, other institutions and sectors should play more constructive roles mainly to revive social hope and economic development based on knowledge and excellence.

The second solution is to pay attention to "international educational and professional markets" implemented by countries to improve their human resources' level of education and skill. This is indeed performed by some countries to increase their soft power abroad and enhance their human resources' level of education and skill, mainly through adopting the "return" policies and programs. China is a successful sample in this regard. Qualitative and quantitative studies on return migration suggest that a majority of returned migrants are highly spirited and motivated and have gained international and practical knowledge and experience, which would be of benefit for many developing countries.

### **Managing the recruitment and retention of talents: necessary but insufficient**

In the macro approaches towards the national talent management, focusing on the establishment of ground for recruiting and retaining unique talents as the most important source of growth and advancement of the country should be pursued by the bodies responsible for the development and training of human resources and the institutions in charge of supporting elites. There is no ground for recruiting and retaining human resources; however, the general socioeconomic atmosphere of the country and the policies govern it. Unless the general atmosphere of the country is appropriate for growing and training unique talents, neither can the policies adopted to retain human resources be effective, nor will the return and recruitment of highly- educated individuals prove helpful. Accordingly, the country's administrative system should seriously take

into account the establishment of a general atmosphere of benefiting from human resources. Moreover, it should design and implement the programs and policies for the recruitment and retain of human resources according to the target of their influences.

### **Neglecting the economic and social opportunities of migration**

One of the main issues in Iranian society is the increasing desire to migrate permanently or temporarily to the neighboring countries, including Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. Labor and economic migration across the globe, particularly across bordering regions, can benefit the sending country financially. It should be noted that the financial benefits that sending countries gain from economic and labor migration are several times higher than the oil revenues of Iran. Due to economic issues, the desire to migrate has alarmingly increased among different social classes, particularly the youth. Turning the threats of this increased desire into an opportunity requires smart policies and efficient bodies to implement them. Such a policy can be applied to exploit the economic attractions and opportunities of the neighboring countries and interact more closely with them and establish domestic capacities. Unfortunately, there is no strategic policy or executive program to deal with the aforementioned issues in the country.

### **The unidentified Iranians' communities abroad**

Regardless of the quantitative and statistical perspectives towards the communities of Iranian diaspora (there is no consensus on their exact number), few studies have examined the qualitative aspects of such communities. For example,

as negligible information on the cultural, social, and economic characteristics of the first generation of Iranian migrants is available, there is little knowledge about the second and third generations of Iranian migrants, particularly their attitudes towards Iran. Although few studies in the field indicate that most first-generation Iranian migrants tend to maintain their relationships and interact with Iran, no coherent and purposive plans and policies have been developed to exploit the capacity of Iranian migrants. Accordingly, the vast economic and social capacities of this multi-million community have been neglected, and the community has just minimally been involved in the country's development.

### **Migration in light of the demographic window of the country**

Demographic studies show that the demographic window of Iran is almost closed. Unfortunately, Iran has benefited the least from that window to develop economically and socially due to its tightening economic and social pressure. Given the social and demographic realities, the country cannot develop without adopting dynamic migration policies to recruit highly-educated Iranians and non-Iranians. Accordingly, predicting demographic risks and establishing the necessary institutional and legal infrastructure to apply timely migration policies in line with the threats and opportunities arising from the neighboring Iran countries.

### **The Afghanistan crisis and the necessity to take into account the migration of refugees to Iran**

After the decision of the U.S and its allies to leave Afghanistan, growing clashes between the state and Taliban forces and the seizure of extensive regions in the country by the Taliban group have been observed

since March 2021. Undoubtedly, this issue has profound migration implications for Afghanistan and the region. If the clashes keep on, the number of internally displaced people will increase, and Afghan refugees will rush towards neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran. Some refugees consider Iran as their destination, while others move to Turkey and other European countries. This can increase the smuggling of migrants through Iran.

On the other hand, programs for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees from other countries (including Iran) will be inefficient as clashes continue in Afghanistan. Moreover, a part of the Afghan workforce will face problems finding jobs and providing for their livelihood due to such violence and conflict. This issue and the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy of Afghanistan will result in the more considerable presence of undocumented Afghan refugees in Iran to seek occupational opportunities and escape from violence in their homeland. Accordingly, the new government of Iran should start planning for receiving Afghan refugees in Iran, legalizing their presence, and focusing on obtaining financial assistance from international organizations to host Afghan refugees and displaced people and provide service to them.

### **The necessity to update migration laws and the establishment of the national migration organization**

For several consecutive decades following the Islamic Revolution, Iran has experienced the flows of international migration in the form of Iranians leaving the country and foreign nationals entering the country. However, no coherent policy and up-to-date legal frameworks have been adopted during the same period. This issue has posed major challenges and has led to missing multiple economic and social opportunities in the field of migration. Developing and updating the laws on different aspects of international migrations such as the resident permits and dual citizenship of migrant Iranians and foreign nationals' access to the country's financial facilities and social services are among the necessities. Since policy-making and managing affairs related to migrant Iranians and inquiring into the issues and challenges faced by the foreign nationals in Iran require a professional institution, the establishment of the "National Migration Organization" seems vital.

The last chapter of the Outlook lists the main policy options for Iran and measures for exploiting the capacity of migrant Iranians and the foreign nationals in the country.



**Part 1: A Review of the Trends of International  
Migrations around the Globe**



**Chapter 1:  
The International Mobility of Students  
around the Globe**

**1**

## The International Mobility of Students around the Globe

Over the past few years, students' international mobility has been observed as an index of academic diversity, internationalization, and a significant source of revenue for higher education institutions in major migration destinations. In this regard, the patterns of students' international mobility have attracted the attention of universities, business leaders, and states. This is not because the grounds for the flow and development of ideas, the exchange of experiences, and the attainment of the common good are over the borders, but because it brings about financial benefits and sustains national interests (Bista, 2019).

In 2018, more than 5.5 million students at different levels were studying abroad, and the number is estimated to rise by above 10 million by 2030 (UIS, 2020). Although the COVID19- pandemic was a temporary shock decelerating the mobility of international students, decreasing the number of international registrations, and consequently posing significant financial losses in universities that relied heavily on their international students, it is expected that the trend will become increasing when the situation becomes normal again. Nevertheless, the international students' mobility will perhaps continue in new modalities such as online education and online mobility alongside the traditional form of international mobility, and the change would not be confined to the pandemic (Mercado, 2020).

Like other fields, international higher education was influenced by the COVID19- outbreak, and attitudes towards this issue underwent significant changes and developments. International students were among the groups experiencing

the highest risks of the outbreak. The impact of the COVID19- on the mobility of international students and global higher education can be investigated from various perspectives. The most important impact of the COVID19- pandemic on international students seem to be the forced return of students to their homelands, the cancellation of educational programs, the emergence of online education, and the decreased number of international registrations, posing irreversible losses in the international education sectors of many countries.

The COVID19- outbreak has had significant effects on international higher education, particularly on students' mobility. Many students changed or canceled their educational programs in foreign countries due to travel restrictions and the closure of universities, leading to a significant decrease in the number of international students in many receiving countries (Xiong, Mok, Ke, & Cheung, 2020). For example, the total number of international students in U.S. colleges (including the number of students studying from their homelands) reduced by 16 percent in the fall of 2020. Furthermore, a -43 percent reduction was recorded in the number of new students' enrollment in the same period (Dennon, 2020). Similar trends have been observed in other major destinations. In Australia, the annual increase in the number of international students stopped following the COVID19- outbreak. According to the report issued by the European Migration Network, new registrations for higher education in Australia in the year leading to June 2020 reduced by %16; however, the number of new registrations of the previous two years had increased by %12 and %9, respectively. Moreover, the pandemic in Canada caused a -17 percent reduction (compared to 2019) in the number of international students after 20 years (ICEF, 2021). Surveys have shown

that perhaps the effect of the Covid19-pandemic on students' reduced desire to study abroad will hardly be confined to the outbreak. According to an opinion poll conducted among students from China and Hong Kong, 84 percent out of the 2,739 respondents indicated they were not inclined to study abroad after the outbreak. This means the number of international students may continue a decreasing trend after the COVID19- era. The reduction can be more significant for the major destinations of international students since many respondents reported their preference for Asian countries and regions such as Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan but not for the U.S. or the U.K (Yildirim et al., 2021).

When the restrictions on the COVID19-outbreak were enforced, educational institutions were to stop in-person education and introduced online and distance education. This approach arose doubts regarding students' lives. Some countries adopted a strict approach with regard to their students, while the approach adopted by some other countries (e.g., Canada) was more moderate. For example, the Trump administration enforced strict limitations on the issuance of visas particularly for Chinese graduates and researchers, and this sharply reduced the number of international students in the U.S. particularly from China. These restrictions challenged universities and the higher education systems of many major destinations for international students. Australia adopted a policy similar to that of the U.S.; the country has closed its borders since March 2020, and this situation is expected to continue by 2022. Such decisions have been quite helpful in getting the coronavirus outbreak under control, though they have caused numerous difficulties for international students in a way that many of them have been made to leave Australia. According

to the Reserve Bank of Australia, the international student market added around 40 billion dollars to the Australian economy in 2019. Around 17 billion dollars came from the students' tuition, and 23 billion dollars was related to their residing costs. This is equal to 109 million dollars a day. Although many students continued their studies online, the total number of registrations decreased. According to estimates, the financial loss due to closing the borders and blocking the entry of international students to Australia amounts to 5 million dollars a day.

Moreover, restrictions in mobility and travel due to the coronavirus outbreak have posed challenges concerning international students' education and employment. Although international students can get a job after education in the host country, the current state of online education has deprived them of the opportunity to find a job during and after their education. This has had more significant effects on the students from underdeveloped countries due to their immediate need for employment during and after education (EMN/OECD, 2020). There is no doubt that the COVID19- outbreak has affected the financial future of higher education institutions and the economy of countries in general. Accordingly, it is quite natural for the policymakers of higher education and international education in many countries to think about maintaining their international students and figuring out solutions to prevent the reduction of their universities' revenues and stimulate demands for international education.

Various supply and demand stimulants encourage international education. In terms of demand, stimulants such as increased wealth of livelihoods, high-quality education in English, access to top international universities, and better job opportunities after getting a prestigious international degree are



incentives for international education. In terms of supply, stimulants such as the financial limitations of universities, higher tuitions from international students, convenient visa-related mechanisms, and the ease of migration justify international education (Assomull & Laad, 2020).

Current trends indicate that western countries are no longer the sole significant destinations of international students, and students tend to choose countries such as East Asian countries as their destination for education (Cheng, 2021). Although many students still seek educational opportunities in English-speaking countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Canada, many Asian students who comprise a significant portion of international students have started to mobilize within Asia over the past 15-10 years. Cultural and geographical proximities, economic considerations, and similarities between their educational systems are some reasons for this trend (Lee, 2017). On the other hand, China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore are attracting more significant numbers of international students from across the globe (Cheng, 2021). For example, China's "Belt and Road" foreign policy initiative has facilitated the emergence of the University Alliance of the Silk Road, which consists of 132 universities located in 32 countries (Bista, 2019).

Moreover, countries such as India have devised ambitious plans to attract larger numbers of international students (Skinner, 2018). The economic prosperity

and competition over higher education in East Asia have provided a more convenient ground for students' mobility. In addition to enhancing mobility into and out of the region, states and institutions have focused on brain circulation in the region. In other words, the increasing number of world-class universities and competitive plans, increasing the rate of regional and multilateral exchange agreements, forming university networks and mutual collaboration, and the increasing use of English as a common academic language are some factors that have influenced students' choices for continuing their education in the region and the recruitment of students from different countries (Institute of International Education, 2018). Moreover, the emergence of nationalistic movements such as BREXIT in England and the restrictions enforced by the Trump administration on some country's students (many of whom were from Islamic countries) have been influential on the mobility and registration trend of international students (Bista, 2019).

### **The mobility of international students on a global scale**

- The total number of students in higher education programs was 227 million persons in 2018, with international students forming only 2.4% of this population.
- The number of international students increased by 2.5 times during 2018-2000.
- Above 5.5 million students were studying in foreign universities in 2018.




Chart 6- Number of international students during the period 2000 to 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

### Major sending countries of international students

Since the major sending countries of international students (i.e., China and India) are located in East Asia, 27% of the total international students in the world (about 1.5 million students) come from East Asia and Oceania.

- Although the rate of sending international students has increased in all regions, the trend has been more highlighted in Central Asia (around 100 percent growth) and Arab countries (85% growth) compared to 2010.
- Moving towards knowledge enterprises, considering long-term developmental goals in developing countries, and highlighting the role of international students in achieving such goals can justify the increasing trend of sending international students to Central Asia and Arab countries.

### Major receiving countries of international students

Since the major receiving countries of international students (including the U.S., the U.K., Canada, etc.) are located in Northern America and Western Europe, these regions have been regarded as popular destinations for international students over centuries.

- Fifty-one percent of international students selected these regions as their destination in 2018.
- East Asia and Oceania are the following popular destinations for international students. In 2018, about 21 percent of international students selected these regions as their destination to pursue their studies.
- Current trends indicate that over the last 15-10 years, the West was not

the only destination of international students, and factors such as the rising of nationalistic movements, the passage of anti-immigration laws in receiving countries, cultural and geographical

proximities, and economic considerations have made East Asia a popular destination for international students (Cheng, 2021; Bista, 2019; Lee, 2017).




chart 7 - Comparison of the main host regions of international students in 2000, 2010 and 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)




chart 8 - Comparison of the main origin regions of international students in 2000, 2010 and 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

## Number of International student

Table 13 - Comparison of top 20 host countries of international students in 2017 and 2018

Country Name	Number of International students		Rank	
	Year 2017	Year 2018	Year 2017	Year 2018
USA	984,898	987,314	1	1
UK	435,734	452,079	2	2
Australia	381,202	444,514	3	3
Germany	258,873	311,738	4	4
France	258,380	229,623	5	5
Russia	250,658	262,416	6	6
Canada	209,979	224,548	7	7
Japan	164,338	182,748	8	8
China	157,108	178,271	9	9
Turkey	108,076	125,138	10	10
Malaysia	100,765	-	11	11
Italy	97,563	106,611	12	12
The Netherlands	96,289	104,015	13	13
Argentina	88,873	-	14	14
Saudi Arabia	78,344	73,977	15	15
Austria	73,964	75,259	16	16
South Korea	70,796	84,749	17	17
Spain	64,927	70,912	18	18
Poland	63,925	54,354	19	19
Swiss	53,368	54,279	20	20
Other Countries	-	-	33-21	30-21
Iran*	26,913	30,951	34	31

Source: (UIS, 2021)






chart 9 - Share of major host countries in the international student mobility market in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)

\*The data of Iran is obtained from the aggregation of data of the Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education and data received from the Islamic Azad University in 2021.



18	China	■
7	India	■
2	Germany	■
2	South Korea	■
2	Vietnam	■
2	France	■
2	America	■
1	Kazakhstan	■
1	Saudi Arabia	■
1	Nigeria	■
62	Other Countries	■

chart 10 - Share of major countries of origin of international students of the international student mobility market in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)

Table 14 - Comparison of top 20 origin countries of international students in 2017 and 2018

Country Name	Number of International Students		Rank	
	Year 2017	Year 2018	Year 2017	Year 2018
China	928,365	993,367	1	1
India	341,442	375,055	2	2
Germany	122,961	122,538	3	3
South Korea	105,500	101,774	4	5
Vietnam	94,621	108,527	5	4
France	89,412	99,488	6	6
America	86,596	84,349	7	7
Nigeria	85,925	76,338	8	11
Kazakhstan	84,852	83,503	9	8
Saudi Arabia	84,246	77,406	10	10
Ukraine	77,878	72,063	11	13
Italy	74,761	75,954	12	12
Nepal	64,288	81,917	13	9
Malaysia	63,276	61,904	14	16
Brazil	58,876	67,183	15	21
Bangladesh	57,916	50,004	16	14
Russia	56,798	57,632	17	18
Pakistan	54,742	58,821	18	17
Syria	53,469	64,379	19	15
Iran *	53,220	56,376	20	19

Source: (UIS, 2021)




chart 11: Top ten host countries for international students in 2020

Source: (open doors, 2021)




Chart 12: Top ten origin countries of international students in 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)





**Chapter 2:**  
**migrant workers and economic  
migration in the world**

2



## migrant workers and economic migration in the world

72

### a. The population of migrants and labor migrants in the world

According to the most recent estimate of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the total number of migrants was 281 million persons in 2020. This shows a three-percent growth from 272 million persons in 2019 to 280.6 million persons in 2020. Moreover, 64-20-year-old migrants comprised about 73% of the total population of migrants in 2020. However, only 57 percent of the world population is placed in this range. The comparison of migrants regarding their gender with the

total population of the world shows no significant difference.

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the total number of labor migrants was 164 million persons in 2017 (Popova & Özel, 2018), which increased by 169 million persons in 2019. of the 280.6 million migrants in 2020, 251.2 million migrants were above 15 years old. As the ILO defines working age as >15 years old, the ratio of the working-age population of global migrants




Chart 13: age and sex composition of migrant population vs world population  
source: ( UNDESA, 2020)

to the total number of migrants was 89 % in 2020.

According to the ILO's estimates, the number of labor migrants did not increase significantly in 2020 compared to the number of documented labor migrants in 169) 2019 million persons) due to the recession and lockdown arising from the COVID19- outbreak. Accordingly, the number of labor migrants was estimated to be about 170-169 million persons in 2020.

According to the ILO's estimates in 2019,

women accounted for 41.5 percent of labor migrants, and the rest were men (%58.5). The lower ratio of women to men in the population of labor migrants can be justified regarding their lower ratio to the total number of migrants and their lower rates of participation in labor markets compared to men. Women face more economical and non-economical obstacles as labor migrants than men. Migration to accompany one's family, gender discrimination in labor markets and the lack of social networks are some reasons justifying women's lower ratio




Figure 5: Global estimates of the stock of international migrants and migrant workers, 2020

Source: (ILO, 2021a) (UNDESA, 2020)

to the total number of labor migrants.

The rate of participation in labor markets has been higher among migrants than native people, though the rate has decreased among both groups. In 2013, 72.7 percent of working-age migrants participated in labor markets; however, the rate dropped to 70 percent and 69 percent in 2017 and 2019, respectively.

Both male and female migrants' participation in labor markets has been higher compared to native individuals' participation. While the participation rate of male migrants was 3 percent higher than that of native people, female migrants participated in labor markets 13 percent more frequently than native women. Factors such as the old population of high-income countries,



Chart 14: Global distribution of international migrant workers by sex, 2019

Source: (ILO, 2021a)

technological changes, and migration and workforce policies can explain the reduced participation of natives and migrants in labor markets. Labor migrants also faced factors such as discrimination in labor markets, employment barriers, linguistic difficulties, and challenges in acknowledging their skills and capabilities in destination countries.

Adults aged 64-25 years form the largest group of labor force migrants. Moreover, young migrants at the age of 24-15 years and migrants above 65 years form 10 percent and 3.6 percent of the total population of labor migrants, respectively. It is important to note that the demographic ratio is slightly different among the total population of migrants. Moreover, there are 12.9 percent migrants aged 24-15 years, 74.7 percent migrants aged 64-25, and 12.4 percent migrants aged above 65 years.

The ratio of the youth to the working-age migrants increased from 8.3 percent in 2017 to above 10 percent in 2019.

In general, 26.7 percent, 66.2 percent, and 71 percent of labor migrants work in services, industries, and agriculture, respectively.

There is a major difference between men and women in terms of employment in different economic sectors. In other words, 14.2 percent, 79.9 percent, and 5.9 percent of female migrants are employed in services, industries, and agriculture, respectively. On the other hand, there are 56.4 percent of male migrants in services, 35.6 percent in industries, and 7.9 percent in agriculture. The larger share of women employed in services can be attributed to the increased demand for personal care and attendance such as healthcare and domestic services.



Chart 15: Global distribution of international migrant workers by sex, 2019

Source: (ILO, 2021a)



Chart 16: Global age composition of international migrant workers, 2019

Source: (ILO, 2021a)

A significant change is observed in men and women's employment in different economic sectors compared to 2013. Migrant women's employment in agriculture has decreased from %11.1 to %5.9, while their employment in services has increased from %73.7 to %79.9. On the other hand, men's employment in agriculture has decreased from %11.2 to %7.9, and their employment in services has decreased from %69.1 to %56.4. More than two-thirds of labor migrants are

concentrated in high-income countries.

According to the statistics, of 169 million labor migrants in 2019, 113.9 million migrants (%67.4) live and work in high-income countries, and 33 million persons (%19.5) work in upper-middle-income countries. Moreover, the others live and work in lower-middle-income and low-income countries.

Migrants form a significant portion of workers in high-income countries. Male




Chart 17: Global distribution of international migrant workers by broad category of economic activity, 2019  
Source : (ILO, 2021a)

and female labor migrants form %18.7 and %17.6 of the male and female labor force of such countries, respectively. Labor migrants comprises below %2.5 of the labor force of lower-middle-income or low-income countries.

- The north, south, and west of Europe, North America, and Arab countries are the three major destinations of labor migrants. In other words, %23.9 of the total labor migrants are settled in the north, south, and west of Europe, while %22.8 and %12.6 of these migrants work in North America and Arab countries, respectively. Accordingly, 60.6 percent of the total labor migrants have

been settled in the three aforementioned regions.

- Regarding the distribution of 169 million labor migrants in major destinations, %37.7 are in Central Asia and Europe, %35.6 are in the U.S., %14.3 are in Arab countries, %14.2 are in Asia and Oceania, and %8.1 are in Africa.

- Considering labor migrants' countries of origin, Asia and Oceania rank first and form one-thirds of the total number of global labor migrants, followed by Europe, Central Asia, the U.S., Africa, and Arab countries, respectively.

- Labor migrants form %18.4 of the total




Chart 18: International migrant workers by income level of countries, 2019

Source: (ILO, 2021a)

labor force in the north, south, and west of Europe; however, they account for %20 of the population in North America. On the other hand, the rate reaches %41.1 in Arab countries.

- The demographic composition of the labor force in the above three major regions did not differ significantly during 2019-2013.

Global markets, particularly the labor market, experienced a deep recession in 2020 due to the COVID19- outbreak. Since migrants' labor market is more significantly affected than native workers, this sector has been influenced quite strongly.




Chart 19: Distribution of international migrant workers by broad subregion, 2019


Source: (ILO, 2021a)

## The impact of the COVID19-outbreak on the global labor force

78

The effects of the COVID19- have been more substantial in countries enforcing restrictions against occupations and markets. The ILO estimates that the total working hours reduced due to the loss of employment or the reduction of working hours in 2020 to 255 full-time jobs. This

reduction has had a significant impact on the output of labor markets and workers' income. In other words, workers lost %4.4 of the estimated global GDP for 2019; however, it was partly compensated by governments. This falling trend is expected to go on in a descending gradient in 2021 (ILO, 2021).



	2020 Quarterly				2021 Projection		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Baseline	Optimistic	Pessimistic
%	5.2	18.2	7.2	4.5	3	1.3	4.6
FTE* (million)	150	525	205	130	90	36	130

Figure 6 : Estimates of the working hours, employment and labour income lost in 2020, and projections for 2021  
Source: (ILO, 2021b)

## Three percent reduction of the global economy due to the COVID19- pandemic

The coronavirus outbreak and its consequences have influenced human life in terms of, among other things, social, cultural, and economic aspects over the past 1.5 years. The effect was so significant that the World Bank called the conditions arising from the COVID19- outbreak the biggest recession of the past decades (World Bank, 2020a).

According to the World Bank, the global economy has shrunk by %3, and even countries with lower rates of infection have

been severely influenced by the economic crisis arising from the pandemic. Figure 20 illustrates the actual decrease in the global GDP in 2020.

The negative economic growth, the loss of jobs, and the reduction of working hours profoundly affected labor migrants as the most vulnerable group in labor markets. For example, entry to the countries receiving labor migrants and the departure of migrants from sending countries have been remarkably affected.




Chart 20: Decrease in real GDP growth (Annual percent change) in 2020

Source: (IMF, 2021)



## Major migration trends in Asia

Different factors are involved in decreasing migrant workers' employment rate in Asia during the pandemic. The first factor is limitations imposed on the issuance of visas and travel restrictions in the countries receiving labor migrants to control the outbreak. Moreover, the major sending countries of labor migrants suspended migration and travel to the countries affected by the coronavirus. Furthermore, prolonged closures and the slow rate of international trade decreased demand for the labor force considerably. Accordingly, a decreasing trend emerged in the entry and the number of the foreign labor force in the most critical Asian labor force destinations.

### The reduced flow of labor migrants from Asian countries

According to the migration report of Oceania-Asia, various countries receiving migrants in Asia have been influenced by the COVID19- outbreak. For example, the arrival of labor migrants to Japan reduced significantly. In other words, the number of migrant job applicants decreased to 627 during April-August 2020, which is considerably lower than 123,000 migrant job applicants in 2019 (ABDI, ILO & OECD, 2021).

Moreover, the number of immigrants to South Korea decreased significantly, and the number of approved Group-E visas (for different types of employment) amounted to 16,400 during March-June 2020. This was about %80 below the same period in 2019 which 84,200 occupational visas were issued. In general, although South Korea had anticipated receiving 56,000 new workers annually, the pandemic reduced it by 30,000 persons (ABDI, ILO & OECD, 2021).

Malaysia suspended receiving foreign nationals in March 2020 and reduced the issuance of new visas for its international

workers returned to Malaysia in April and May. Nevertheless, restrictions were gradually lowered for some groups such as individuals with type one to three employment permits and those with passports of technical visits, and the issuance of visas was resumed in June 2020. However, the reception of low-skilled foreign workers with temporary employment visas, including workers involved in domestic services, agriculture, production, and services, remained suspended (ABDI, ILO & OECD, 2021).

In Thailand, registering work permits for foreigners- except for a specific group of individuals already in the country- reduced by about one-third compared to the period before the outbreak of COVID19-.

In Hong Kong, the reception of foreign labor migrants reduced significantly in the first half of 2020. In the first nine months of 2020, the number of employment and investment visas issued in Hong Kong decreased by %61 from 31,300 to 11,500 visas (Moroz et al., 2020).

No accurate data is available on the entry of migrants in some destinations located in East Asia, though the reduction of the total number of labor migrants is observable. In Singapore, the number of labor migrants reduced by above %5 in the first half of 2020, indicating that above 70,000 workers reduced the number of labor migrants. This reduction (%8.5) was more considerable among migrants employed in domestic jobs and construction. Moreover, the observed reduction in the number of labor migrants during the first nine months in 2020 was around %2 in Taiwan (ABDI, ILO & OECD, 2021).

In addition to the East and Southeast Asia, the flow of labor migrants to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf countries decreased. For example, the Arab Reform Initiative reported that Saudi Arabia issued 633,000 labor visas in the first half of 2020, while it had issued 943,000 labor visas during the same period

in 2019. Accordingly, the issuance of labor visas decreased by %91 in the second half of 2020 compared to 2019. Furthermore, the UAE suspended the issuance of entry

permits from March to September; however, it resumed the procedure in October 2020 (Alsahi, 2020).

### Reducing the inflow of labor migrants to Asian destination economies




Chart 21: Decline in Labour Migration Inflows to Asian Destination Economies, thousands  
Source: (ADBI, ILO & OECD, 2021)




Chart 22: Changes in Stock of Foreign Workers, 2019-2020  
Source: (ADBI, ILO & OECD, 2021)

## The reduced flow of labor migrants from Asian countries

The flow of labor migrants from different regions decreased due to the COVID19-pandemic. The Philippines, as the most remarkable source of labor migrants, decreased sending its labor force to other countries considerably. In other words, the number of new departures from January to May 2020 was just 71,000 persons, which was about %60 below the 174,300 workers left the country during the same period in 2019. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) reported that sending labor migrants almost stopped in April 2020. For example, only 47 migrants left the country in 2020 April compared to 30,600 workers in 2019 (ABDI, ILO, & OECD, 2021).

Moreover, the number of Indian labor migrants decreased during the COVID19-pandemic. The rate of Indian workers leaving their country during April and September 2020 was only %1.6 of the number of workers leaving their country during the same period in 2019. Accordingly, 175,400 Indian labor migrants decreased to only 2,900 persons in 2020 (ABDI, ILO, & 2021).

In March 2020, the number of labor migrants leaving Bangladesh decreased from 58,500 to 52,000, a slight reduction compared to the previous year. However, the flow of labor migrants was almost suspended from April to June 2020, and the number of labor migrants leaving in December 2020 became almost half of the those recorded during the same period in 2019 (ABDI, ILO, & OECD, 2021).

The number of Pakistani labor migrants who left their countries during the COVID19-pandemic reduced sharply. The number of labor migrants leaving Pakistan in 2020 was 225,000 people, which is significantly lower than the number of those who had left their homeland (625,000) in 2019. Sending labor migrants from Pakistan was suspended in March 2020, while the procedure was

resumed in December 2020. According to the Pakistan Overseas Employment Association, about 200,000 Pakistani workers could not leave their country during March and July 2020 (ABDI, ILO, & OECD, 2021).

Moreover, Sri Lanka suffered a sharp reduction in the number of its current labor migrants. In other words, the number of labor migrants who left the country in March 2020 was almost half of the predicted numbers.

A significant reduction was observed in the number of Vietnamese labor migrants leaving their country. Accordingly, the number of labor migrants leaving Vietnam during the second 3 months of 2020 was just %6 of the migrants leaving their homeland within the first three months. The total number of workers who left Vietnam (despite a slight increase in the third three months of the year) during the first nine months of 2020 was only %41 of the same period in 2019. In general, the number of labor migrants leaving the country in 2020 was 60,000 below the estimates in 2019 (ABDI, ILO, & OECD, 2021).

In Indonesia, the number of labor migrations of 2020 was just %38 of the previous year. The situation influenced both "documented" and "undocumented" workers. The number of documented Indonesian labor migrants leaving their country decreased from 134,000 to 36,000 persons during the same period, while the number of undocumented workers decreased from 142,000 to 69,000. Moreover, the largest decrease was observed in April 2020 when the exit rate was %90 below the documented rate in April 2,300) 2019 workers vs. 25,500 workers), and the number remained relatively low until October 2020 (ABDI, ILO, & OECD, 2021).

The number of exiting Thai labor migrants (counting the repeated dispatches)

decreased by %60.9 in the first six months of 62,500) 2020 cases in 2019 vs. 24,500 cases in 2020). Sending new labor migrants alone shrank by %62 and decreased from

31,400 to 11,900 workers. Moreover, entry to some particular OECD destinations was banned (ABDI, ILO, & OECD, 2021).




Chart 23: Changes in outgoing deployment of migrant workers from Asian Economies, 2019-2020

Source: (ABDI, ILO & OECD, 2021)

## Migrants and remittances

In addition to labor migrants, their families were also influenced directly or indirectly by the economic pressure posed by the coronavirus outbreak. Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nepal experienced dramatic difficulties because migrants who lost their jobs or earned less money than before could send fewer remittances to their families. Accordingly, migrants' families lost access to convenient healthcare, welfare systems and nutrition, and their children faced the risk of deported (ESCAP, 2020).

### The reduction of remittances and its impact on the GDP

Remittances constitute a significant portion of the GDP in some countries in Asia

and Oceania. The recession caused by the coronavirus outbreak significantly reduced the remittances in 2020 compared to 2019. The data obtained from the National Bank of Bangladesh indicate that the total remittances were reduced by %25 in April 2020, which was calculated to be 353 million dollars. Furthermore, a -35percent reduction was observed in the remittances of Sri Lankan labor migrants in 2020. In general, it is estimated that countries in Asia and Oceania will receive 304 billion dollars from their migrants in 2020, which is 25 billion dollars (around %8) less than the recorded amount in 2019. Moreover, it is estimated that the remittances to Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been reduced by %16.1 (decreasing from 57 billion dollars in 2019 to 48 billion dollars in 2020).

Moreover, the reduction of remittances in East Asia and Oceania is estimated to be 8 percent (i.e., 148 billion dollars in 2019 vs. 136 billion dollars in 2020). Countries in Asia-Oceania such as Tonga, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Nepal rely heavily on their migrant workers' remittances. For example, the -15percent reduction in the remittances of Kazakhstani migrants caused the country's GDP to shrink by 361 million dollars, which is equal to %5 of the total GDP of Kazakhstan (ESCAP, 2020).

Nevertheless, an increasing trend can be observed in the remittances to some countries. For example, the remittances transferred to Bangladesh and Pakistan increased in the third three months of 2020 compared to the second three months of the same year. Moreover, the data related

to Oceania showed that international migrants continued sending remittances to their homelands during the pandemic and supported their families with renewed visas (ESCAP, 2020).

The following table shows the rate of remittances to labor migrants' homelands and the percentage of its growth according to the latest estimates of the World Banks in 2021.

The global remittances sent by labor migrants in 2020 decreased compared to 2019, though the World Bank has estimated slight increases in 2021 and 2022 (World Bank, 2020b).

The following Figure compares the money sent by migrant workers in the first ten countries during 2020-2019. It can

Table 15: Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low- and MiddleIncome Regions

Region	2009	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 E	2021 F	2022 F
	(\$ billion)								
Low- and Middle-Income	302	446	441	478	524	548	540	553	565
East Asia and Pacific	80	128	128	134	143	148	136	139	142
Europe and Central Asia	33	42	43	52	59	62	56	54	40
Latin America and Caribbean	55	68	73	81	89	96	103	108	112
Middle East and North Africa	31	50	49	52	53	55	56	57	59
South Asia	75	118	11	117	132	140	147	152	158
Sahara Desert	28	41	37	41	49	48	42	43	44
World	433	602	597	640	694	719	702	713	726
	(Growth rate, percent)								
Low- and Middle-Income	-4.8	0.5	-1.3	8.4	9.8	4.6	-1.6	2.6	2.2
East Asia and Pacific	4.8	3.7	-0.5	5.1	6.8	3	-7.9	2.1	2.1
Europe and Central Asia	-11.3	-15.3	2.1	21	12.9	4.6	-9.7	-3.2	-6.9
Latin America and Caribbean	-12.3	6.5	7.4	11.1	9.9	8.33	6.5	4.6	4
Middle East and North Africa	-6	-6.4	-1.2	5.3	2.3	3.4	2.3	2.6	3.1
South Asia	4.5	1.6	-5.9	6	12.3	6.1	5.2	3.5	4
Sahara Desert	-2.1	6.6	-8.3	10.3	17.4	-0.4	-12.5	2.6	1.6
World	-5	-1.3	-0.8	7.1	8.5	3.7	-2.4	1.5	1.8

Source: (Ratha & et al, 2021)

be observed that the transferred money decreased in all countries except Mexico, Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

The 10 top countries with the highest remittances transferred by migrant workers to their homelands are the U.S., UAE, Saudi

Arabia, Switzerland, Germany, China, Russia, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. The trend has decreased in all of the above except in Saudi Arabia, China, and Luxemburg.




Chart 24: Outward remittance flows from top ten countries and in 2019 and 2020 and its growth rate  
Source: ( World bank remittance inflow, 2021)




Chart 25: Top ten remittance recipients in 2019 and 2020 and its growth rate  
source: (World bank remittance outflow, 2021)

## Remittance recipients in the Middle East and North Africa

The following Figure portrays the 10 top receiving countries of remittances in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt received the largest portion (29.6 billion dollars), and Iran ranked eighth by receiving around 1.3 billion dollars.

Lebanon was found to have the largest ratio of remittances to the GDP in the region, and Iran ranked tenth by the %0.2 share of the received remittances to its GDP.




Chart 26: Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa. (billion \$,2020)

Source: (Ratha & et al, 2021)




Chart 27: Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa, 2020 (percentage of GDP,2020)

Source: (Ratha & et al, 2021)

## The policies of countries to reduce the impact of the corona on migrant workers

Migrants are usually more susceptible to the loss of their jobs, the reduction of salary, and the lack of access to healthcare programs than native people. Residing under risky and crowded conditions, being employed as undocumented workers, and being unable to access social and healthcare support are some of the factors making the coronavirus-related crisis longer, deeper, and more extensive for migrants. Enforcing lockdowns, restricting travels, introducing social distancing regulations, and suspending economic

activities in many countries, particularly in leading receivers of migrants, have affected them considerably. Accordingly, the receiving countries faced serious problems in many areas where migrants' presence was required (e.g., health and agriculture). The following table illustrates some of the challenges experienced by migrants in different occupational classes.

The challenges faced by different types of migrants





## The challenges faced by different types of migrant workers

Table 16: Labour migrants challenges

category	challenges	example
Temporary international migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Job loss leads to economic hardship, loss of remittances for migrant's family, inability to repay debt incurred to finance migration, loss of employer provided housing, and legal status</li> <li>● Limited social protection</li> <li>● High risk of disease exposure and transmission due to living and working conditions</li> <li>● Lack of resources and travel restrictions may strand these workers who may not receive final pay if they have lost their job</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Most are in Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Malaysia through bilateral migration agreements with many countries in South and SouthEast Asia.</li> <li>● Other examples include Korea's Employment Permit System and the guest and seasonal worker programs in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand</li> </ul>
Informal international migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Same as temporary international migrants but these migrants also typically lack contracts and any social protection benefits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Origin and destination countries with long, porous borders (India, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, United States)</li> <li>● High-income countries where migrants may overstay visas (Europe, United States)</li> </ul>
Long- term international migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Job loss could jeopardize legal status</li> <li>● May not be eligible for certain types of social protection</li> <li>● Job loss may lead to a reduction in remittances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High-income countries (Australia, Canada, European Union, United Kingdom, United States)</li> </ul>
Internal migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Same as temporary international migrants without the implications for legal status in most cases</li> <li>● May face challenges accessing benefits if they are based on location or jurisdiction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Many developing countries</li> </ul>
Return migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Health risks for migrants moving in large groups and for populations at home</li> <li>● When back home, lack of employment opportunities, limited access to social safety nets, large debts accumulated to finance migration costs, families that are no longer receiving remittances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Many developing countries</li> </ul>

Source: (World bank, 2020c)

## The policies of countries on labor migrants

The sending and receiving countries of labor migrants adopted different programs and policies to face the crisis and its consequences. According to the agility of regulatory and policy-making systems of migration, these measures differed for their domestic and foreign labor force.

### Increasing the ratio of native labor force to migrant workers

A policy adopted by some leading receiving countries against labor migrants was the replacement of labor migrants with the native workforce. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait are among the countries that followed this policy (Alsahi, 2020). In Saudi Arabia, 300,000 migrant workers have already left the country, and 178,000 workers have decided to leave soon (Alsahi, 2020).

Around 10 million full-time jobs were lost in the UAE as such the number of full-time jobs in the country shrank by %16.9 in 2019. A policy pursued by the UAE was to allow affected businesses to revoke their contracts with migrants and refer their extra workers to the virtual markets of ministries so that other companies can employ them. Such policies themselves increased pressure on migrants (Alsahi, 2020).

Similarly, Kuwait was to decrease the ratio of migrants to the native population from %70 to %30 (Alsahi, 2020).

### Income support for labor migrants

New Zealand and Thailand implemented more comprehensive programs. All workers in New Zealand (including temporary and seasonal workers) were entitled to receive income support. Moreover, migrants being paid more than six months of their social security fees in Thailand were entitled to

receive support packages of the COVID19- (ADB, ILO & OECD, 2021).

### Renewing the residency permits of labor migrants

Some countries and regions made attempts to keep migrants' conditions normal; For example, Thailand showed more flexibility in renewing the residency permits of workers who changed their employers.

Moreover, Hong Kong and China added one month to the time spent to find a new job for migrant workers in domestic services, who had lost their jobs before July 2020 ,30. Russia suspended monthly payments for documents and allowed migrants to keep their jobs or find a new one (ESCAP, 2020).

Japan treated migrants with permanent residency as its citizens, and Australia provided income support services for migrants with permanent residency and allowed its international students to work more hours (ESCAP, 2020).

### Support to labor migrants from their countries of origin

The source countries (sending countries of labor migrants) provided migrants with conveniences. For example, the Philippines paid 10,000 Philippine pesos (about 200 dollars) to more than 270,000 Philippine migrants (However, it was half of the number of individuals applied for help by August ,15 2020). Moreover, the Ministry of Labor in the Philippines introduced a plan to re-employ Philippine migrants until the removal of restrictions (ABDI, ILO & OECD).

Nevertheless, many countries provided no support for their international workforce, and their migrants became vulnerable to the negative economic impacts of the COVID19-.

The Malaysian Ministry of Human

Resources suggested that if businesses have to lay off their employees, they should prioritize their migrant workers. Moreover, most migrants have no access to social security systems or state support services against the damages of the COVID19-. For example, labor migrants in Malaysia, who lost their jobs and neither had the chance to find another job or return to their countries, were not entitled to receive state support packages such as income supports (ABDI, ILO & OECD, 2021).

Canada temporarily suspended examining employment and permanent residency permits from March to the end of June. However, it started an online examination process on July 1 to travel to the country after reopening the borders. Canadian employers allowed their employees in management, research and development, education, and other public services to work online; however, foreign employees could only keep their jobs in Canada. The Canadian government enacted severe consequences for companies that ignored such regulations. A reason for this severe reaction is that when migrant employees are not present in the country, the government cannot collect their taxes, or the healthcare system will gain no profit from them; thus, companies and employees are not allowed to employ them, such people. On the other hand, the shortage of labor force in the agricultural sector made the federal government of Canada suggest special contracts to labor migrants with low skill levels so that they can enter Canada and work in agricultural seasons. Nonetheless, this shortage was so remarkable that the Canadian government persuaded many Canadian citizens to work in agriculture sector during the COVID19- pandemic (Triandafyllidou & Nalbandian, 2020).

Different countries used different positive and negative measures to adapt their labor migrants to the pandemic. Some of these policies were flexible and expansionary, while others were contractionary and aimed to limit the number of labor migrants.

## **b. The migration of healthcare workers during the Covid19-pandemic**

### **Labor migrants in the healthcare sector**

A significant portion of labor migrants that gained significant importance during the COVID19- outbreak concerns migrants with key functions, particularly in healthcare. The impact of migrant healthcare workers on global health and hygiene and the policies adopted by some countries have attracted considerable attention.

The COVID19- outbreak changed the approaches taken by the receiving countries towards their migrants. The OECD countries had relied on migrants even before the outbreak. For example, in Luxemburg and Australia, more than %50 of physicians had been foreigners (born in foreign countries) before the coronavirus crisis, and almost half of the physicians and two-thirds of the nurses in London were migrants. The outbreak changed public attitudes and awareness of the critical role of this sector of the labor force. Economies that receive migrants gained a thorough understanding of the effects of key labor migrants on their societies. Although migrants form only %4.7 of the labor force, their significance becomes highlighted when the labor force is analyzed in terms of key activities (Kumar, 2021).

The following Figure illustrates the ratio of migrants in key labor positions in European countries, ranging from %53 in the case of Luxemburg to %6 in Finland.

Migrants assumed a significant role among healthcare workers during the COVID19- pandemic in many advanced and high-income countries. For example, one out of each six physicians has been graduated from a foreign country in OECD countries, and the number of doctors and nurses born in a foreign country has increased by %20 over the past decade. In 2018, around %17 of the 156 million employees involved in the healthcare and nutrition sectors of the U.S. were migrants. Around six million migrants worked in the frontline of healthcare activities in the U.S. during the outbreak, which shows that they play a more significant role in fighting the disease. For example, in addition to the considerable number of workers employed in hospital wards, food factories, and the food production sectors, migrant doctors and medics in healthcare centers constitute %29 and %38 of the total number of doctors and medics in the U.S.,

respectively. Nevertheless, many migrant workers in the country (about %12) lost their jobs and were unemployed (MPI, 2020).

Many sending and receiving countries understood their reliance on the migrant labor force and specialists during the Covid19- pandemic and the closure of borders. Some required activities and occupations included domestic care and healthcare. A significant gap emerged between doctors and nurses' services and the cleaning services after the outbreak, and the need for healthcare centers for such services increased. Depending on the conditions of specialized work markets and value chains, the list of jobs described as "needed" includes healthcare workers, executive and office employees, healthcare personnel in the health sector, and guards (IMO, 2021).




Chart 28: Share of migrant workers in the essential workforce in European countries

Source: (Kumar, 2021)

## Labor force gap in the healthcare sector

92

By the coronavirus outbreak and increased demand for healthcare workers, the warnings by WHO and international institutions regarding the lack of healthcare specialists and their imbalanced distribution in this sector came true quite earlier than the expected date. However, the role of migrants employed in the healthcare sectors of many countries and their presence in the front line of fighting the COVID19- attracted much attention.

Getting access to healthcare workers in sufficient scales and skills is quite essential to attain health-related goals. However, all countries – whether developed or developing – face different degrees of issues related to education, establishment, maintenance, and improving their healthcare workers' performance (Cometto et al., 2016). The pre-coronavirus predictions of the World Health Organization (WHO) indicated that the world will face a growing need to supply healthcare workers in 165 countries by 2030, and the gap in the healthcare sector market will be about 40 million jobs. Moreover, the imbalance between the demand for healthcare workers and its supply will intensify if the sending trend continues. Estimates show that attaining the sustainable development goals of WHO requires more than 18 million healthcare workers by 2030 (Cometto et al., 2016). According to the estimates, the threshold of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) index\* is 4.45 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1000 persons, indicating the minimum concentration of the required healthcare workers by 2030; based on the estimates of WHO, the world will face a shortage of 15 million nurses by 2030 (Dempste & Smith,

2020). If the situation does not change and the required number is not provided, healthcare costs arising due to healthcare workers' inefficiency will amount to 500 billion dollars by 2030 (WHO, 2019).

However, the coronavirus outbreak and the impacts of healthcare workers' death and exhaustion caused the overhead costs to exceed the predicted values in 2019, and the situation became much more worrying than in the pre- pre-Covid19-era. In terms of the capacity of healthcare workers in different countries\*\*, the WHO (as the frontline of fighting the disease) has reported that high-income countries have the highest-quality healthcare workers and the largest healthcare centers commensurate to their population. Accordingly, Norway has the largest human capacity in healthcare by employing 1,049 healthcare workers per 10,000 Norwegians. Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland rank next, with 800 healthcare workers per 10,000 persons. Moreover, the U.S. and the U.K. rank the tenth and thirteenth with 682 and 664 healthcare workers per 10,000 persons, respectively. In general, high-income countries with an average of 580 healthcare workers per 10,000 people have almost 12 times more healthcare workers than low-income countries with 49 healthcare workers per 10,000 people. This indicates the gap between high-income and low-income countries regarding the distribution of human resources in the healthcare sector and makes fighting the crisis more problematic in low-income countries (ILOSTAT, 2020).

\* According to the ISIC rev. 4 classification

\*\* According to the ISIC rev. 4 classification

## The international mobility of healthcare workers

The migration of the expert healthcare workforce is usually from developing countries to developed countries; thus, it imposes financial losses and brain drain for the sending countries. The healthcare workers' migration is somehow a threat to the performance of the healthcare systems of many countries. In general, each country has to compensate for the inadequate healthcare workers using domestic or foreign sources. In other words, countries have to either supply their healthcare service providers from inside or foreign countries. Accordingly, a solution to this worrying issue is recruiting more doctors and nurses from abroad or facilitating their entry to a particular country (Forbes, 2020).

According to the WHO's estimates, the international migration of healthcare workers is increasing due to the contemporary global healthcare challenges such as population aging, discrepancies in the demographic and waging structures of different countries, epidemiological crises and the increased rates of chronic diseases, different capacities of training healthcare workers, the use of modern technologies, different employment methods for healthcare workers, and the lack of standard structures to identify and benefit from skills appropriately. Over the past decade, the number of migrant doctors and nurses in the OECD countries has increased by almost 60%; moreover, future predictions indicate that the healthcare workers' international migration will increase because of the deepening gap between the supply and economic demand of this field.

According to the above explanations and regarding the current situation and the shortage of healthcare workers on a global scale, migration management has gained particular importance in domestic and international policy-making. Due to the significance of migration, some international

organizations, including the E.U. and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) have started to collect data from volunteer countries, provide reports, and present the mobility map to provide the grounds for attaining a better understanding of the mobility trends, manage healthcare workers' migration, and purposively support the enforcement of the global statutes issued by the WHO concerning the employment of international healthcare workers. The latest presentation of these organizations included a considerable rise in mobility between southern-southern, northern-southern, and southern-northern regions. Simultaneously, the temporary migration trends such as the targeted recruitment and employment in different healthcare-related areas increases (WHO, 2018).

Among the European sending countries, migration occurs from countries in Eastern Europe such as Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria to the countries in the West of Europe, including the U.K., Southern Ireland, and the Netherlands. The impact of free movement on the healthcare systems of the above countries was evident during the pandemic, which caused to a new wave of healthcare workers emigration. According to the estimates of a major healthcare federation in Romania, the country's public healthcare system has almost 40,000 healthcare workers covering only 17.46% of the need for healthcare personnel in the Romanian public hospitals.

This challenging situation can also be observed in other countries in Eastern Europe such as Bulgaria. Accordingly, between 250 and 300 doctors leave the country annually to work abroad. Moreover, Poland lost at least 7% of its nurses and doctors due to their migrations between 2004 and 2014. Other countries of the region

face similar challenges, which have been augmented due to the recent financial crisis. Accordingly, the impacts of such challenges can be seen on healthcare workers and the performance of healthcare systems in such countries.

The migration of doctors and nurses in many countries is considered a challenge and damages the healthcare system. However, some countries (e.g., Philippines), plan to send their healthcare workers abroad and exploit the receiving countries' needs to keep their unemployment rates low and respond to their subjects' tendency for migration.

### **The impact of the Covid19-pandemic on the exhaustion and reduction of healthcare workers**

Healthcare workers are often exposed to infection and even death by the coronavirus outbreak across the globe (Forbes, 2020). Concerns about the health and safety of healthcare workers who fight on frontlines are pretty extensive. The infection of some doctors and nurses is inevitable due to the shortage of safety equipment and facilities and the high-stress level in hospitals. The consequences of such shortages in healthcare workers will be devastating for doctors, nurses, and patients. Furthermore, many healthcare workers were kept in quarantines due to the infection and could not provide services in their workplaces (Forbes, 2020). Accordingly, the supply of healthcare workers faced serious challenges in many countries despite the increasing demand.

Hospitals need to have a sufficient number of nurses, and shortages in this regard cause the reduction of hospital beds and double the pressure on patients and healthcare workers. The coronavirus outbreak was one of the major causes of the reduced number of nurses. Around %15 of patients with the COVID19- in Wuhan, China, were nurses,

and the number was 14 and 10 percent in Spain and Italy, respectively (Dempste & Smith, 2020). In Romania, the shortage of healthcare workers and the lack of congruency on doctors' ages in the country (on average 60-50 years old) increased the rate of healthcare workers' infection by the ratio of 1:5 considering the total population. However, working on the frontline of fighting the pandemic is quite dangerous, and a large portion of those affected with the disease worldwide are healthcare workers (Center for Global Development, 2020).

On the other hand, about 1.4 million jobs in the healthcare sector were lost during January and April 2020 (Batalava et al., 2021). One of the impacts of the coronavirus on the healthcare sector was the increased use of distance visits and treatments. Accordingly, a considerable portion of non-emergency treatment sessions was held by phone or video calls. The use of distance health services was almost %11 in 2019, while it rose by %46 by the end of April 2020 (Batalava et al., 2021). Such an increase in online healthcare services led to the loss of some jobs in this sector.

### **Migration plans and policies regarding to healthcare workers during the Covid19- pandemic**

In general, the migration policies related to supplying the required specialist healthcare workers were pursued through the following three mechanisms: (1) Employing specialist healthcare workers usually according to international agreements and compacts signed between states, (2) Recruiting international students in medical and healthcare sectors, and (3) Introducing plans to recruit migrant specialists.

Around one year after signing the Global Compact for Migration (U.N., 2019; Shaffer et al., 2019) that raised hopes for the establishment of a global regime to better support migrants, the COVID19-

outbreak caused a significant regression in the attempts to make migration "safe" and "regulated." The world witnessed a series of measures, including the closure of borders to contain the spread of the virus, restrictions imposed on the flow and migration of skilled workforce, engineers, and even in some cases, healthcare specialists. Nevertheless, migrants in the healthcare sector experienced a different policy response. Since countries' healthcare systems across the globe were under significant pressure, they often exempted healthcare workers from migration restrictions. Although the rate of migration decreased all over the world, nurses and healthcare specialists considered as exceptions. However, healthcare specialists' migration decreased despite such policies, and the sending countries influenced their mobility by imposing multiple limitations and restrictions.

During the outbreak, major high-income receiving countries relied on the recruitment and entry of international nurses similar to the pre-pandemic era. Accordingly, the lack of healthcare workers in low-income countries was deepened by offering attractive options to recruit their nurses. In other words, if the country-level policies on the supply of nurses do not change, the increasing pre-pandemic trend of nurses' migration from the low-income countries to the high-income countries will continue; thus, the unequal global distribution of nurses will become more apparent and more profound.

WHO propose different responses at national and international levels for retaining and supporting health care workers (WHO, 2019).

At the national level, policy packages have to be introduced to improve the retainment of trained nurses within their homelands and ensure the sufficient capacity of the required domestic training. This requires a strong

commitment to analyze the national nursing personnel regularly and systematically using different datasets and predict the future of the labor force, particularly in countries with limited human resources). Moreover, policy solutions are required to reach an agreed response on actions, which are of priority regarding the supply and retainment of nurses in their homelands.

At the international level, the international policies that will come after the COVID19-pandemic have to prioritize mutual and regional agreements to encourage and facilitate the mobility of healthcare workers, mainly from wealthier regions, towards more vulnerable places.

If policy responses to medical and nursing personnel are implemented effectively and timely both at the national and international levels, the sustainability of human force in this sector can be fulfilled in the future. Policy strategies have to guarantee significant investments in countries with limitations in training, employing, and retaining nurses and other healthcare specialists by supplying domestic budgets and international developmental assistance (Buchan et al., 2019). It is essential to be committed to monitoring the international trends of nurses' mobility effectively both at national and international levels to determine "nurses' adequacy" in planning, coordinating, and preparing themselves to fight the pandemic globally and other unexpected health crises (Shaffer, Rocco & Stievano, 2020).

Healthcare workers worldwide have had considerable desire and possibilities for migration and international mobility despite facing the restricting laws and regulations of countries. However, the coronavirus outbreak and the resulting critical conditions caused an easing of such policies. The healthcare systems of many countries worldwide relied on migrant (foreign) personnel during the Covid19- outbreak.



These healthcare workers were divided into two classes: those who had graduated from another countries and those who had been educated in the receiving countries after their migration. Some examples in this regard have been presented below.

### **Adopting the policy of reserved healthcare workers by sending countries**

As the most significant country among the major senders of healthcare personnel, particularly nurses, the Philippines suspended the migration of its healthcare workers to other countries by the emergence of the crisis on April 2nd, 2020. The Philippines adopted a "reserved" healthcare workers policy to replace its international healthcare workers with its domestic personnel (in case they are infected). However, countries that had signed agreements to exchange healthcare workers with the Philippines ignored this policy and went to extremes to receive healthcare workers from the country. For example, Germany received 150 healthcare workers from the country according to the mutual agreement signed before the crisis. Although the Philippines has almost 300000 extra nurses annually, it suspended many mutual agreements. Moreover, although the country had sent a large number of healthcare workers (in the field of nursing) to other countries before the emergence of the pandemic, it is suffering from a shortage of doctors (Channel News Asia, 2020).

### **Designing quick and flexible ways to recruit healthcare workers by receiving countries**


Increasing evidence shows that the COVID19- outbreak can be cyclical and seasonal, and it is possible to witness abnormal variants despite the production and distribution of vaccines. Accordingly,

countries have to create systems for the quick and circular implementation of their healthcare workers internationally to prevent the pandemic and reduce the mortality rate. In this manner, countries improving their condition can mobilize and send their extra healthcare workers to countries in the midst of a severe crisis. This can be fulfilled if countries, particularly the high-income ones, quickly identify and investigate skill certificates, issue flexible visas, and support the healthcare personnel. Some instances of the quick and flexible measures adopted by some countries are summarized below.

Canada allowed international medical graduates who had already passed their exams or graduated from a Canadian medical school within the past two years to apply for temporary permits and work in its healthcare system (Thevenot, 2020).

Some states in Germany invited migrant doctors who waited for the accreditation of their degrees to be employed on the frontlines of fighting the pandemic. According to the estimates of Business Insider, 14000 foreign doctors waited their documents and degrees to be approved so that they could register their equivalence certificates in Germany. This significant number indicates the potential number of medical personnel to fight the coronavirus, and some German states took advantage of the opportunity (Wallis, 2020).

In the U.K., hundreds of migrant doctors were summoned by the government and the General Medical Council (GMC) to approve their letters of credit so that they could assist the NHS in its fight against the COVID19- pandemic (Taylor, 2020).



3 W 2

  
**JNCR**  
ON  
Emergency





# Chapter 3: Forced Migration

3



## Forced Migration

100

As a result of conflict, political, ethnic, and religious persecution, natural disasters etc. people have seen no other way than leaving their homelands. In such situations, they attempt to either seek asylum in other countries (Bacaian, 2011). Accordingly, the COVID-19 outbreak made a more profound impact on such vulnerable populations as asylum-seekers and refugees. Although little information is available on the spread of the COVID-19 among asylum-seekers, the pandemic posed numerous challenges to the population (Reynold, 2021).

During the pandemic, refugees usually have had no sufficient access to national health-care systems, including medical insurance and healthcare services, and inequalities such as sociocultural obstacles and xenophobic attitudes. Refugees have no right to legal residency and usually continue to live on the margins of their receiving societies with limited access to essential services. Many refugees are disproportionately employed in high-risk workplaces such as factories, workshops, agriculture, food services, and the frontlines of healthcare services, which make them more vulnerable to the COVID-19. Moreover, some reports indicate the illegal deportation and the violation of asylum-seekers and refugees on the grounds of Charthting the COVID-19.

On the other hand, limitations in mobility and the closure of borders have practically made asylum seekers' applications for international support impossible. Nevertheless, major emphasis has been placed on taking care of asylum-seekers and refugees according to the sustainable development goals and global compacts concerning these groups.

### Number of refugees worldwide

- Although the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration and displacement have not been thoroughly investigated on a global scale, the UNHCR's reports indicate a significant decrease in the frequency of new asylum seekers in most regions (about 1.5 million below the expected number for normal conditions). Similarly, the U.N. estimates that the pandemic may decrease the number of global international migrations during the first six months of 2020 by around 2 million people (i.e., almost 27% percent less than the expected international migration rate from July 2019 to June 2020). By the end of 2020, the number of people who were displaced by force due to the conflicts, violence, and the violation of human rights increased to 82.4 million, and this was the highest documented number according to the available data (UNHCR, 2021e).

- The international support regime, particularly the right to apply as refugees and the principle of non-refoulement, faced considerable challenges in 2020. Consequently, many countries limited or rejected the applications of asylums fleeing from conflict or harassment. Despite such limitations, the number of refugees increased by almost 250,000 in 2020; thus, it increased from 20.4 million in 2019 to around 20.7 million refugees under the UNHCR's mandate and 5.7 million (Palestinian) refugees protected by the UNRWA by the end

of 2020. Moreover, 3.9 million Venezuelans were displaced in foreign countries

- The UNHCR has reported that the developing countries hosted 86% of the total number of refugees and the Venezuelan displaced people in 2020. Moreover, 27% of the total population of refugees lived in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, 73% of the total refugees and the Venezuelan displaced people were hosted by their neighboring countries. From this perspective, Turkey itself hosts the largest population of

refugees in the world (3.7 million refugees). Colombia ranks second by hosting 1.7 million refugees, including the Venezuelan displaced people. Moreover, Iran ranks 10th in the world by hosting 800,000 refugees.

- More than half of the refugees (68%) and the Venezuelan displaced people come from 5 countries. In this regard, Syria ranks 1st with a population of 6.7 million refugees worldwide. Moreover, Venezuela ranks 2nd by having 4 million international displaced.




Chart 29. Total number of refugees in the world (2010-2020)

Source: (UNHCR data finder)

1-It should be noted that the majority of the 3.9 Venezuelan displaced people are not classified as refugees; however, the statistics published as part of the report on the global trend of displaced people around the globe (UNHCR) regard all Venezuelan displaced people as refugees.




Chart 30. Major countries hosting refugees and Venezuelan displaced person- 2020  
Source: (UNHCR, 2021e)




Chart 31. Major source countries of refugees- 2020  
Source: (UNHCR, 2021e)

## Number of asylum-seekers worldwide

### • Asylum seekers

The governments or UNHCR decide to assign the status of "Refugee" to some asylum-seekers via a process known as the Refugee Status Determination (RSD). The

statistics reported by the UNHCR indicate that around 4,140,000 people were classified as asylum-seekers in 2020.



Chart 32. Total number of asylum seekers in the world (2010-2020)

Source: (UNHCR data finder)




Chart 33. Major countries hosting asylum seekers- 2020

Source: (UNHCR data finder)

1. Refugee Status Determination (RSD)



▪ The U.S., Peru, and Turkey hosted the largest number of asylum-seekers worldwide in 2020.

▪ The largest numbers of asylum-seekers were from Venezuela, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 2020.




Chart 34. Major source countries of asylum seekers- 2020  
Source: (UNHCR data finder)

### ▪ New asylum applicants in 2020

The first time asylum applicants in 2020 decreased by 45% (1.1 million persons vs. 2 million persons in the previous years). The observed decrease was the most remarkable annual reduction since the registration of asylum-seekers' data began in 2000.

- In 2019, the top ten destinations of the new asylum-seekers registered fewer numbers of asylum seekers. The decreased rate ranged from 14% in the U.S. to 80% in Peru.

The U.S., Germany, and Spain are still countries with the largest numbers of registered new asylum-seekers in 2020.

- In 2020, a majority of the registered asylum applications were made by citizens from Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Syria. Although above 80% of the applications made by the Venezuelans were registered in the U.S., almost all Afghans and Syrians registered their applications in Europe.




Chart 35. Major countries for individual registration of new asylum-seekers- 2020  
Source: (UNHCR, 2021e)




Chart 36. Major source countries of new asylum applications- 2020  
Source: (UNHCR, 2021e)

## Number of asylum-seekers worldwide

According to statistics, 251,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin in 2020. Some cases of return were facilitated by the UNHCR and its associates; however, the other cases were organized by the refugees themselves. The rate was 21% below the

number of 317,200 returnees in 2019. About half of the refugees (122,000 refugees) returned to South Sudan in 2020, followed by Uganda (74,000 refugees), Sudan (22,500 refugees), and Ethiopia (14,500 refugees) (UNHCR, 2021e).



Chart 37. The number of refugee returnees to the origin countries (2010-2020)

Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)

## Resettlement of refugees

Resettlement is one of the main programs developed by the UNHCR to support refugees in their countries of destination. However, this option was applicable for fewer refugees due to the significant decrease in the reception capacity of the U.S. and the travel restriction rates caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, several countries fulfilled their commitments regarding resettlement as a vital tool to support refugees. The resettlement of refugees decreased to its lowest level during almost the past two decades.

- The three-year strategy on resettlement, which started on May 2019, anticipated the resettlement of 70,000 refugees in 31 countries in 2020. Since the travel restrictions posed by the COVID-19 outbreak stopped the resettlement plans temporarily from March to June 2020, the predicted resettlements partially came true.

- According to the UNHCR, 39,500 resettlement applications were registered in 2020, and 34,400 refugees were resettled in 21 countries, two-thirds of whom were assisted by the UNHCR. This accounted for only one-third of the refugees resettled in 2019 (107,700 persons).



Chart 38. Refugees resettled in the third countries (2016-2020)

Source: (UNHCR data finder)

- Out of the 9,600 refugees settled in 51 countries in 2020, the U.S. mainly hosted refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (25%), Ukraine (18%), and Myanmar (17%). Moreover, 9,200 refugees, who were mostly Syrian, Iraqi, and Eritrean, were settled in Canada.
- In general, Syrians and Eritreans accounted for 12% of the total number of refugees settled in 2020. The remaining refugees were from 82 countries, including Iraq, Eritrea, Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan, and Afghanistan.





Chart 39. Major source countries of refugees resettled in 2020  
Source: (UNHCR data finder)



### Naturalization of refugees

In 2020, 33,800 refugees from 126 countries were naturalized in 28 countries. While there was no significant difference between the number of countries naturalized their refugees in 2019 (28 countries in 2020 vs. 25 countries in 2019), the total number of refugees naturalized in 2020 was one-third below the 55,000 naturalization cases in 2019.

- Out of the 33,800 naturalization cases worldwide, the Netherlands ranked first following the naturalization of 25,700 refugees (three-fourths of the total naturalization cases). In general, 85% of the naturalization cases in 2020 were reported by European countries. Moreover 4,986 refugees in Canada and 2,515 refugees in France naturalized in 2020.




Chart 40. The number of naturalized refugees in the world (2010-2020)

Source: (UNHCR data finder)

## Irregular migrant deaths

Through the project called “Missing Migrants”, the International Organization for Migration has started collecting and reporting the statistics of (undocumented) migrants who passed away on their route to the host countries since 2014. According to the statistics, 15,792 migrants around the globe passed away while migrating to other countries during 2014-2020. The statistics, however, include only migrants who passed

away on borders and seas or because of road accidents, violence against migrants, or medical/health-related complications during their journeys. Thus, the actual number of irregular migrants who die on migration routes is very higher than the formal statistics. For instance, the mortality rate of undocumented migrants in the host countries or in the refugee camps has not been added to these statistics.




Chart 41. Undocumented migrant deaths in the process of migration towards an international destination (2014-2020)

Source: (Missing Migrants Project, retrieved 02 June 2021)

### New internally displaced people (IDP)

By December 31st, 2020, the number of internally displaced people worldwide reached a record number of 55 million. Forty-eight million (85%) of IDPs have escaped their places of residence because of conflict and violence, while about 7 million persons have become internally displaced due to natural disasters (IDMC, 2021).

-In 2020, 40.5 million new IDP cases were recorded, and that is the highest number over the past decade. Out of the total number of new IDPs in 2020, 9.8 million were related to violence and conflict, while 30.7 million were due to natural disasters. The

COVID-19 pandemic posed new challenges due to the issues such as social distancing measures and the observance of health in crowded places (e.g., emergency settlements). Despite receiving preliminary warnings on the evacuation of endangered settlements, many people decided not to leave their homes out of the fear of the pandemic. Nonetheless, the mobility rate arising from natural disasters was unprecedented over the past decade despite restrictions on mobility due to the coronavirus outbreak (IDMC, 2021).




Chart 42. Internally displaced people by conflict and disaster (2011-2020)

Source: (IDMC, 2021)







# Chapter 4

## Return migration

4

## Return migration worldwide

Migration is a universal phenomenon that has existed regardless of time and place in every era and country. Migration increased unbelievably during the 20th century due to the ease of communicating information, safer intercontinental trips, and the problems arising from the world wars. Therefore Policymakers have been confronted with very different challenges related to migration issues (Sana'i, 2019).

Since such mobility was usually considered as one-way migration, so migration, particularly the migration of highly- skilled people and specialists was considered as a big challenge for the origin countries. However, the evidence obtained over the past decades has shown that migration is not necessarily a phenomenon only with negative consequences. What distinguishes the migration of human resources in the developing and underdeveloped countries from that of the developed countries is that such cases are one-way in the latter and result in losing the human capital forever. In other words, the sending country's need to its human resources is what makes migration a negative issue. However, suppose a convenient ground is established to benefit from the capacity of the international migrants of a country. In that case, it can both bring about economic benefits for the sending country and lead to the mobility of skills, knowledge, ideas, and wealth across national borders.

In other words, the threat of human resources' migration, particularly the skillful human resources, can be turned into an opportunity to benefit from migrants' capital, knowledge, network, etc. The approach adopted by countries in facing the issue and their policymaking and management

methods distinguishes different countries regarding migration as an opportunity or a threat. The fact is that if no coherent policy approach is proposed by a ruling system or a society to control and manage the phenomenon of migration, the migration of human resources will turn into a significant crisis and challenge. On the other hand, if countries rely on effective programs and policies to benefit from the capacity of their international migrants, they can gain more advantages compared to countries that have smaller shares of the mobility of human resources.

Return migration is the most typical strategy to reverse the process of brain drain. The return migration can be either forced or voluntary. Although millions of migrants return to their countries of origin annually, all the return migration instances are not necessarily documented (Migration Data Portal, 2021).

Information on the forced return of migrants is usually collected by the national and international statistics offices and the border protection and immigration law enforcement agencies (Migration Data Portal, 2021). Moreover, the information related to voluntary return is not usually documented due to the difficulty in keeping track of migrants after a term of employment or education abroad. Accordingly, no exact data are available regarding the global rate of voluntary return. Only a few countries monitor their migrants' voluntary returns or have established a database to keep track of their returned migrants (ILO, 2019). For example, China has adopted dynamic and effective policies on the return of Chinese migrants and has produced reliable statistics in this regard.

## Classifying countries according to the return migration

The migration of highly- educated people is an undeniable fact in developing countries. Such migration can bring about major economic and social losses for countries if they completely break their ties with their countries of origin. In other words, if there is no sufficient ground to benefit from migrants' capacity, they will not participate in the development and the enhancement of national production in their countries. Instead, other countries will benefit from their work and expertise.

Adopting the "Return Policies" is an important solution for developing countries. Return migration is the most prominent strategy in reversing the migration of highly- educated people.

Due to the significance of global experiences as a guide for planners and policymakers in the field of migration, this section aims to investigate the return policies in nine countries selected from Asia, the Americas, Europe, and Africa<sup>\*</sup>. These countries were placed into four major classes according to their approaches towards return migration: passive, reactive, active, and proactive.

The return policies of a developing country have to enhance the tendency to return among people, and there should be enough readiness to benefit from the returned migrants' potentials. Based on these two factors, the selected countries were classified into four categories.

The first group is called the passive countries; For example, although Egypt has considerable diaspora populations worldwide, it has not established the required infrastructure to benefit from them and has not adopted an effective policy to make its migrants return. Accordingly,

the tendency to return is quite low among Egyptian migrants. Consequently, the country has only been able to compensate a portion of the economic losses arising from the extensive migration of its workforce by facilitating the attraction of migrants' capital and remittances. As a result, Egypt and countries in similar conditions are considered passive countries.

The second group is called the "Reactive countries." This group covers a much larger number of countries and is concerned with those that understand the importance of return migration and have adopted limited policies to integrate the returned migrants. However, they are not ready enough to exploit the capacity of the returned migrants. In other words, return migration in such countries is primarily due to the migrants' personal decisions, and the government incentives are not attractive enough to influence their choices. The countries in this group include Malaysia, Iran, Turkey, Argentina, and Mexico. Although these countries face moderate waves of return migration, they have not provided a convenient ground to benefit from them and have only established conveniences for their re-integration. Disregarding the provision of a ground to benefit from return migrants' potentials can motivate them to migrate again; thus, such issues decrease the tendency to return within the whole diaspora of that particular country.

The third group is called the "Active countries", which took a step further than the reactive countries. These countries have provided rather convenient grounds to benefit from their returned migrants' capacity and have devised return policies to encourage their international diaspora to return or maintain relations with their countries of origin. India and Poland are

<sup>\*</sup> The countries included China, India, Malaysia, Turkey, and Iran (Asia), Mexico and Argentina (the Americas), Poland (Europe), and Egypt (Africa)

classified in this group. While Poland has created diverse job opportunities, India has provided opportunities in the I.T. industry. Accordingly, the two countries have managed to make optimal use of the potentials of their diaspora and encourage them to return temporarily or permanently.

The fourth group is called the "Proactive countries", which could get quite ready to attract their returned migrants by making profound changes in their economy, education, etc. Accordingly, their promising prospects have led to an extensive tendency

among migrants to return home. Only China in this group has managed to make fundamental economic and educational reforms to turn the threat of brain drain into an opportunity for the full-scale development of the country (Iran Migration Observatory\* 2021).

In the following section, the case of China (as the most successful country in terms of return migration) will be reviewed briefly, and some statistics on the highly- educated Chinese people's return to their country is presented.




Figure 7- Categorization of countries' return migration approaches  
Source: (Iran Migration Observatory, 2021)

\* Taken from "The policies of the return of highly- educated migrants to the developing countries: a case study of Iran" (in print)

### China as the most successful country in terms of return migration

-China is considered one of the major senders of migrants worldwide. The population of Chinese migrants significantly increased from around 4,232,000 persons in 1990 to above 10,461,000 persons in 2020 (United Nations, 2021).

-Since 2003, adopting the Open Door policy by China has increased the number of Chinese students in foreign universities considerably. As a result, the government of China has come to understand the importance of the phenomenon of brain drain and has decided to take actions to reverse the process in the form of recruiting the Chinese highly- educated migrants (National Elite Organization, 2013).

-China has managed to turn the threat of brain drain into an opportunity for the

full-scale development of the country by relying on economic and educational reforms and adopting some policies to encourage its migrants to return. The country's most important and efficient policy in terms of the return of highly-educated people in the Thousand Talents Plan initiated in 2008 (Hao, Yan, Guo & 2017).

-China pursues the maximum benefit of the circulation of its students by maintaining the high levels of dispatching, recruiting, and returning its migrant students, and adopting this policy has resulted in a positive overflow for the country. Accordingly, the ratio of the returned Chinese highly- educated individuals to those leaving China has increased since 2015, reaching its peak in 2019.




Chart 43- Number of international students in China, Chinese students abroad and Chinese specialists returning home (2008-2019)

Source: (China Ministry of Education, 2019) (China Ministry of Education, 2020a) (China Ministry of Education, 2020b) (UIS, 2021)



**Part 2: A review of the trends of international  
migration around the globe**




**Chapter 5:**

**The status and rank of Iran in terms of  
the international mobility of students**

**5**





## The status and rank of Iran in terms of the international mobility of students

120

Regarding the trends on the population of migrant Iranian students, it should be argued that the number of Iranian students in foreign universities increased 3.2 times during 18-2000 (increasing from 17,477 students in 2000 to 56,376 students in 2018). However, the critical point is that such increase mainly occurred during 11-2004 when the population of Iranian international students suddenly soared from the level of 20,000 to the level of 50,000; thus, it can be said that the population of Iranian students has increased 2.5 times during the eight years. In terms of sending international students, Iran's ranking rose from 28th to 12th, which is the most significant surge in the country over the past two decades. It should be noted that during 18-2011, the population of Iranian international students was stable at the level of 50,000 students, and the rank of Iran retreated from 12th to 19th. In general, three main reasons can be mentioned for the stable number of Iranian international students over the past few years:

1. The increased exchange rate of dollar to Rials and the consequent increase in educational migration costs, particularly for students not receiving financial assistance.
2. The visa restrictions imposed by the U.S. government on Iranian students (Note that the U.S. is the priority of the Iranian students).
3. The COVID19- pandemic slowing down or stopping the educational migration procedures in Iran and worldwide.

In addition to the stable number of Iranian international students over the past few

years, a new trend can be observed in terms of the destinations of Iranian students. North America and Western Europe have always been the popular destinations of Iranian students. However, the stricter visa regulations imposed by the U.S. and the currency devaluation that considerably augmented the costs of educational migrations made Iranian students select countries with more lenient visa regulations and lower education costs (e.g., Germany, Canada, and Italy) or the neighboring countries (e.g., Turkey and Armenia).

Regarding the international students in Iran, despite the increasing trend of such students in Iran, the country's approach to them has been chiefly passive; thus, most foreign students studying in Iran are the second and third generations of Afghans born in Iran. In other words, the Iranian universities have played no role in their recruitment. Attracting foreign students can be a convenient economic solution since Iran faces issues such as the reduced number of Iranian students in universities and the disappearance of job opportunities created in higher education.

- The number of Iranian international students has increased by around %6 compared to 2017 (from 53,220 students to 56,376 students).
- The number of international students in Iran increased by almost 5.5 times during 19-2011 (from 5,458 students to 30,951 students). Moreover, the number of international students increased by 44,350 students in 2020.

Table 17 - status of Iran in inbound and outbound student mobility

The general situation of Iran in student migration		
Number of Iranian students abroad in 2018	Number	56,376
	Rank of Iran	19
Number of foreign students in Iran in 2018	Number	30,951
	Rank of Iran	31
Number of returning Iranians in the cooperation plan with non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists until April 2021	Number	1989

Source: (UIS, 2021) (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021)

### a. The Iranian international students

- The number of Iranian international students increased by 3.2 times during 2018-2000. The number of Iranian students in foreign universities was stable (50,000) during the period.
- In 2018, almost %1.6 of Iranian students were registered in foreign universities.

The rank of Iran in terms of sending international students

- During 2018-2010, Iran's ranking in terms of sending international students ranged from 12 to 20.





Chart 44 - Population (cumulative) of Iranian students abroad from 2000-2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)



45 - Iran global rank in outbound student mobility  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

### The main destinations of Iranian students

- The U.S., Turkey, Germany, Italy, and Canada were the five top destinations of the Iranian international students in 2018.




Chart 46 - Top ten destinations of Iranian students in 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 47 - Top ten destinations of Iranian students based on the latest available data  
 Source: (UIS, 2021) (open doors, 2021) (Austrade, 2021)

### The population of Iranian students in a selected group of countries

#### The population of Iranian students in the U.S.

The number of international students in the U.S. during the academic year :2020-2019 1,075,496 students

- China, India, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Canada have the highest shares of the

international student market in the U.S.

- The population of Iranian students in the U.S. universities was 11,451 students in 2019, which they formed %1 of the international student market in the U.S.




Chart 48 - Student sending share of selected countries in the US international student market in 2019-2020 (percentage)  
 Source: (open doors, 2021)

- In the mid20-th century, Iran was among the 10 top countries that sent the largest number of students to the U.S. (600 students).
- When the Islamic Revolution took place, Iran was at the top of the international student market in the U.S. by sending 51,000 students.

Since the 1990s, Iran has left the top 10 list of the countries sending students to the U.S.

- In 2019, the number of Iranian students in the U.S. decreased by almost %6 compared to 12,142) 2018 students in 2018 and 11,451 students in 2019).

Table 18 - Comparison of the number of Iranian students in the United States during the years 1950-2020

1949-50			1979-80			2019-20		
Country	Number	Contribution (%)	Country	Number	Contribution (%)	Country	Number	Contribution (%)
Canada	4,400	16.5	Iran	51,000	16.5	China	373,000	34.6
Taiwan	3,600	13.8	Taiwan	18,000	13.8	India	193,000	18
India	1,400	5.1	Nigeria	16,000	5.1	South Korea	50,000	4.6
UK	800	3.1	Canada	15,000	3.1	Saudi Arabia	31,000	2.9
MexicoMexico	800	3.1	Japan	12,000	3.1	Canada	26,000	2.4
Cuba	700	2.8	Hong Kong	10,000	2.8	Vietnam	24,000	2.2
Philippines	700	2.7	Venezuela	10,000	2.7	Taiwan	24,000	2.2
Germany	700	2.5	Saudi Arabia	10,000	2.5	Japan	18,000	1.6
Columbia	600	2.2	India	9,000	2.2	Brazil	17,000	1.6
Iran	600	2.2	Thailand	7,000	2.2	Mexico	14,000	1.3
Other Countries	12,100	46	Other Countries	129,000	46	Other Countries	307,000	28.5
Total	26,400	100	Total	286,000	100	Total	1,075,000	100

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 49 - Population of Iranian students in the United States in the period 2000-2019

Source: (UIS, 2021) (open doors, 2021)




Chart 50 - Rank of Iran sending students to the United States in the period 2011-2019  
Source: (open doors, 2021)

- The rank of Iran in sending international students to the U.S. ranged from 11 to 20 during 19-2011. Iran ranked 13th in sending international students to the U.S. during the 20-2019 academic year.
- Most Iranian students in the U.S. (almost %75) are involved in the higher education (master's and Ph.D.) programs.
- More than half of the Iranian students in the U.S. are studying engineering.
- Iran ranked fifth among the 10 top receivers of the temporary educational visas for the Ph.D. programs during 2019-2010.
- Iran ranked fourth regarding the number of international Ph.D. students in the U.S. in 2019.



Chart 51 - Iranian students in the United States by degree (percentage)  
Source: (open doors, 2021)




Chart 52 - Academic profile of Iranian students in different fields in American universities (percentage)  
Source: (open doors, 2021)




Chart 53 - Top Ten Countries Receiving US temporary Doctoral Visa During 2010-2019  
Source: (NSF, 2020)

Table 19 - Top 20 countries with temporary doctoral visa holders in the United States in 2019

Rank	Country	Recipients of temporary doctoral student visas in 2020
1	China	6,305
2	India	2,050
3	South Korea	1,164
4	Iran	959
5	Saudi Arabia	553
6	Taiwan	491
7	Canada	442
8	Turkey	405
9	Bangladesh	291
10	Brazil	252
11	Nepal	239
12	Colombia	203
13	Iraq	203
14	Mexico	188
15	Italy	170
16	Vietnam	168
17	Egypt	163
18	Thailand	159
19	Germany	152
20	Sri Lanka	150

Source: (NSF, 2020)



## The population of Iranian students in Turkey

- The number of international students in Turkey in 125,138 :2018 students
- Syria, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have the highest shares of the international student market in Turkey. These five countries account for %50 of the international student market in Turkey.
- In 2018, Iran had 6,418 students in Turkey and had a -5percent share of the international student market in that country.
- The lower costs of education in Turkey compared to other countries is one of the reasons for the increased population of Iranian students in that country.
- The number of Iranian students studying in Turkey in 2018 increased by %5 compared to 6,099) 2017 students in 2017 vs. 6,418 students in 2018).
- Iran ranked fourth in terms of sending international students to Turkey in 2018.




Chart 54 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Turkey in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 55 - Number of Iranian students in Turkey during the years 2000-2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 56 - The top five sending student countries to Turkey in 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

### The population of Iranian students in Germany

- The number of international students in Germany in 311,738 :2018
- China, India, Australia, Russia, and France had the highest shares of the international student market in Germany.
- Iran had %1.7 of the international student

market in Germany in 2018.

- The number of Iranian students studying in Germany in 2018 increased by %14 compared to 4,646) 2017 students in 2017 vs. 5,565 students in 2018).




Chart 57 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Germany in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)

▪ China, India, Australia, Russia, and France were the five top senders of international

students to Germany. Iran ranked 15th in this regard.




Chart 58 - Number of Iranian students in Germany from 2013 to 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 59 - The top five sending student countries to Germany in 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

## The population of Iranian students in Italy

- The number of international students in Italy in 106,611 :2018 students
- China, Albania, Romania, Iran, and India had the highest shares of the international

student market in Italy.

- Iran had 4,535) %4 students) of the international student market in Italy.




Chart 60 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Italy in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)

- The number of Iranian students studying in Italy in 2018 increased by %6 compared to 4,265) 2017 students in 2017 to 4,535 students in 2018).

- Iran ranked fourth regarding the number of international students in Italy in 2018.




Chart 61 - Number of Iranian students in Italy from 2000 to 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 62 - The top five sending student countries to Italy in 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

### The population of Iranian students in Canada

- The number of international students in Canada in 224,548 :2018
- China, India, France, the U.S., and Nigeria had the highest shares of the international

student market in Canada.

- Iran had 4,535) %2 students) of the international student market in Canada in 2018.




Chart 63 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Canada in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 64 - Number of Iranian students in Canada from 2000 to 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

- The number of Iranian students studying in Canada in 2018 increased by about 7% compared to 3,884) 2017 students in 2017 vs. 4,146 students in 2018).
- Iran ranked eighth in terms of sending international students to Canada in 2018.




Chart 65 - The top ten sending student countries to Canada in 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

## The population of Iranian students in Australia

- The number of international students in Canada: 444,514 students
- China, India, Nepal, Vietnam, and Malaysia had the highest shares of international students in Australia.
- Iran had 2,328 (0.5% students) of the international student market in Australia in 2018.

- The number of Iranian students studying in Australia in 2018 increased by 2,153 (8%) students in 2017 vs. 2,328 students in 2018).
- China, India, Nepal, Vietnam, and Malaysia were the five top countries in sending international students to Australia. Iran ranked 23rd by sending 2,328 students.




Chart 66 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Australia in 2018 (percentage)  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 67 - Number of Iranian students in Australia from 2002 to 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 68 - The top five sending student countries to Australia in 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

### The population of Iranian students in Hungary

- There were 32,332 of international students in 2018.
- Germany, Romania, China, Serbia, and Iran were the five top countries in sending

international students to Hungary.

- Iran had %6 of the international student market in Hungary by sending 1,878 students.




Chart 69 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Hungary in 2018 (percentage)  
Source: (UIS, 2021)



▪ The number of Iranian students studying in Hungary in 2018 increased by %8 compared to 2,153) 2017 students in 2017 vs. 2,328

students in 2018).

▪ Iran ranked fifth in 2018 in terms of sending international students to Hungary.




Chart 70 - Number of Iranian students in Hungary from 2001 to 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 71 - The top five sending student countries to Hungary in 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

## The population of Iranian students in India

- The number of international students in India in 2019 was 47,424
- Nepal, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nigeria were the five top countries in sending international students to India.

and Nigeria were the five top countries in sending international students to India.




Chart 72 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of India in 2018 (percentage)  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

- Iran had 1,127 (2% of the international student market in India in 2019).
- The number of Iranian students studying in India in 2019 decreased by almost 3%

compared to 1,558 (2018 students in 2018 vs. 1,127 students in 2019).

- Iran ranked ninth in terms of sending international students to India in 2018.




Chart 73 - Number of Iranian students in India from 2000 to 2019  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 74 - The top ten sending student countries to India in 2018

Source: (UIS, 2021)

### The population of Iranian students in France

- The number of international students in France in 229,632 :2018 students
- Morocco, Algeria, China, Tunisia, and Senegal had the highest shares of the international student market in France.
- Iran had 1,492) %0.06 students) of the international student market in France in 2019.

- The number of Iranian students studying in France in 2018 increased by almost %5 compared to 1,424) 2017 students in 2017 vs. 1,492 students in 2018).
- Morocco, Algeria, China, Tunisia, and Senegal were the five top countries in terms of sending international students to France in 2018. Iran ranked 34th in this regard in 2018.




Chart 75 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of France in 2018 (percentage)

Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 76 - Number of Iranian students in France from 2000 to 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 77 - The top five sending student countries to France in 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

## The population of Iranian students in Austria

- The number of international students in Austria in 2018 was 75,259 students
- Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Hungary, and Turkey had the highest shares of the international student market in Austria.
- Iran had 1,483 (2% of the students) of the international student market in Austria in

2019.

- The number of Iranian students studying in Austria in 2018 increased slightly compared to 1,465 in 2017 vs. 1,483 students in 2018).
- Iran ranked eighth in terms of sending international students to Austria in 2018.




Chart 78 - The share of sending student countries in the international student market of Austria in 2018 (percentage)  
Source: (UIS, 2021)






Chart 79 - Number of Iranian students in Austria from 2000 to 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)




Chart 80 - The top ten sending student countries to Austria in 2018  
Source: (UIS, 2021)

## b. International students in Iran

Although the population of international students in Iran has been increasing over the past decade, the population of foreign students in Iran is now quite behind the objectives of the 6th Iranian Development Plan regarding the recruitment of 75,000 international students.

- The population of international students in Iran increased by eight times during (5,485) 2020-2011 students in 2011 to 44,350 students in 2020)\* .
- The ratio of international students to

the total population of students in Iranian universities increased from %0.15 in 2011 to %1.39 in 2020.

- Afghan (%46) and Iraqi (%24) students were the largest international students in Iran, accounting for %69 of the total population of international students in Iran. Moreover, Lebanon (%3) and Syria, and China (%2) ranked next.

- The majority of international students in Iran were registered in bachelor and master degrees. In %55 ,2019 of these individuals




Chart 81 - Number of foreign students in Iran during 2010-2019  
Source: (UIS, 2021) (Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education, 2021)  
(Islamic Azad University, 2021)

\* It should be noted that the number of international students in 2020 has been drawn, assuming that the number of international students in universities other than the Islamic Azad University (17,675 students) is stable. In the first semester of the 21-2020 academic year in the Islamic Azad University, the number of international students was 26,675 students.




Chart 82 - Number of foreign students in Iran by country of origin in 2019 (percentage)  
 Source: (Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education, 2021) (Islamic Azad University, 2021)

were studying in bachelor degrees, while %31 were in master programs.

- The international students in Iran were studying in the following universities: Different branches of the Islamic Azad University (%43), the universities of the

Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology (%31), private higher education institutions (%9), and the universities affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Medical Education (%8).




Chart 83 - Comparison of the population of foreign students in Iran based on the degree in 2018 and 2019  
 Source: (Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education, 2021) (Islamic Azad University, 2021)






chart 84 - Population of foreign students in Iran based on the type of university affiliation in 2019  
Source: (Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education, 2021) (Islamic Azad University, 2021)



## Conclusions

In this chapter the status of Iran in the international student market in terms of both inbound and outbound trends has been analyzed. The number of Iranian migrant students increased as much as 3.2 times during 2018-2000, while the population of international students in Iran increased by eight times during 2019-2011. As the number of outbound and inbound students in Iran increased, the country's rank rose in terms of sending and receiving international students; thus, Iran ranked 19th among the countries sending international students and 31st among the countries receiving international students in 2018.

Although North America and Western Europe have always been the popular destinations for Iranian students, the recent restrictions imposed by the U.S. government regarding the issuance of visas and the increased migration costs for Iranian students increased the number of Iranians who selected to study in countries such as Turkey, Germany, Canada, and Italy. Furthermore, the neighboring countries of Iran were the major senders of international students to this country. In 2019, Afghanistan (%46) and Iraq (%24) were the major countries sending international students to

Iran, and Lebanon, Syria, and China ranked next. Although the number of international students has increased over the past decade, the current status is far behind the objectives specified in the 6th Iranian Development Plan (i.e., the recruitment of 75,000 international students by 2021).

Although the tendency to study in the top universities of the world is one of the main motives for Iranian students, economic considerations and residing a better life abroad, and migration via the channel of education are among the main factors that can explain the increasing trend in the migration of Iranian students. A survey was conducted in winter 2021 to assess the tendency and decision to migrate among Iranian students and graduates after 2013 (N=2065 students and graduates). The survey findings showed that the country's general status and economic considerations are the main motives and reasons for the tendency of students and graduates to migrate. The lack of opportunities to play a significant role and feeling useless in the country strengthen the motives of migration and makes many students and graduates attempt to migrate.





**Section two: A review of the status of Iran in terms of  
international migration**



**Chapter 6:  
The status of Iranian migrants in the  
main receiving countries**

6

## The status of Iranian migrants in the main receiving countries

Migrants are a part of the human capital that resides outside countries' geographical borders, and many aspects of their financial, knowledge and emotional resources are linked to their countries of origin. Due to the role that migrants play in developing their countries of origin, countries with large numbers of migrants have always considered this. Unfortunately, Iranian institutions use no reliable methods to collect the demographic information related to the Iranian migrants. Accordingly, the present chapter will deal with the demographic data of Iranians in their major destinations according to the international data sources and the data recorded by the migration departments of the receiving countries. The data on citizenship, short-term and long-term resident permits and different types of visas received by Iranians have primarily been extracted from the migration databases of the host countries.

### Iranians in North America

#### Iranians in the U.S.

The U.S. Census Bureau presents the demographic estimates of the American population in terms of the origins and the country of birth as part of the American Community Survey. The population of

Iranians in the U.S. was extracted from this source regarding the following factors: Iranian nationality and place of birth.

- The population of Iranians in the U.S. based on the place of birth (Iran) according to the U.N. data in 387,264 :2020 persons.

- The population of Iranians in the U.S. based on the place of birth (Iran) in 2019 according to the U.S. Census Bureau: 385,473 persons.

The population of Iranians in the U.S. based on Iranian nationality in 2019 according to the U.S. Census Bureau: 468,798 persons.

- The number of Iranians (born in Iran) in the age group of 34-18 years has been decreasing over the past few years, while the number of Iranians in the age group of >65 years has been increasing.

- The educational status of Iranian migrants in the age group of >25 years in the U.S. indicates that the largest communities of the Iranian highly- educated people in that country consist of the post-graduate students, and the students with bachelor degrees rank next.

- Over the past few years, Iranian migrants in the age group of >25 years with degrees below high school diplomas in the U.S. has decreased.




Chart 85: Iranian population in USA by country of birth and ancestry (2010-2019)  
Source: (Census Burea, 2020)




Chart 86: Iranian population in USA by age categories (2010-2019)  
Source: (Census Burea, 2020)




Chart 87: Iranian population in USA by age categories (2010-2019)

Source: ( Census Burea, 2020)

## Naturalization and citizenship

The number of Iranians who were naturalized as U.S. citizens in 2019 was 11,310 people, %34 more than the cases naturalized in 2018.

- The number of Iranians naturalized as permanent U.S. citizens have been decreasing over the past few years and have reduced to 6,640 people in 2019 (%34) reduction compared to 2018).
- The number of Iranians receiving temporary labor and educational visas has decreased since 2015 and has reduced to 4,575 people in 2019.
- A majority of Iranians (according to the place of birth), who became permanent U.S. citizens in 2019, were naturalized as the labor force (2,512 persons) and asylum-seekers/refugees (2,096 people).




Chart 88: Temporary & permanent residence granted and naturalization acquisition by Iranians in USA (2010-2019)  
 Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2020)

- While the naturalization of Iranians as the labor force did not change significantly during 19-2018, their naturalization, according to other reasons, decreased considerably.
- Students were the largest group of Iranians, who received the temporary non-tourism visas of the U.S. over the last decade.
- Since 2016, granting temporary educational visas (to educational and cultural exchange programs) has decreased. The number of such visas granted to Iranians in 2019 decreased by %40 compared to 2015.






Chart 8g: Temporary & permanent residence granted and naturalization acquisition by Iranians in USA (2010-2019)

Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2020)




Chart 9g: Iranian (by nationality) nonimmigrant admissions (1-94 only) by selected category of admission (2010-2019)

Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2020)

## Iranians in the U.S. labor market

Sixty percent of Iranian migrants in the U.S. during 19-2018 were involved in management, business, sciences, and arts, while those involved in manufacturing, transportation, and the delivery of goods ranked next.

involved in education, healthcare, and social services during 19-2018. Moreover, specialists, scientists, managers, executives, and the waste service managers ranked next.

Iranian migrants in the U.S. were mainly

- Most Iranian migrants in the U.S. were wage earners during 19-2018.




Chart g1: Iranian occupation in US (16 years and over) 2018 - 2019  
Source: (Census Bureau, 2020)




chart g2: Industry employed of Iranian population in US (16 Years and over)-2018 - 2019  
Source: (Census Bureau, 2020)




Chart 93: Class of Iranian workers in US-2018 - 2019

Source: (Census Bureau, 2020)

## Iranians' overstay in the U.S.

Overstay means that a person stays in the host country longer than the duration specified by the laws. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) to identify and classify non-migrants overstay.

The United States Ministry of Homeland Security presents an annual report called the «Entry/Exit Overstay Report.» The report is aimed to identify the rates of overstay in a given year in terms of people's nationality across all received groups of migrants.

The Trump administration imposed stricter migration regulations in the field of migration and student visas. A well-known instance is Trump's executive order in 2017 called «Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry,» which became

famous as the «Muslim Ban.»

The Iranians who overstay in the U.S. are classified into the following three groups:

- Iranians who have traveled to the U.S. for tourism or business.
- Iranians who have traveled to the U.S. for education.
- Iranians have traveled to the U.S. for other reasons (temporary workers or interns, family reunification).

Evidence and statistics indicate that the rate of Iranians' overstay in the U.S. differs according to their purpose of migration (education, tourism, business, etc.):

The rate of Iranians' overstay who had traveled to the U.S. for tourism or business increased significantly after 2018 (around %3.42 in 2018 to more than %20 in 2019). Some reasons for Iranians' overstay in the

Table20- Nonimmigrant Business or Pleasure Overstay Rates of Iranians in US

Year	Expected Departures	Out-of Country Overstays	Suspected In Country Overstays	Total Overstays	Total Overstay Rate	Suspected In Country Overstay Rate
2016	23,749	121	588	709	%2.99	%2.48
2017	17,506	94	540	634	%3.62	%3.08
2018	9,149	79	234	313	%3.42	%2.56
2019	1,391	61	240	301	%21.64	%17.25

Source: (partmant of Homland Security, 2021)




Chart 94: Nonimmigrant Business or Pleasure Overstay Rate of Iranians in US(2016-2019)

Source: (Department of Homland Security, 2021)

Table 21: Nonimmigrant Student and Exchange Visitors Overstay Rates in US (2016-2019)

Year	Expected Departures	Out-of Country Overstays	Suspected In Country Overstays	Total Overstays	Total Overstay Rate	Suspected In Country Overstay Rate
2016	3,567	81	238	319	%8.94	%6.67
2017	4,418	70	280	350	%7.92	%6.34
2018	4,178	78	212	290	%6.94	%5.07
2019	4,011	39	135	174	%4.34	%3.37

Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2021)




Chart 95: Nonimmigrant Student and Exchange Visitors Overstay Rates in US (2016-2019)

Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2021)

U.S. and their refusal to return to Iran are the withdrawal of the U.S. from the JCPOA, the currency devaluation in Iran, and the poor prospects of the future in Iran.

- The rate of overstay for the Iranian students migrated to the U.S. for education

decreased after 2018 due to the stricter migration regulations imposed by the Trump administration, the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran, and the related issues such as problems in opening bank accounts and the currency

Table 22: Overstay Rates of Iranians for All Other In-scope Classes of Admission (2016-2019)

Year	Expected Departures	Out-of Country Overstays	Suspected In Country Overstays	Total Overstays	Total Overstay Rate	Suspected In Country Overstay Rate
2016	632	21	82	103	%16.3	%12.98
2017	1,274	16	87	103	%8.08	%6.83
2018	1,102	9	58	67	%6.08	%5.26
2019	879	6	39	45	%5.12	%4.44

Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2021)




Chart g6: Overstay Rate of Iranians for All Other In-scope Classes of Admission (2016-2019)  
Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2021)

devaluation, and the fact that Canada became Iranians' priority for migration to study or live.

- The overstay rate for Iranians traveled to the U.S. for other reasons declined significantly (decreasing from %16 in 2016 vs. below %6 in 2019).



Chart 97: Overstay rates of Iranians in US by reason (2016-2019)

Source: (Department of Homeland Security, 2021)

## Iranians in Canada

The number of Iranians in Canada increased steadily from 1990 to 2020, though its increasing rate slowed down over the past few years. The population of Iranians in Canada reached 166,294 persons in 2020, accounting for more than 2000 persons compared to 2019.

The population of Iranians in Canada increased by about %26 during 2010-2005 and about %27 during 2018-2010. However, the increase in that population in the year ending in 2020 was only %8. There were 83,923 Iranian men and 82,371 Iranian women in Canada in 2020.

The number of temporary visas received by Iranians in Canada by March 2021 was 5,860 visas. Moreover, the number of permanent visas received by Iranians in

Canada during the same period was 2,130. Further, the total number of permanent and temporary visas issued in 2020 was %31 less than the ones issued in 2019.

- A majority of the temporary Canadian visas received by Iranians over the past few years were educational visas.
- Issuing temporary labor and educational visas for Iranians in 2020 decreased in all groups- except for the International Mobility Program (IMP) in that has almost always been constant- compared to 2019.
- The study permit decreased by %27, while the humanitarian and compassionate work permit decreased by %62; moreover, the number of Iranians who migrated as part of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) decreased by %5.




Chart g8: Iranian population (by place of birth) in Canada (1990- 2020)  
Source: (UNDESA, 2020)




Chart g9: Iranian population in Canada by sex (1990-2020)  
Source: (UNDESA, 2020)






Chart 100: temporary and permanent residence permits granted for Iranians in Canada (2015-March2021)  
Source: (IRCC, 2021)




Chart 101: the number of granted temporary visas (2015- March 2021)  
Source: (IRCC, 2021)

## Iranians in Europe

### Iranians in the European Union\*

The population of migrants worldwide differs in terms of «the country of birth» and «citizenship.» According to the U.N. data, the top 4 countries in the E.U. that host the largest communities of migrants born in Iran include Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France. These data indicate that Germany ranked 1st in 2020 by hosting 152,590 Iranian migrants, while Sweden (79,363), the Netherlands (34,809), and France (26,069) ranked next, respectively.

The statistics reported by the E.U.\*\* indicate that the number of Iranian citizens residing in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands was 15,210, 99,606, and 7,824 persons, respectively. It should be noted that the data for the U.K. and France are missed. Regarding reasons for the smaller population of Iranians in terms of citizenship, individuals might have received the host country's citizenship; however, the country of origin has not declared their citizenship.



Iranian population (by country of birth) in Top 5 Iranian destination in Europe (1990-2020)

Source: (UNDESA, 2019)

\* Only 27 countries were investigated due to the withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U.

\*\* Excluding the U.K. due to its withdrawal from the E.U.




Chart 103: Iranian population (by citizenship) in Top three Iranian destination in Europe (2009-2020)  
Source: (Eurostat, 2020)




Chart 104: Iranian population (by citizenship) by gender in Top three Iranian destination in Europe (2019)  
Source: (Eurostat, 2020)

A majority of migrants with Iranian citizenship in the E.U. lived in Germany (57,490 men and 42,116 women).

According to the E.U. statistics, Germany, Sweden, Italy, France, and the Netherlands host the largest population of Iranians in terms of Iranian citizenship. Germany ranked 1st by hosting 76,547 Iranians; however, Sweden (14,998), Italy (13,383), France (11,463), and the Netherlands (9,934) ranked next, respectively.

In 2019, there were 163,553 Iranians with valid resident permits in the E.U., while it was 96,249 in 2008.

The majority of Iranian migrants with valid resident permits in 2019 were refugees residing in Germany.

Regarding the duration of resident permits in the four top countries of the E.U. in 2019, most Iranian migrants stayed in Germany for above 12 months.

- The number of Iranian migrants with long-term resident permit in the E.U. in 2019 was 48,662 people

Most Iranian migrants with long-term resident permit live in Germany, Sweden, France, and Italy. Around 20,199 Iranians had a long-term resident permits in Germany.




Chart 105: Iranians (by citizenship) with all valid permits in the first 5 European Union countries (2010-2019)  
Source: (Eurostat, 2020)



Chart 106: Iranians with all valid permits in European Union (2010-2019)

Source: (Eurostat, 2020)




Chart 107: Iranians with valid permit in 4 first European Union countries of destination by permit reason (2019)

Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)




Chart 108: Iranians with valid permit in 4 first European countries of destination by Stay Duration (2019)  
Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)




Chart 109: Iranian with long term residence permit in European Union 2019  
Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)

- The number of Iranians with residence permit with employment reason in the E.U. was 8,049 people in 2011 and increased to 19,258 people in 2019.
- The top 4 destinations for Iranians> labor migrants in the E.U. include Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. In 2019, Germany issued the largest number of a residence permit with employment

reason for Iranians (6,039 migrants), and Italy (4,218 migrants), the Netherlands (1,811 migrants), and Sweden (1,755 migrants) ranked next in hosting Iranian labor migrants, respectively.

- Most of resident permits received by Iranians in the E.U. in 2019 were one-year and longer permits.




Chart 110: Iranian with long term residence permit in 4 first European countries of destination (2010-2019)

Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)



Chart 111: Iranian with valid work permit in European Union (2011-2019)  
Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)




Chart 112: Iranian with work valid permit in 4 first European Union countries of destination (2010-2019)  
Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)






Chart 113: Iranian with work valid permit in 4 first European Union countries of destination by duration of stay (2019)

Source: (EUROSTAT, 2020)

## The Schengen visa

The Schengen Area includes 26 European countries, which manage their internal borders for free and limitless mobility with shared regulations and a single judicial system to control their external borders. The Schengen Area consists of the majority of the E.U. members except Ireland, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus. Moreover, countries such as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein are not the members of the E.U and are considered as parts of the Schengen Area.

- In 2020, the most significant number of applications for the Schengen visas by Iranians and the ones issued for them belonged to Germany, France, and Italy.
- The number of visa applications by Iranians and the visas issued for them in the majority of the countries in the Schengen Area in 2020 decreased by around %80 compared to 2019.




Chart 114: Application for Schengen visas from Iranians in first 10 countries (2018-2020)

Source: (Schengen Visa Info, 2020)




Chart 115: Schengen Visas issued for Iranians in first 10 countries (2018-2020)

Source: (Schengen Visa Info, 2020)

## Iranians in the U.K.

The U.K. is the second major destination of Iranians in Europe, and around 83,531 Iranians are living there. The U.N. estimates that the population of Iranian migrants in 2020 will decrease by almost %7 compared to 2019.

- The number of Iranians who applied for citizenship of the U.K. in 2020 was 1,993 persons, which decreased by almost %39 compared to 2019.
- The number of Iranians who received citizenship in the U.K. in 2020 was 1,752 persons, which decreased by around %14 compared to 2019.
- The number of U.K. visas issued for Iranians was 4,024 cases in 2020. While 27,149 Iranians received visas for the U.K. in 2011. After Iranian protesters storm the British Embassy in Tehran in November 2011 visa issuance for Iranians decreased

it by 11,377) %58 visas). The trend has not changed significantly since then, and the most significant number of visas issued over the past few years was 13,816 in 2017.

- The number of visas issued in 2020 decreased by %69 compared to 2019 (4,024) visas). The number includes labor, education, family reunion, tourism, transit, and other forms of visas.
- Educational, family and work visas has been the most prominent types of visas issued over the past few years.
- Although the trend of issuing visas for Iranians gradually increased from 2014 to 2019, it decreased by %23 in 2020 compared to 2019.
- Issuing travel and transit, labor, family, and education visas decreased by ,%34 %19, and %7 compared to 2019.




Chart 116: Iranian population (by place of birth) in UK (1990-2020)

Source: (UNDESA, 2020)



Chart 117 : Citizenship applications from and Citizenship grants for Iranians in Uk (2010-2020)  
Source: (Home Office, 2021a)




Chart 118: Total entry Visas Issued for Iranians in UK (2010-2020)  
Source: (Home Office, 2020)

- The number of work visas issued for Iranians in the U.K. was 459 visas in 2020, around %50 less than the visas issued in 2019.
- On the other hand, the trend of issuing labor visas for Iranians in the U.K. increased in the three consecutive years ending in 2019.

Data presented in Figure 120 include families and the associates of an applicant for the work visa, and those illustrated in figure 121 distinguish between the applicant and the associates.

The work visas issued by the U.K. can be generally divided into the following four classes: (1) Short-term work visas, (2) Long-term work visas, (3) Entrepreneurship, Investment, Business, and Talents Visas, and (4) Other type of work visas. At the moment, most Iranians have the General Work Visa of the U.K. The short-term creative and sporting visa

and the domestic workers in a private household visa are other primary visas received by Iranians in the U.K.

The procedures for issuing such visas (as well as the investor visa and the entrepreneurship visa) and their relationship with each other have been illustrated in Figure 122. It should be noted that the investor and entrepreneurship visas have been abolished since 2019 and have been replaced by long-term innovator and start-up visas (GOV.UK, 2020). The statistics in Figure 122 illustrates the main applicants of the visas regardless of their family members.

The residence visas given to Iranians in the U.K. had usually ranged from 4-2 cases during 19-2004 (except 2010 when a significant surge was observed); thus, although the trend of the visas received by Iranians in the U.K. had been increasing up to 2019, it has been decreasing since then.




Chart 119: Entry clearance visas granted for Iranian by purpose in UK (2010-2021)

Source: (Home Office, 2021b)




Chart 120: Entry clearance Work visas granted for Iranians in UK (2010-2020)  
Source: (Home Office, 2021b)




Chart 121: Entry clearance work visas granted for Iranians by main applicants and dependents(2010-2021)  
Source: (Home Office, 2021b)




Chart 122: Entry clearance Work visas granted for Iranians in UK by categories (2010-2021)  
Source: (Home Office, 2021b)




Chart 123: Grants of settlement for Iranians in UK (2004-2019)  
Source: (Home Office, 2020b)

## Iranians in Germany

- Germany is the Iranian migrants' first choice in Europe.
- The population of Iranians in Germany in 2020 was 152,590 people.

The number of Iranians who became German citizens in 2019 was 3,810 people, which was higher than the years before. Moreover, the number of Iranians receiving German citizenship over the past few years has been increasing.

- Germany granted citizenship to 128,905 foreigners in %15 ,2019 more than the cases recorded in 2018.

- On the other hand, granting German citizenship to Iranians in 2019 increased by %24 compared to 2018, about%10 above the average increase in granting German citizenship to foreigners.

Migrants in Germany can be divided into two categories in terms of the status of residency:




Chart 124: Iranian population (by place of birth) in Germany (1990-2020)

Source: (UNDESA, 2020)



- People who do not need resident permits.
- People who need resident permits.

The former group includes two groups of migrants: people who have the freedom of movement according to the E.U. law in Germany, and displaced people and people who are exempt from the requirement to have resident permit. The majority of migrants are those who need to have residence permits. Such people are divided into three groups: people with resident permits, people with no resident permits, and people applied for resident permits. The residence of people who have permits is either temporary or permanent. People with temporary resident permits are classified into five groups regarding type of resident permits:

education, labor, humanitarian, family, and resident with specific privileges. Individuals with no resident permits are divided into three categories: individuals whose deportation has been suspended temporarily, individuals with permits to stay, and other cases (Figure 5).

- The number of Iranians who had permanent resident permits in Germany in 2019 was 21,855 persons.
- The number of Iranians who had temporary resident permits in Germany in 2019 was 58,340 persons.
- A majority of Iranians with temporary resident permits in 2019 had temporary humanitarian visas, which had increased exponentially from 2016.




Chart 125: Iranian citizens Naturalized in Germany (2010-2019)

Source: (DESTATIS, 2020a)




Chart 126: Total immigrants naturalized in Germany (2010-2019)  
Source: (DESTATIS, 2020a)




Figure 8: Immigrants with resident title in Germany  
Source: (BAMF, 2018)




Chart 127: Iranian with Limited and Unlimited residence permit in Germany (2010-2019)  
Source: (DESTATIS, 2020b)




Chart 128: Iranians Temporary residence permit holders in Germany by types of permit(2010-2019)  
Source:(DESTATIS, 2020b)

## Iranians in Turkey

The number of Iranians in Turkey was 84,270 people in 2020. The population increased by four times during 2020-1990, though it did not increase significantly compared to 2019.

- The number of migrants in Turkey who had Iranian citizenship was 42,351 persons in 2019, which was higher than the previous years.
- The number of Iranians leaving Turkey in 2019 was 18,004 people, almost twice the number recorded in 2018.

▪ The number of immigrants with Iranian nationality (in terms of the year of receiving residency) in Turkey was 42,532 people.

▪ The number of Iranians receiving Turkish citizenship in 2019 doubled the cases recorded in 2018, and the number of Turkish citizenship granted to Iranians in 2018 was twice as much as the cases recorded in 2017. On the other hand, this trend was growing quite slowly.




Chart 129: Iranian population (by place of birth) in Turkey (1990-2020)

Source: (UNDESA, 2020)





Chart 130: Iranian citizens Immigration to Turkey (2016-2019)  
Source:(TURKSTAT, 2021a)




Chart 131: Iranian citizens Emigration from Turkey (2016-2019)  
Source: (TURKSTAT, 2021a)




Chart 132: Iranian population (by citizenship) by first year of residence in Turkey (2014-2019)  
 Source: (TURKSTAT, 2021b)



## Iranians in Australia

Australia has always been one of the significant destinations of Iranians in all types of migration, particularly labor migration. Accordingly, the total number of Iranians in Australia has been increasing

over the past few years and the number of whom residing in Australia in 2020 was 74,322 persons. Australia grants 24 temporary and permanent work visas to recruit the required workforce by different characteristics and skills at the moment.




Chart 133: Iranian population( by place of birth)in Australia(2010-2020)

Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2021) , (UNDESA, 2020)

### Temporary resident permits in Australia

The temporary resident visas of Australia include the transit, special category, student, crew and transit, working holidaymaker, skilled employment, and other employment visas.

- The number of Iranian citizens with Australian temporary resident visas was 58,011 people in 2020.

Investigating the status of Iranians with the temporary Australian visas in 2020 in terms of the visa type indicated that most Iranians had received the temporary protection visa in Australia, which is a humanitarian and protective visa.




Chart 134: Iranian Temporary visa holders(2012-2020)  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2021a)




Chart 135: Iranian Temporary visa holders in Australia by type of visas (2012- 2020)  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2021b)



### Tempotary skilled visas in Australia

The number of Iranians who received temporary resident visas for the employment of the skillful workforce in Australia was 87 in 2020, indicating a decreasing trend compared to the previous years. This can be due to the COVID19- pandemic, Australia's stricter measures compared to other countries (including Iran), and the resulting travel restrictions.

- The number of temporary resident visas for the skillful workforce issued in Australia in 2020 was 20,893 cases.
- Only 87 temporary visa for the employment of skillful workers was issued for Iranians in 2020.
- The issuance of temporary resident visas for the employment of the skillful foreign

workforce decreased by %60 in Australia in 2020.

- The total number of foreign migrants who had temporary resident visas for the employment of the skillful workforce in Australia (types 457 and 482) was 497,494 persons in 2020.
- The number of Iranians with temporary residency visas for the employment of the skillful workforce in Australia (types 457 and 482) was 2,051 persons in 2020.
- The total number of migrants with temporary residency visas for the employment of the skillful workers in Australia has declined by almost %10, while the reduction rate for Iranians has been %7.




Chart 136: Skilled Employment 457,482 Visa Granted for Iranians compared to Total in Australia(2010-2019)  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2021b)




Chart 137: Iranian Skilled Employment 457,482 Visa Holders in Australia compared to Total (2010-2020)  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2021b)

### The temporary visa for other forms of employment

- The total number of migrants with temporary visas for other forms of employment in Australia was 141,808 people in Australia.
- The number of Iranians with temporary visas for other forms of employment in Australia was 1,280 people in 2020.

- Although the number of Iranians with temporary visas for the other forms of employment in Australia was more than the skillful workforce, it declined significantly in 2021 compared to 2020 and became below the number of the Iranians with the temporary visas for the employment of the skillful workers.




Chart 138: Iranian Other Employment Visa holders in Australia compared to Total (2012-2019)  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2021c)



Chart 139: Temporary skilled Employment and Other Temporary Employment Iranian visa holders in Australia (2012-2020)

Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2021c)






Figure 9: Australia permanent migration visa types  
 Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2020a)

## Tested Skilled Migration Australian permanent visas

The largest number of visas issued in the program in Australia was related to state/territory visas (21,495 visas). In general, the issuance of different types of visas in Australia declined in 2019 compared to the previous years.

- Most enrolled in the Tested Skilled Migration Australian permanent visas in Australia in 2019 received state/territory visas (589 visas).






Chart 140: Tested Skilled Migration Australian, permanent visas issued for Iranians by categories  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2020b)



Tested Skilled Migration Australian, permanent visas issued for all immigrants  
 Source : (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2020b)



### The permanent resident visas for innovation in business and investment

The number of innovation in business visas received by Iranians in Australia in 2020 was 223 cases.




Chart 142: Australis Business Innovation and Investment visas Issued for Iranian(2010-2019)  
Source: (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2020b)

### The status of Iranian migrants in the migrants' communities of the destination countries

The economic and social department of the U.N. annually estimates the population of migrants in different countries and regions according to the latest national data. Such data are available for most countries and regions regarding the countries of origin and destination. The population of Iranian migrants in their top 10 destinations and the rank of Iranians

among the migrant communities of such countries are presented in the following table.

Iranians (born in Iran) are the 27th major migrant group in the U.S., while their rank in Canada, Germany, and Turkey is 10th, 24th, and 7th among the migrant communities.

Table 23 : Number and rank of Iranian immigrants in the top ten destination

Rank	Destination country	Iranian immigrant's stock in destination countries	Iranian immigrant's rank in destination country
1	United states	387,246	27
2	Canada	166,294	10
3	Germany	152,590	24
4	Turkey	84,270	7
5	UK	83,531	30
6	Sweden	79,363	5
7	Australia	74,322	25
8	Israel	50,808	9
9	The Netherland	34,809	16
10	France	26,069	46

Source: (UNDESA,2020)

## Conclusion

The population of Iranian migrants has declined slightly compared to 2019, according to the international statistics reported by the economic and social department of the U.N. (decreasing from 1.9 million people in 2019 to 1.8 million people in 2020). Moreover, the number of labor, student, and family visas received by Iranians has declined in almost all countries.

Iranians' annual trend of receiving temporary and permanent visas has declined significantly in all investigated countries compared to the previous years. The number of U.S. temporary and permanent visas received by Iranians in 2019 declined by %8.9 and %34.36, respectively. Moreover, the number of Iranians who received the German temporary and permanent resident visas in 2019 decreased by %7.77 and %1.59, respectively. The number of Iranians who received temporary and permanent

resident visas in Canada in 2020 declined by %29.36 and %37.07, respectively. Furthermore, the number of temporary and permanent resident visas received by Iranians in Australia in 2020 declined by %11.79 and %33.39, respectively. In the whole of E.U., the number of Iranians receiving long-term resident visas in 2019 increased by %1.41 compared to 2018. Moreover, the frequency of Iranians applied for citizenship in the U.K. in 2020 increased by %39.80, while granting such citizenship to Iranians decreased by %14.11 during the same period.

The number of Iranian migrants has been increasing over the past few years; thus, the frequency of Iranians in Turkey increased by around %32 in 2019 compared to 2018. Furthermore, the frequency of houses bought by the Iranians in Turkey has soared up as they have reached the top among foreigners in terms of purchasing houses in Turkey.








## **Chapter 7:** **The status of Iran in terms of forced and asylum related migration**

7



## Forced and asylum related migration

194

International migration can be divided into two major categories: voluntary and forced. Iran is an important country both regionally and globally in terms of hosting the forced migrants and refugees of its neighboring countries. The special political and security conditions of the countries neighboring Iran, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq, have led to the significant presence of their migrants/asylum-seekers in Iran. Moreover, Iran has hosted refugees from other countries, including Poland (before the Islamic Revolution), Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc.. This chapter focuses on the asylum related migrants and foreign nationals in Iran. Due to the lack of access to detailed data on the refugees in Iran, we used data presented by the UNHCR as well as the Iranian National Census conducted in 2016. The census data addresses foreign nations residing in Iran. Moreover, the data regarding the return migration of foreign nationals from Iran have been investigated due to the presence of Afghan undocumented migrants in the country. Furthermore, the trend of Afghan>s returning to their country and their resettlement in other countries has been investigated in this chapter.

Some Iranians have applied as refugees in other countries over the past four decades; however, the share of Iranian refugees in compare to the total number of refugees worldwide has been low. Some Iranians have migrated to other countries via the channel of asylum-seeking over the past decades. It should be noted that

a portion of asylum-seekers worldwide have economic motivations to migrate to other countries to gain more money, get access to better job opportunities, and provide a better life for their children. The following section deals with the status of Iranian migrants and asylum-seekers worldwide. Since European countries present detailed data on asylum-seekers status in the Eurostat database, the data related to Iranian asylum-seekers in such countries will be investigated. Moreover, the statistics on the undocumented Iranian migrants in European countries and their exit rate from such countries will be analyzed.

### a. The status of Iranian asylum-seekers worldwide

Although Iran has always been a major destination for asylum-seekers worldwide, some Iranians attempt to migrate to other countries via the channel of asylum-seeking. This section presents the data on Iranians' asylum-seeking and irregular migration to other countries. The status of Iranian asylum-seekers and refugees, their resettlement in other countries, and their naturalization around the globe are also discussed in this section. Since the data presented by the European countries (EFTA, EU28 ) in the Eurostat database illustrate the status of registered asylum-seekers and the results of their applications in detail, this section focuses on the status of Iranian asylum-seekers in each country.

---

After the withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U., the data on this country are not available in the Eurostat since 2020. Of course, some required statistics on the U.K. have been extracted from other statistical sources of this country. In this section, EU27 means that the presented data are related to the E.U. members, while EU28 means that the U.K. data are also added to the E.U. members. Moreover, the EFTA countries include Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and the EU28. In other words, the EU28 and EFTA include 32 countries

## Number of Iranian refugees worldwide

According to the UNHCR data, by the end of 2020:

- The total number of Iranian who are classified as refugees is 134,767 persons. Most of Iranians with refugee status

are residing in Germany, the U.K., Australia, Sweden, and Austria.

- The U.S. ranked 6th by hosting 5,582 Iranian refugees by the end of 2020.

Table 24: Major countries hosting Iranian refugees in the world

1990		2000		2010		2020	
Contry	Number	Contry	Number	Contry	Number	Contry	Number
Sweden	29,948	Iraq	23,893	Germany	20,444	Germany	44,965
USA	29,510	The Netherlands	15,472	UK	10,837	UK	20,433
UK	7,554	Sweden	9,909	Iraq	7,989	Australia	12,606
Denmark	3,186	Canada	8,897	USA	5,173	Sweden	7,507
Italy	2,755	Italy	6,319	Canada	3,819	Austria	6,878
Other countries	2,936	Other countries	23,776	Other countries	20,524	Other countries	42,378
Total	75,889	Total	88,266	Total	68,786	Total	134,767

Source: (UNHCR data finder)

## The total number of Iranian asylum-seekers worldwide

According to the UNHCR data in 2020,

- The total number of Iranian asylum-seekers was 77,217 persons.

- The largest number of Iranian asylum-seekers were in Turkey, Germany, the U.K., Iraq, and Australia.

Table 25: Major countries hosting Iranian asylum seekers in the world

2000		2010		2020	
Contry	Number	Contry	Number	Contry	Number
Slovenia	5,687	Germany	3,436	Turkey	24,300
The Netherlands	3,861	Turkey	2,706	Germany	18,355
Turkey	3,133	Iraq	1,678	UK	6,389
Germany	2,622	Sweden	1,270	Iraq	5,765
USA	1,380	Greece	1,164	Australia	3,837
Other countries	3,939	Other countries	5,801	Other countries	18,571
Total	20,622	Total	16,055	Total	77,217

Source: (UNHCR data finder)

## The registration of new Iranian asylum-seekers

### The registration of new Iranian asylum-seekers worldwide

According to the data presented in the UNHCR Data Finder, the number of new Iranian asylum-seekers worldwide increased from 2007 to 2016. The highest number of these persons was documented in 2016, when more Iranians attempted to migrate via the channel of asylum-seeking alongside the increasing trend in the number of global asylum seekers.

A total of 369,868 Iranians registered their asylum-seeking applications worldwide during 2006-20. In this period, 16,804,267 new asylum-seekers were registered in world, and the ratio of Iranians to the total

population of asylum-seekers ranged between 1.4% and 3.4%. 1,069,139 new asylum-seeking applications (N =New Applications) were registered worldwide in 2020. Moreover, 15,333 new Iranian asylum-seekers were registered in the world, which has been the lowest rate since 2010. The ratio of the Iranian new asylum-seekers to the total population of new asylum-seekers in the world was 1.4, which has been the lowest rate since 2006.

The largest number of new Iranian asylum-seekers in 2020 were registered in the UK, Germany, Turkey, Australia, Greece, and Canada, respectively.






Chart 143: The number of Iranian first time asylum applicants and their share in the world  
 Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)




Chart 144: Top destination countries of Iranian first time asylum applicants  
 Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)

## The registration of new Iranian asylum-seekers in the E.U. and EFTA countries

The European countries have been among the major destinations of Iranian asylum-seekers. According to the data presented in the Eurostat database in 2020,

- About 10,909 Iranian new asylum-seekers registered in the EU28 and EFTA countries, the rate of which is quite lower compared to the previous year due to the COVID-19 pandemic\*.

- After the pandemic the main destination of Iranian new asylum-seekers changed from Germany to the U.K. Accordingly, 4,199 Iranian new asylum-seekers registered in the U.K. in 2020.

The U.K., Germany, and Greece are the top 3 destinations of Iranian new asylum-seekers among the EU28 and EFTA countries.

Table 26: The number of Iranian first time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
<b>Germany</b>	5,395	26,425	8,610	10,855	8,405	3,120
<b>UK</b>	3,715	4,835	3,095	4,005	5,455	4,199
<b>Netherlands</b>	1,885	885	720	1,870	1,535	370
<b>Greece</b>	190	1,085	1,295	1,730	2,325	835
<b>Sweden</b>	4,270	935	905	1,095	985	580
<b>Austria</b>	3,380	2,400	950	1,050	655	305
<b>France</b>	265	390	395	605	520	310
<b>Belgium</b>	450	255	200	485	710	210
<b>Swiss</b>	570	530	280	455	490	255
<b>Italy</b>	260	385	225	230	270	145
<b>Other</b>	6,910	2,755	1,045	1,495	1,565	575
<b>Total</b>	27,290	40,875	17,710	23,890	22,920	10,909

Source: (Eurostat, 2021)

\* Source of data for the UK in 2020: (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)

\* The number of new Iranian asylum-seekers in each EU28 and EFTA country has been presented in the appendix.




Chart 145: Top destination countries of Iranian first time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries- 2020  
 Source: (Eurostat, 2021)  
 (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)

### Iranian new asylum- seekers in the European countries (by sex)

Of the overall asylum-seeking applications registered by Iranians in the EU28 and EFTA countries in 2020, 69% were men, and 31% were women. The number of

new Iranian male asylum-seekers in 2020 increased by around 5% compared to 2019.




Chart 146: The number of Iranian first time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries (by sex) - 2020  
 Source: (Eurostat, 2021)  
 Source: Source of data for the UK in 2020 (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)





### Iranian new asylum-seekers in the European countries (by age group)

Of the total Iranian new asylum seekers in the EU27 and EFTA countries in 2020, the people aged 18-34 (34%) years formed the largest group.

In the UK, out of the 4,199 Iranian new asylum-seekers registered in 2020, 544

persons (13%) were below 18 years, 1,763 (42%) were 18-29 years, 1,751 (41.7%) were 30-49 years, 120 (2.9%) were 50-69 years, and 21 (0.5%) were above 70 years (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May, 2021).




Chart 147: The number of Iranian first time asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries (by age) - 2020

Source: (Eurostat, 2021)

Data for 2020 does not included the UK

### Unaccompanied Iranian asylum-seekers (minors) in the European countries

Minor asylum-seekers may migrate alone, lose their companions or caretakers on their way, or get left alone by their family or companion after entering their destinations. The data presented in the Eurostat indicate that the EU27 and EFTA countries registered 14,235 asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors in 2020, among whom only 125 cases were Iranians.

- Out of the 125 Iranian asylum-seekers considered as unaccompanied minors,

only 20 persons were below 14 years. Accordingly, the majority of the Iranian asylum-seekers considered as unaccompanied minors were between 14 and 17 years.

- The decrease in the number of unaccompanied Iranian asylum-seekers in 2020 compared to 2019 was due to the withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U. and the reduction in the number of Iranian asylum-seekers in 2020.

The U.K. and Germany were the two main

destinations of the unaccompanied Iranian asylum-seekers over the past decade. Out of 785 Iranian unaccompanied minors

who were asylum applicants in 2019, 545 cases were registered in the U.K.




Chart 148: The number of Iranian unaccompanied minor asylum applicants in the EU & EFTA countries (2011-2020)

Source: (Eurostat, 2021)

Data for 2020 does not include the UK

### The ratio of Iranian asylum-seekers to the total number of asylum-seekers in Europe

In 2020, 464,986 new asylum applications were registered in the EU28 and EFTA countries, of whom 10,909 applicants (2.3% of the total asylum-seekers) were Iranians. The ratio of the Iranian asylum-seekers to

the total number of asylum seekers in the world was the lowest in 2020 since 2016.

Syria and Afghanistan registered the largest numbers of new asylum applications in the EU28 and EFTA countries.

۱. شامل ۲۷ کشور اتحادیه اروپا، چهار کشور EFTA و بریتانیا است

Table 27: Share of Iranian and selected nationals' asylum applicants in total asylum applicants in the EU 28 & EFTA countries EU28 & EFTA

	2015		2016		2017	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Iran	27,290	2.06	40,875	3.31	17,710	2.62
Afghanistan	193,025	14.56	186,550	15.08	45,135	6.68
Syria	377,940	28.50	337,435	27.28	105,230	15.56
Turkey	4,650	0.35	10,660	0.86	15,590	2.31
Iraq	126,835	9.56	128,620	10.40	48,450	7.17
2018						
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Iran	23,995	3.87	22,980	3.32	10,909	2.3
Afghanistan	43,990	7.10	57,925	8.38	47,481	10.2
Syria	83,090	13.41	77,785	11.25	66,606	14.3
Turkey	23,830	3.84	26,275	3.80	15,914	3.4
Iraq	41,085	6.63	31,420	4.54	19,936	4.3

Source: (Eurostat)

\* Source of data for the UK in 2020: (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)




Chart 149: Share of Iranian and selected nationals' asylum applicants in total asylum applicants in the EU 28 & EFTA countries

Source: (Eurostat)

Source of data for the UK in 2020: (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)

## Iranian new asylum- seekers in the OECD countries

Similar to the previous years, Iranian asylum-seekers ranked eighth in terms of registering asylum applications in the OECD countries in 2019. The number of Iranian asylum applications in the OECD countries

in 2019 decreased slightly compared to 2018.

Turkey entered the list of the top senders of asylum-seekers to the OECD countries in 2019 due to its political issues.

Table 28: Major source countries of asylum applicants in the OECD countries (2015-2019)

2015		2016		2017	
Syria	372,860	Syria	336,010	Afghanistan	110,770
Afghanistan	251,970	Afghanistan	214,930	Syria	96,700
Iraq	179,790	Iraq	155,300	Iraq	89,290
Albania	67,530	Iran	56,880	El Salvador	59,290
Kosovo	62,320	Pakistan	51,880	Venezuela	58,150
Pakistan	51,450	Nigeria	51,230	Nigeria	50,330
Eritrea	47,500	El Salvador	40,840	Guatemala	41,790
Iran	40,780	Eritrea	40,680	China	39,520
Nigeria	33,390	China	39,010	Pakistan	36,240
China	31,970	Mexico	35,530	Honduras	33,980

2018		2019	
Afghanistan	95,180	Afghanistan	91,094
Syria	80,100	Venezuela	90,390
Iraq	59,550	Honduras	77,290
Venezuela	58,990	Syria	73,631
El Salvador	45,320	Guatemala	56,048
Honduras	41,140	El Salvador	53,247
Nigeria	36,850	Iraq	46,616
Guatemala	34,830	Columbia	39,492
Iran	33,260	Iran	30,932
Pakistan	30,400	Turkey	30,788

Source: (OECD, 2020)

According to the statistics provided in the OECD stat database in 2019,

- Except the European EU28 and EFTA countries, Turkey, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. are the major OECD destinations for Iranian asylum-seekers.
- Unlike 2018, when Turkey registered the

largest number of Iranian asylum-seekers among the OECD countries, the number of Iranian asylum applicants in Canada increased by 48% in 2018, and the country became the main destination of Iranian asylum-seekers.

Table 29 - The number of Iranian asylum applicants in the selected OECD countries

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<b>Turkey</b>	11,023	11,856	8,828	6,387	3,558
<b>Australia</b>	844	2971	5,075	744	1,069
<b>Canada</b>	149	286	684	2,483	3,663
<b>USA</b>	1,048	991	691	325	268

Source: (OECD stat, Retrieved 19 April 2021)

### The decisions on Iranians' asylum applications in the E.U. and EFTA countries

After registering asylum applications, the host countries of asylum-seekers investigate and decide on such applications. The following section focuses on the first instance decisions on Iranians' asylum applications. According to the Eurostat data in 2020,

- 15,091 Iranian asylum-seekers received the first instance decisions on their

applications from the EU28 and EFTA countries, the number of whom was lower compared to 2019<sup>\*</sup>

- The percentage of positive decisions on the Iranians' asylum applications in EU28 and EFTA countries indicates that the rate of such decisions declined to the lowest level in 2020 compared to 2015.

<sup>\*</sup> The number of the first instance decisions on Iranians' asylum applications and the number of positive decisions for such applications have been presented for the EU28 and EFTA countries.

Table 30: First instance decisions on Iranian asylum applications in the EU 28 & EFTA countries

	2015			2016			2017		
	Total decisions	Positive decision	Positive decision (%)	Total decisions	Positive decision	Positive decision (%)	Total decisions	Positive decision	Positive decision (%)
<b>Belgium</b>	320	225	70.3	110	65	59.1	560	460	82.1
<b>Germany</b>	1,925	1,585	82.3	9,855	5,850	59.4	27,005	15,145	56.1
<b>Greece</b>	145	55	37.9	300	160	53.3	630	380	60.3
<b>France</b>	225	135	60	250	150	60	550	195	35.5
<b>Italy</b>	345	225	65.2	300	240	80	230	145	63
<b>The Netherlands</b>	410	285	69.5	1,425	435	52.4	1,535	725	47.2
<b>Austria</b>	3,505	385	81.1	640	465	72.7	1,900	1,275	67.1
<b>Sweden</b>	390	175	44.9	1,425	665	46.7	2,280	1,145	50.2
<b>UK</b>	3,505	2,005	57.2	4,390	1,705	38.8	3,255	1,560	47.9
<b>Switzerland</b>	285	210	73.7	250	95	38	150	130	86.7
<b>Other</b>	610	315	51.6	2,650	1,235	46.6	2,595	1,025	39.5
<b>Total</b>	8,640	5,600	64.8	20,995	11,075	52.8	40,695	22,180	54.5

205

	2018			2019			2020		
	Total decisions	Positive decision	Positive decision (%)	Total decisions	Positive decision	Positive decision (%)	Total decisions	Positive decision	Positive decision (%)
<b>Belgium</b>	345	265	76.8	395	295	74.7	310	140	45.1
<b>Germany</b>	8,645	2,715	31.4	8,275	2,090	25.3	7,185	1,800	25
<b>Greece</b>	695	460	66.2	680	400	58.8	1,245	570	45.7
<b>France</b>	535	175	32.7	590	155	26.3	295	85	28.8
<b>Italy</b>	215	150	69.8	270	185	68.5	205	105	51.2
<b>The Netherlands</b>	730	330	45.2	955	375	39.3	840	405	48.2
<b>Austria</b>	3,040	1,355	44.6	1,095	465	42.5	390	185	47.4
<b>Sweden</b>	2,045	755	36.9	1,195	410	34.3	1,025	325	31.7
<b>UK</b>	2,735	1,210	44.2	4,140	2,780	67.1	2,546	1,386	54.4
<b>Switzerland</b>	230	195	84.8	230	195	84.8	420	375	89.2
<b>Other</b>	790	330	41.8	1,215	460	37.9	630	215	34.1
<b>Total</b>	20,010	7,955	39.8	19,035	7,815	41.1	15,091	5,591	37

Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 01 May 2021)

\* Source of data for the UK in 2020: (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)




Chart 150: Total positive decisions on Iranian asylum applications in the EU 28 & EFTA countries (%)

\* Source of data for the UK in 2020 (Home Office Immigration Statistics, retrieved 28 May 2021)

## Iranian irregular migrants in the E.U. and EFTA countries

Some asylum-seekers who receive negative decisions for their asylum applications apply once more so that their applications can be reconsidered. However, if the result of the reconsideration procedure is negative, they have to leave the country according to the host country's laws. Some applicants decide to continue residing in the host country illegally, and others try to register their applications in other countries. Some asylum-seekers who receive negative decisions are deported voluntarily or forcefully from the destination country.

The Iranian undocumented citizens identified in the E.U. and EFTA countries.

- countries \*
- One reason for the decline of undocumented migrants is the withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic reduced the number of undocumented migrants in Europe.
- The number of Iranian undocumented migrants identified in the EU27 countries

\* Statistics on the U.K. in 2020 is not available.

was 9,315 persons in 2020, indicating a 46% decline compared to 2019 (17,290 persons).

- In 2020, 9,505 undocumented Iranian migrants were in the EU27 and EFTA countries, accounting for 1.7% of the total population of undocumented foreign

nationals in such countries.

- The largest number of undocumented Iranian migrants in the EU27 and EFTA countries in 2020 were identified in Germany, France, and Greece.



Chart 151: Iranian nationals found to be illegally present in the EU28 & EFTA countries  
 Source: (EuroStat, Retrieved 31 May 2021)  
 \* Statistics on the UK in 2020 is not available




Chart 152: Iranian nationals found to be illegally present in the EU27 & EFTA countries  
 Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 31 May 2021)



### The order to leave the country for the undocumented Iranian migrants in the E.U. and EFTA countries

- The number of Iranian citizens who received the order to leave the EU27 and EFTA countries was 6,280 in 2020; this was 1.6% of the total number of foreign nationals who received the order to leave in such countries in that period.
- Among the EU27 and EFTA countries, France, Germany, and Sweden issued

the largest number of orders to leave the country for Iranian undocumented migrants in 2020.

- 6,065 undocumented Iranians in the EU27 countries ordered to leave the country in 2020; indicating a 38% decline in comparison to 2019 (9,815 orders).




Chart 153: Iranian nationals ordered to leave EU 27 & EFTA countries- (by major countries of destinations)

Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 31 May 2021)

### The number of undocumented Iranians leaving the E.U. and EFTA countries following the order to leave

- The number of undocumented Iranians leaving the EU27 countries after receiving the order to leave in 2020 was 21.7%, indicating a decline in comparison to 2019.
- Out of 32 E.U. and EFTA countries, only 20 countries present the statistics on the return of undocumented migrants after receiving the order to leave by the country of origin\*. Nevertheless, some of these 20 countries have not reported the number of

returned Iranian undocumented migrants in some years. In 2020, 350 undocumented Iranian migrants who had received the order to leave one of the above 20 countries returned to Iran. Countries such as the UK, Lichtenstein, Portugal, and France have not presented the statistics on the return of Iranian undocumented migrants in 2020.

\*The countries include Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Lichtenstein, and the U.K.




Chart 154: Iranian nationals returned following an order to leave EU28 & EFTA countries (2011-2020)

Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 31 May 2021)

\* Statistics on the UK in 2020 is not available




Chart 155: Iranian nationals returned following an order to leave EU27 & EFTA countries (by major countries of destinations)

Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 31 May 2021)

\* Statistics on the UK in 2020 is not available

## Iranian refugee returnees

The UNHCR database presents the statistics on the returned refugees by their countries of origin. The number of Iranian refugees returned to Iran is relatively low. However, some Iranian refugees may have

returned to their country without being formally declared and registered in the host country, which can justify the low number of returned Iranian refugees.




Chart 156: The number of Iranian refugees returned home (2010-2020)

Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)

## The resettlement of Iranian migrants across the world

According to the latest statistics reported by the UNHCR, 394 Iranian refugees were resettled in different countries in 2020. The number of Iranian refugees resettled in other countries has decreased since 2017.

The number of Iranians resettled in other countries in 2020 declined to the lowest level in the past two decades. The number of resettled refugees in 2020 declined

significantly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the number of Iranian resettled refugees decreased accordingly.

The number of Iranian migrants resettled in the U.S. has significantly decreased over the past few years. Canada was the first destination of Iranian refugees resettled in 2020, with the U.S., Australia, and Sweden ranking next.




Chart 157: The number of Iranian refugees resettled in the third countries (2000-2020)  
Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)



Table 31: The number of Iranian refugees resettled in the third countries (by destination) (2000-2020)

2000		2005		2010	
Destination country	Number	Destination country	Number	Destination country	Number
USA	5,100	USA	1,856	USA	2,979
Canada	662	Australia	349	Canada	321
Australia	478	Canada	260	Australia	277
Norway	416	New Zealand	122	Norway	142
Sweden	345	Denmark	116	Sweden	80
Finland	118	Finland	115	Germany	37
Denmark	50	Ireland	46	The Netherlands	8
New Zealand	31	The Netherlands	13	Czech Republic	5
Ireland	6	Sweden	9	Finland	5
The Netherlands	5	Norway	5	-	-
		-	-	-	-
Total	7,211	Total	2,891	Total	3,854

2015		2019		2020	
Destination country	Number	Destination country	Number	Destination country	Number
USA	3,121	Australia	671	Canada	182
Australia	482	Canada	391	USA	141
Canada	420	USA	216	Australia	66
Finland	22	Spain	77	Sweden	5
Cambodia	5	UK and Northern Ireland	8	-	-
-	-	New Zealand	7	-	-
-	-	South Korea	5	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	4,050	Total	1,375	Total	394

Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)

### The naturalization of Iranian refugees in destination countries

In total, 38,637 Iranian refugees were naturalized in other countries during 2000-2020. The number of such cases declined in the 2010s compared to the previous decade. Although the number of

naturalization cases for Iranian refugees has increased since 2016, the it decreased by more than 50% in 2020 (only 861 Iranian refugees were naturalized in 2020) in compare to 2019.




Chart 158: . The number of Iranian refugees naturalized in other countries (2000-2020)  
Source: (UNHCR Data Finder)

### b. Foreign nationals in Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has hosted millions of foreign nationals over the past few decades. Although the presence of foreign nationals in Iran dates back to the years preceding the Islamic Revolution, the formal statistics on such cases are quite limited. According to the National Iranian Census 2016 (Statistical Center of Iran, 2016),

- The total population of foreign nationals in Iran was more than 1.5 million.

- Afghan citizens constitute around 96% of the total foreign nationals in Iran (583,979 people).

- The population of Iraqis in Iran is 34,532 people (2% of the total population of foreign nationals in Iran).

-Forty-six percent of foreign nationals in Iran are female, and the others are male.




Chart 159: The number of foreign nationals in Iran by nationality- 2016  
Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016)




Chart 160: The number of foreign nationals in Iran (by nationality & sex) - 2016  
Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016)




CHart 161: The number of foreign nationals in Iran (by nationality & age groups) - 2016  
Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016)

### Afghan and Iraqi nationals in the provinces of Iran

Afghans and Iraqis constitute the majority of foreign nationals in Iran. The following sections focus on the characteristics of these two groups in Iran (Statistical Center of Iran):

- The geographical distribution of foreign nationals in Iran is regulated by Iran's law. The law prohibits the residence and mobility of foreign nationals in some provinces of Iran, particularly the border provinces.
- Qom and Khorasan Razavi host the largest numbers of Iraqi, Pakistani, Turkish, and other nationals due to their roles in religious education.
- Some border provinces host the citizens of the neighbor countries due to cultural and linguistic similarities. Some examples include Turkish citizens in East and West Azerbaijan provinces, Pakistanis and Afghans in Sistan and Baluchestan, and Iraqis in Khuzestan province. Marrying Iranian citizens, doing business, or being close to their country of origin are the main reasons for their presence in such provinces.



Table 32: Major provinces hosting foreign nationals in Iran by nationality- 2016

Afghan Nationals		Pakistani Nationals		Turkish Nationals	
Province	Number	Province	Number	Province	Number
Tehran	515,567	Qom	6,543	Qom	340
Razavi Khorasan	219,442	Sistan and Baluchestan	2,617	Tehran	154
Isfahan	183,124	Razavi Khorasan	1,744	West Azerbaijan	83
Kerman	125,411	Tehran	1,699	East Azerbaijan	49
Fars	109,247	Hormozgan	730	Razavi Khorasan	17

Iraqi Nationals		Other countries	
Province	Number	Province	Number
Qom	8,365	Qom	8,413
Razavi Khorasan	6,400	Razavi Khorasan	5,068
Khuzestan	4,972	Tehran	2,648
Tehran	4,965	Hormozgan	1,083
Isfahan	2,211	Isfahan	744

Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016)

### Afghan and Iraqi nationals in rural and urban areas



The number of Afghans residing in the urban areas of Iran is 1,242,332 people, while 332,000 live in the rural areas of the country. Accordingly, 78.5% and 21.5% of Afghans live in Iran's urban and rural areas, respectively (Statistical Center of Iran, 2016).

The largest populations of Afghans in Iran are settled in the urban areas of Tehran province; however, the largest number

of Iraqis reside in the urban areas of Qom province.

The number of Iraqis residing in the urban areas of Iran is 31,910 persons; however, 2,621 Iraqis are settled in the rural areas. Accordingly, 92.5% and 7.5% of the Iraqis in Iran live in the urban and rural areas of the country, respectively.



The number of Afghans living in urban areas in Iran



The number of Afghans living in rural areas in Iran

Chart 162: The number of Afghans living in urban and rural areas in Iran (by province) - 2016  
 Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016)

The number of Iraqis living in urban areas in Iran



The number of Iraqis living in rural areas in Iran

Chart 163: . The number of Iraqis living in urban and rural areas in Iran (by province) - 2016  
 Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016)

## The employment status of foreign nationals in Iran

The documented foreign nationals in Iran can obtain formal work permits to be employed in the country. However, a large number of the foreign nationals in Iran, particularly Afghans, are employed with no work permits. According to the latest data obtained from the National Census in Iran,

- The total number of male and female foreign nationals employed in Iran was 538,646 persons.
- The total number of male and female

foreign nationals unemployed in Iran was 21,394 persons.

- The employment rate of foreign nationals in Iran was 96.1%, and their unemployment rate was 3.9%.

The highest employment rate for foreign nationals in Iran was documented in Bushehr province (98.1%), while the lowest rate was observed in Kermanshah province (31.6%).

- The economic participation rate of foreign nationals' in the Iran was 44% in 2016.




Chart 164: Employment and unemployment status of foreign nationals in Iran- 2016

Source: (Iran national population and housing census, 2016; Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives and Social Welfare, 2017)

## The temporary work cards for foreign nationals

Temporary work cards are issued for the foreign nationals with valid refugee cards (called Amayesh) or for the Afghans who hold family passports. The temporary work card is a permit issued by the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare upon the requests of employers involved in an authorized field according to the needs of each province (mainly in agriculture, forestry and fishing, construction, etc.). The cards are valid for one year and can be extended annually. According to the latest statistics of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social welfare:

- Foreign nationals in Iran received or

extended 198,977 temporary work cards in 2019.

- The main reasons for the increased rate of issuing or extending temporary work cards in 2019 compared to the previous years are issuing cards based on the self-report way and adopting the policy of extending and issuing temporary work cards for men aged 18-60 years along with extending the identification cards.

- During 2012-19, the largest number of temporary work cards were issued or extended in 2014.




Chart 165: Afghans' temporary work permits in Iran (issued and extended) - (2012- 2019)

Source: (Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives and Social Welfare, 2019 -2012)

## Penalty charges against the employers who employ undocumented foreign nationals

Employers are among the stakeholders who exploit undocumented migrants as their workforce. According to Iranian law, employers who employ any undocumented workforce should be penalized. The penalty for employing an undocumented workforce was around 3,060,000 Rials per day in 2020.

Moreover, the repeated incidence of such employment can result in more severe penalties and even imprisonment.

It should be noted that 91,320 employers were penalized for employing undocumented workforce during 2015-19.




Chart 166: the number of employers fined and the amount received as fine due to the hiring of unauthorized laborforce (million Rials)

Source: (Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives and Social Welfare, 2015- 2019)

### Inspecting workshops and the identified undocumented foreign nationals

Employers are only allowed to employ foreign nationals with work permits or temporary work cards. Employing undocumented foreign nations is illegal, and the offenders are punished based on the law. Accordingly, workshops eligible to the Iranian labor code (except the home-based workshops) are inspected to identify such employers. The workshops eligible to the Iranian labor code are not merely industrial and professional ones, but the legal concept and definition of a workshop include any

place where workers eligible to the labor code work for a particular employer. Accordingly, inspection is conducted in any workshop eligible to the Iranian labor code. According to the executive bylaw of Article 191 of the Iranian Labor Code, workshops with less than ten employees are exempt from some labor code requirements.

On average, about 65,000 undocumented employees were identified in workshops during 2005-19.




Chart 167: . The number of unauthorized employed foreign nationals to be identified in Iran (2005- 2019)  
Source: (Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives and Social Welfare, 2019 -2005)

## The population of refugees in Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been hosting the Afghan refugees since the 1970s, and the refugees of other countries, including Iraq, were added to them during the following decades. The largest frequency of refugees in Iran was recorded in the 1990s.

- The latest UNHCR statistics indicate that 800,025 refugees lived in Iran in 2020, of whom 780,000 refugees were from Afghanistan, and 20,000 refugees were from Iraq (UNHCR Data Finder, retrieved June 19th, 2021).
- The UNHCR reports on Iran indicate that, out of the 3 million Afghan nationals in Iran, 780,000 persons are refugees, 2.1-2.25 million are undocumented migrants, and 586,000 hold Afghan passport with Iranian valid visa (UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2021).
- The number of stateless individuals in Iran in 2020 was 34 persons.




Chart 168: The number of Afghan and Iraqi refugees in Iran (1980-2020)

Source: (UNHCR Data Finder, retrieved 28 May 2021)

### The population of refugees in the Iranian guest cities

Several guest cities were built to host refugees following the arrival of Afghan refugees in Iran. At the moment, some refugees (e.g., Afghans, Iraqis, etc.) are residing in the guest cities.

- Around 3% (30,000 persons out of 800,000 refugees) of the population of refugees in Iran live in the 20 active guest cities.

- Around 97% of the population of refugees in Iran reside in cities or rural areas.

- The largest Iranian guest city in terms of population was the guest city of Rafsanjan in Kerman province, were hosting 5380 refugees in 2018.





Chart 16g: The number of refugees living in the Guest Cities in Iran (by sex) - 2018

Source: UNHCR, 2018, Retrieved 08 February 2020)




Chart 170: The number of refugees living in the Guest Cities in Iran (by provinces) - 2018

Source: UNHCR, 2018, Retrieved 08 February 2020)

### The population of asylum-seekers in Iran

Since Iran changed its approach to receiving new asylum-seekers from the early 2000s and emphasized on the voluntary return of refugees, the number of new asylum-seekers in Iran has decreased since then.

- The trend of registering new asylum applications has been decreasing over the past few years; thus, only 34 asylum-seekers were in Iran in 2020 (UNHCR Data Finder, retrieved June 19th, 2021).
- Comparing the statistics on the foreign

asylum-seekers in Iran over the past few years indicates that a majority of asylum applications registered in 2009 (1,851 cases) were from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.

- Iran has hosted asylum-seekers from different countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, etc.

Table 33: The number of asylum seekers in Iran (by nationality) - (2005-2019)

2005		2007		2009		2011	
Country	Number	Country	Number	Country	Number	Country	Number
Afghanistan	56	Afghanistan	967	Afghanistan	1,718	Afghanistan	421
Kuwait	10	Bangladesh	134	Iraq	96	Pakistan	15
Kyrgyzstan	5	Kuwait	11	Pakistan	19	Uzbekistan	6
Pakistan	29	Kyrgyzstan	5	Uzbekistan	18		
Tajikistan	16	Pakistan	20				
Uzbekistan	22	Uzbekistan	47				

2013		2015		2017		2020	
Country	Number	Country	Number	Country	Number	Country	Number
Afghanistan	37	Afghanistan	33	Myanmar	84	Myanmar	34
Pakistan	9	Pakistan	9				

Source: (UNHCR data finder, retrieved 28 May, 2021)



## The return of Afghan migrants from Iran

226

Afghan migrants constitute more than 95% of foreign nationals in Iran. The population of Afghan migrants in Iran can be divided into three groups in terms of their resident status: the first groups are refugees. The second group include the undocumented (irregular) migrants who have arrived in Iran illegally or have not extended their resident permits (ID cards or visas). Some undocumented migrants received census codes during the National Census in the 2010s, and their permits are extended annually. Moreover, a group of Afghan migrants received household passports following the census of the undocumented foreign nationals in the early 2010s, and their passports have been extended since then.

Most Afghans "move back and forth between neighboring countries, particularly to Iran for employment, trade or other temporary reasons. The flow of Afghan returnees have been increased in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The following section focuses on the impacts of the pandemic on the return of undocumented afghan migrants.

After the pandemic begun in Iran, like Iranian citizens, the Afghan migrants faced challenges. The most significant challenges for the Afghan migrants, and the foreign national in general in Iran can be divided into the following two categories:

Healthcare issues: The Iranian government

declared that all foreign nationals in Iran – including the undocumented migrants – can access to healthcare services during the early weeks of the pandemic. However, the migrants not covered by health insurance were forced to pay for their treatment, and this was reflected in the domestic news outlets. Access to free or paid Covid-19 testing for the foreign nationals was similar to the Iranian citizens' access to such services. A major challenge for the Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran is the lack of health insurance coverage for undocumented migrants. On the other hand, the UNHCR paid the health insurance fees of 120,000 vulnerable refugees in Iran in 2021 (the health insurance fees of 92,000 refugees had been paid in 2020), and the remaining documented migrants were forced to pay the fees of their health insurance. The majority of Afghan migrants are not covered by health insurance due to its high prices. Accordingly, only about 10,000 non-vulnerable migrants paid for their health insurance and were covered\*

Difficulties in terms of livelihood: The coronavirus outbreak in Iran coincides with the imposition of the most severe forms of economic sanctions against the country and increased inflation in all sectors of the Iranian economy. Accordingly, inflation in terms of housing and food caused many Afghans to experience similar problems as the

---

\* See the interview by the director-general of insurance and revenue in the Health Insurance Organization of Iran on May 2021, <https://yun.ir/sfg032>

Iranian citizens.

Nevertheless, the government in Iran faced extensive limitations in providing livelihood support measures due to the economic problems posed by the sanctions and the coronavirus outbreak. On the other hand, some professions were forced to stop their economic activity during the pandemic peaks, which influenced the Afghan migrants' income and livelihood. Moreover, according to Iran's law, the foreign nationals covered by employment insurance are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefit payments. Accordingly, many migrants that were covered by employment insurance could not get unemployment insurance benefits.

#### **The return migration of the undocumented Afghan migrants from Iran**

Undocumented Afghan migrants enter Iran illegally through the eastern borders of the country and get employed. After a while, they return to their country either voluntarily or after being identified and arrested (deported). Since the International Organization for Migration (IOM) records the undocumented Afghan returnees, the following section focuses the undocumented migrants' return migration trends over the past few years.

-Comparing the return trends of the Afghan undocumented migrants during the five years ending in 2020 indicates that the undocumented Afghans' return

migration reached a peak in 2020.

-Around 859,000 undocumented Afghan migrants returned to their country in 2020, the most significant cause of which was the coronavirus outbreak and the resulting economic difficulties.

-The rate of voluntary return of undocumented Afghans significantly increased in 2020. Accordingly, out of the total undocumented Afghans who returned in 2020, about 62% were voluntary migrants. On the other hand, the rate of migrants' voluntary return was about 44% in 2019.

#### **The statistics on the return of Afghan refugees**

The return of refugees is always classified as a voluntary return because the hosting countries are not allowed to deport refugees (except in cases specified by the law). The UNHCR data show that about 930,000 Afghan refugees have returned to their country since April 2020 (UNHCR, 2021).

The number of Afghan refugees returning from Iran after the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 decreased to 947,000. Accordingly, the number of Afghan refugees who returned to their country in 2020 declined by half compared to 2019.




Chart 171: . The number of undocumented Afghan returnees from Iran (2012-2020)

Source: (IOM, Weekly Report on Return of Undocumented Afghans, 2015-2021)

### The tendency to migrate among the Afghan migrants in Iran\*

The Afghan migrants who live in Iran are 3-4% of the total population of Iran and 8-9% of the population of Afghanistan. Accordingly, considering their tendency to migrate – whether refugees or regular/irregular Afghan migrants to return to their country or have the tendency to migrate to other countries – is quite important both internationally and nationally. The following section presents the findings of two surveys conducted on the Afghan

migrants' tendency to migrate and return to Afghanistan. Accordingly, the data related to 3 areas including the Afghan migrants' tendency to return, planning for return among the Afghan migrants, and planning to migrate to European countries, will be presented (the tables related to these surveys are available in the Iran Migration Outlook 2020).

\* The Figures in this section summarize the surveys and other field studies on Afghan migrants in Iran. The first survey was a joint effort by the Department of Human Geography of the Shahid Beheshti University and the Department of Geography of the University of Turku in 2017 (See Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu, 2018). The second survey was conducted by the Iran Migration Observatory (the Sharif Policy Research Institute) and the Department of Geography of the University of Turku (See Jauhiainen et al., 2020).




Chart 172: The number of Afghan refugee returnees from Iran (2012-2020)

Source: (UNHCR, 2021 و UNHCR, 2021b)

### The tendency to migrate among the Afghan migrants in Iran

The return migration of Afghans from Iran is conducted via legal and illegal ways according to their resident status in Iran. In general, it can be estimated that around 0.5 million undocumented Afghan migrants have entered to Iran annually, while around the same number of undocumented Afghan migrants have returned to their country (IOM, 2019). Moreover, only a few thousand Afghan refugees have returned to their country via the UNHCR programs, and

this constitutes less than 1% of the total population of Afghan migrants in Iran.

The surveys' findings indicate that the tendency to migrate is higher among the undocumented Afghan migrants in Iran. Moreover, this tendency was more pronounced among the men.

- The most considerable opposition against returning to Afghanistan was observed among the Afghan refugees in the guest cities.



Chart 173: Afghan respondents who would like to go back to Afghanistan (%)  
 Source: (Jauhiainen et al. 2020) & (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018)

## Planning to return among the Afghan migrants

▪ The findings of the surveys indicated that planning to return was more common among the undocumented migrants. This was more pronounced

among the men.

▪ The lowest tendency to return was observed among the refugees in rural and urban areas.



Chart 174: Afghan respondents who plan to return to Afghanistan (%)  
Source: (Jauhiainen et al. 2020) & (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018)



### Planning to migrate to European countries

- Some Afghan migrants in Iran plan to migrate or migrate to other countries for various reasons such as economic reasons.
- The findings of the surveys indicate that planning to migrate to European countries was more common among the refugees in the Iranian guest cities.
- Undocumented Afghan migrants are less likely to plan to migrate to European countries than other groups. The majority of the undocumented Afghan migrants in Iran have a family or relatives in Afghanistan or attempt to return after employment and saving enough money.



Chart 175: Afghan respondents planning to migrate to European countries (%)  
 Source: (Jauhiainen et al. 2020) & (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018)



### The resettlement of Afghan refugees in the world\*

Most refugees cannot return to their countries of origin due to prolonged conflicts, wars, or violence. Many of these refugees reside under risky conditions or have special needs, which cannot be fulfilled in the country of their residency. In such conditions, the UNHCR assists them to be resettled in a third country.

According to the resettlement statistics reported by the UNHCR,

- During 2003-20, 13,644 Afghan refugees in Iran were resettled in other countries.
- Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only 114 Afghan refugees in Iran were resettled in other countries in 2020.




Chart 176: Afghan refugee resettlements (submissions and departures) (2003-2020)

Source: (UNHCR 2021c)

\* The statistics on the resettled refugees are available in the resettlement portal of the UNHCR in terms of the country of origin, the country hosting the refugee, and the third country or the receiver of the resettled refugee. The resettlement statistics presented in this portal only refer to the number of refugees resettled by the UNHCR and do not include the resettlement cases organized by the receiving countries themselves.

### The resettlement of Afghan refugees in the third countries

According to the data reported by the UNHCR,

- Factors such as the strict policies of the Trump administration concerning migrants and refugees, the reduced capacity for resettlement, and the coronavirus outbreak in 2020 resulted in a considerable decline in the number of Afghan refugees resettled in other countries. Accordingly, only 791 Afghan refugees were resettled in other countries during 2019-20.

- The largest number of Afghan refugees were resettled in other countries during 2011-14.
- Sweden recorded the highest rate of resettling Afghan refugees during 2019-20.
- Australia has always been regarded as one of the top destinations in terms of resettling Afghan refugees.
- Although Canada was among the top countries in resettling Afghan refugees by 2010, it has left the list since then.




Chart 177: Afghan refugee resettlements in the third countries by the third country (2003-2020)

Source: (UNHCR 2021c)

## Conclusion

Despite the spread of the coronavirus, the number of displaced people worldwide increased to more than 82 million people in 2020, of whom 20.7 million are refugees, and 5.7 million were Palestinian refugees (the UNRWA). The number of new asylum applications recorded in 2020 declined due to the special conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic; thus, 1.1 million new asylum applications were registered in 2020, which is quite lower than the 2 million applications registered in 2019.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been a major destination of refugees around the globe due to its geographical locations and being a neighbor of two major origins of refugees (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq). Iran hosted about 0.8 million (mostly Afghan and Iraqi) refugees by 2019. Some of the refugees changed their status from refugee to passport holders which caused to decline in the number of refugees in Iran in the past few years. Thus, Iran ranked 10th by hosting 800,000 refugees (780,000 Afghans and 20,000 Iraqis). Aside from the refugees, the UNHCR estimates that around two

million undocumented migrants live in Iran, most of whom are seasonal workers. The number of undocumented Afghans returning to their country in 2020 increased compared to the previous years due to the coronavirus outbreak and the economic issues arising from the pandemic and the U.S. sanctions. Over 850,000 undocumented Afghans returned home in 2020. However, the arrival of the undocumented Afghans to Iran continued because of the gloomy economic conditions in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the coronavirus outbreak greatly influenced the number of registered Iranian refugees worldwide. The number of new Iranians asylum applications in 2020 was cut in half compared to 2019. This reduction can be attributed to the travel restrictions imposed by countries and the border controls by governments. In 2020, 134,767 Iranians in refugees status, and 77,217 people in asylum-seeker status were living in other countries.

REPUBLIKA  
HRVATSKI



**Air**



AIRBUS A310-300

NP



**Section two: A review of the status of Iran in the  
global migration**



# **Chapter 8:**

## **The status of Iran in terms of the return migration**

8





## The status of Iran in terms of the return migration

240

Iran has always faced a considerable out- flow of highly- educated migrants. This issue has led to accumulation of human, financial, and knowledge resources abroad that can be implemented towards development of the country by adopting effective policies. Nevertheless, it was mentioned in chapter 4 that Iran could be classified as a "reactive country" in terms of its approach to the return migration. In other words, Iran had hardly adopted a structured policy or program to encourage or facilitate the return of Iranian migrants, particularly highly-educated migrants, before 2015. Accordingly, there is little accurate statistics on Iranian return migrants before 2015; however, different news agencies released such statistics. For example, the head of the Faculty Recruitment Council of the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology has argued that 2,214 Iranian migrants who graduated from foreign universities were recruited in Iran's universities during 2021-2004 (Students' News Agency, 2021).

The returns of highly- educated Iranian migrants has been highlighted during the last decade; thus, one of the important and effective actions that have been started since 2015 is the program of cooperation with the Iranian specialists and scientists in foreign countries. The program is aimed to facilitate the return of highly- educated Iranians and has been operationalized and executed by the Vice-presidency for Science and Technology and the Center of International Interactions in Research and Technology.

Since Iran adopts a reactive approach to

the issue of return migration, the policies adopted by the country have mostly been developed to facilitate the economic and social integration of the returned Iranian migrants. The program of cooperation with Iranian specialists and scientists in foreign countries was developed in 2015 to benefit from their knowledge, experience, and innovative ideas in the country. The main goal of this program is to create a mechanism to benefit from their knowledge and experiences in the fields of post-doc programs, sabbatical leave, visiting professors, technological activities, and holding speeches and workshops emphasized on the brain circulation (Iran Migration Observatory, 2020).

The return migration of 1,989 highly-educated Iranians and connecting with 864 Iranian specialists in foreign countries by holding speeches and workshops are some of the major achievements of this program (Vice-presidency of Science and Technology, 2021; Iran Knowledge, 2021).

### The achievements of the program of cooperation with the Iranian specialists and scientists

The latest statistics obtained from the Vice-presidency of Science and Technology and the Iran Knowledge Institute indicate that since this program has been started until 1,989 ,2021 Iranians have returned to the country. the statistics show that most of highly- educated Iranians returned in 2016 and 2017; this was predictable due to the JCPOA and the promising political and

economic future of Iran. Then, the imposition of the U.S. sanctions in 2018 slowed down the return migration of the highly- educated Iranians, though their return's cumulative

frequency has still been growing.

Further, men accounting for about %83 of the Iranian returned migrants by 2021.




Chart 178- Absolute frequency and cumulative frequency of Iranian return specialists and scientists (2015-2021)

Source: (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021) (Iran Knowledge, 2021)




Chart 179- Beneficiaries of the Cooperation Plan with Non-resident Iranian Specialists and Scientists (2015-2021)

Source: (Iran Knowledge, 2021)

## The highly- educated return migrant's facilities

Based on the latest statistics in 2021, the program of cooperation with the Iranian specialists and scientists has provided facilities for 1,989 individuals returned temporarily or permanently since 2015. Moreover, the program maintained relations with 864 Iranian specialists and highly-educated migrants.

By 2,340 ,2021 seminars and workshops were held by the Iranian returned migrants and Iranian specialists abroad to benefit from their knowledge and experience.

Other facilities of the program are classified into two groups: occupational and non-occupational facilities. The non-occupational facilities include post-doc programs, military service, and sabbatical

leave. A total of 1,096 cases of post-doc programs, 401 cases of military service, and 76 sabbatical leave were offered to the selected returned migrants. Moreover, occupational facilities are offered to facilitate the employment or the professional integration of the Iranian highly- educated returnees and the recruitment of young assistant professors, the establishment of start-up companies, the recruitment of visiting professors, and employment in knowledge-based companies. A total of 445 young visiting professors, 217 cases of assistance in the establishment of start-up companies, 107 visiting professors, and 27 cases of employment in the knowledge-based companies are the results of this program.




Chart 180- Facilities allocated to Iranian return specialists and scientists

Source: (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021) (Iran Knowledge, 2021)

### The major countries from which Iranian highly- educated migrants have returned

The statistics show that the majority of the highly- educated Iranians choose Northern America and Western Europe as their destination. Similarly, their return migration is usually recorded from these regions. According to the latest statistics reported in 2021, the U.S., Canada, the UK, Australia, Malaysia, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and France are the major countries from which Iranian highly- educated migrants have returned. More than 420 Iranian highly- educated migrants have returned from the U.S., while the returned cases from Canada, the UK, Australia, Malaysia and Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, and France are around ,160 ,310 60 ,90 ,120, and 50, respectively.

### The distribution of the returned highly- educated Iranians according to the university rankings

Iran is one of the countries emphasizing the return migration of specialists from top universities of the world. Accordingly, facilities are usually offered to Iranian students and graduates of the best universities in the world. According to the latest statistics, in 121 ,2021 highly-educated Iranians (%5,8) returned from the 10 top universities of the world. Moreover, %24,6 from the 50 top universities, %45,3 from the 100 top universities, %67,1 from the top 200 universities, and %82,5 from the top 300 universities of the world.




Figure 10- Share of Iranian return specialists and scientists by university ranking

Source: (Vice-Presidency for Science and Technology, 2021)

## The academic fields of the Iranian highly- educated returnees

The majority of the Iranians who returned to their country via the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists were studied in

engineering, humanities, basic sciences, medical sciences, and arts/architecture.




Chart 181- Different fields of Iranian return specialists and scientists (2015-2021)

Source: (Iran Knowledge, 2021)





Chart 182- Different fields of study of Iranian return specialists and scientists (2015-2021)

Source: (Iran Knowledge, 2021)





## The effects of the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists

According to the data reported by the international institution of Iran Knowledge in 2021:

- Within the 6 years since starting the program, 1,989 Iranian highly- educated migrants have returned to Iran; Moreover, they have published 784 research articles and registered 13 patents (Iran Knowledge Institution, 2021).

### The return migration drivers

The desire to return and the return rate are two major indicators of migration. The return migration rate is one of the main quantitative indicators, which influences the development of countries. If the desire to return is actualized, it can bring numerous advantages for the country of origin. On a global scale, the average return rate of human resources within five years of their migration is less than %40. On the other hand, this rate is far less for developing countries such as Iran (Shirkhani & Bayazidi, 2018). However, investigating the desire to return among Iranian migrants can be a key guide for policy makers to implement convenient policies to turn the potential of return migrants into the actual ones.

It should be noted that no coherent investigation has been made on the desire to return and the drivers of return migration among Iranian migrants so far. Accordingly, the relevant surveys should be conducted to understand the drivers of return migration. Consequently, we attempted to combine three different types of data to illustrate the status of Iran in terms of return migration. The first and second surveys were conducted before and after signing the JCPOA, respectively, while the third survey consists of in-depth and semi-structured

interviews conducted by the Iran Migration Observatory with the Iranian migrants in 2021. Aggregating the statistics of the surveys is impossible due to their differences (e.g., in terms of sampling), and each of the surveys has to be investigated separately. However, we analyzed them alongside one another to draw a detailed picture of the migrant Iranians' return to Iran. The details of the above surveys are presented below:

- The survey of "the motives and obstacles of return migration to Iran" was conducted in 2014 by a group of Iranian researchers in foreign universities. The survey aimed to provide a better, more accurate, and in-depth understanding of the drivers and obstacles of return migration to Iran and included 4,569 Iranian students and graduates in foreign universities (Ale-Yasin et al., 2014).
- The survey of "identifying the factors influencing Iranians' migration and return" was conducted by the Sharif Research Institute of Science, Technology, and Industry and the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) in 2017. The survey aimed to investigate the reasons for the migration of highly- educated Iranians, their conditions in foreign countries, and their motives for returning to Iran. The survey was conducted by participating 408 resident or non-resident Iranian students and graduates (Salavati, 2017).
- The Iran Migration Observatory conducted in-depth and semi-structured interviews to identify the drivers of migration and return migration to Iran. Accordingly, 30 resident or non-resident Iranian migrants were interviewed (Iran Migration Observatory, 2021).

The results indicated that various factors

influenced the desire to return in different periods. Based on the survey of "the motives and obstacles of return migration to Iran" (2014), the survey of "identifying the factors influencing Iranians' migration and return" (2017), and the in-depth and semi-structured interviews by the Iran Migration Observatory (2021), personal reasons such as "reunification with one's family" and "being with one's friends" were among the major drivers of return migration of Iranians. Accordingly, the surveys conducted in 2014 and 2017 indicated that "reunification with one's family" and "being with one's friends" are the drivers for the return migration of around %70 and %50 of Iranians (Al-Yasin et al., 2014; Salavati, 2017).

The findings of the surveys indicate that "homesickness," "feeling of responsibility and commitment to Iran," and "feeling that one can be more effective in Iran" are among the other major drivers for almost %50 of Iranians (Ale-Yasin et al., 2014; Salavati, 2017).

Apart from personal reasons such as one's family, the feeling of belonging to one's country, and the desire to help and be effective in Iran that has always been important drivers of return migration, signing the JCPOA in 2016 and the removal of the sanctions significantly increased the desire to return among the Iranian migrants. However, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of the U.S. sanctions in 2018 slowed down the trend (Salavati, 2017; Iran Migration Observatory, 2018).

The results obtained from in-depth interviews conducted by the Iran Migration Observatory in 2021 suggested that the most important incentives to return among the Iranian migrants are still personal (family reunification) reasons and the feeling of more effectiveness in Iran; however, dissatisfaction with the destination country should not be overlooked (Iran Migration Observatory, 2021).

Table 34- Return drivers between Iranian migrants (2014, 2017, 2021)

2014		2017		2021	
Return drivers	%	Return drivers	%	Return drivers	%
Family ties	72.5	Family tie	73.9	Family ties	61
Being with friends	49.5	Feeling of responsibility towards Iran	60.1	Feeling of being useful in Iran	43.3
Feeling of being useful in Iran	48	Homesickness	58	Dissatisfaction with the conditions in destination country	43.3
Homesickness	41	Feeling of belonging to Iran	51.5		
		Changing political situation in Iran	47		
		Nuclear commitments and lifting sanctions	43.3		

Source: (Ale Yasin et al., 2014) (Salavati, 2017) (Iran Migration Observatory, 2021)



## Conclusion

It should be emphasized that the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists is a valuable step towards benefiting from the capabilities of the highly- educated Iranian migrants in foreign countries and has desirable results. However, it should be considered that Iran's "reactive" approach towards the return migration has not been effective enough to encourage the return of the large number of Iranian migrants. The effects of return policies and programs in Iran are still limited in terms of volume, extent, and effectiveness and have to become more in-depth and strengthened. Accordingly, the reactive approach of Iran towards the return of highly- educated migrants has resulted

in a situation where the majority of the Iranian migrants return due to the personal reasons such as "the desire to be with one's family and relatives," "the desire to be with one's friends" "the feeling of being more effective in Iran," and "the feeling of homesickness in migration destinations".

If Iran wants to use the capacity of the Iranian migrants more efficiently, it should replace its "reactive" approach with a more "active" one. Accordingly, more Iranians will be encouraged to return home. Furthermore, Iran needs to develop its infrastructure to be more prepared for recruiting and creating more opportunities for the economic and social integration of the highly-educated Iranian migrants.







**Section two: A review of the status of Iran in  
terms of the international migrations**



**Chapter 9:**

**Retention, migration and return  
migration of the top ranks of national  
university entrance exam and  
Olympiad medalist in Iran**

9

## Retention, migration and return migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalist in Iran

252

One of the challenging and highly-debated topics in the field of migration is the brain drain phenomenon among the top ranks of national university entrance exam and the Olympiad medalists. Due to the importance of this topic, the statistics of retention, migration, and return migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and the Olympiad medalists provided by the National Elite Foundation has been analyzed in the present outlook.

### Basic definitions and estimation of migration

At the beginning of this section, the data provided by the Office of Immigration and Passport of Iran are the main criteria for determining the entry and exit of people by using their national ID numbers. Accordingly, analyzing this information can help us to determine the duration of one's residency inside or outside of the country.

- The records of educational migration: Spending at least 400 days in a foreign country within two years during 2021-2001.
- The year of migration: The first year following the migration.
- Residency in a foreign country: Spending at least 400 days of the past two years in a foreign country.

- Residency inside the country: Spending at least 400 days of the past two years inside the country.
- Return to the country: Residing in Iran after a period of educational migration.
- The year of return: The year following the first two-year period (after migration) when a person lives for more than 400 days inside his/her country of origin.

### The definition of the elite and talented person

According to the Article 1 of the statute of the National Elite Organization, "elite" refers to a efficient person who has a key role in the production and developing of sciences, arts, technology, and the management of a country and implement his/her intelligence, innovation, entrepreneurship, and intellectual genius to develop the country. A "talented person" refers to a potentially elite person, the grounds for the complete identification of whose talents have not been provided. It should be noted that the above definitions has been used in different sectors such as science and technology, education, culture, society, arts, and management. According to the National Elite Organization definition, an elite and talented person is:

- Top ranks of national and international scientific Olympiads;

- Top ranks of national university entrance exam;
- Inventors and discoverers;
- Graduates of the top universities;
- Top ranks of the Quran competitions;
- Distinguished scientific, economic, social, and cultural figures;
- Creators of innovative and valuable literary and artistic works;
- Faculty members of universities and the research and technology institutes; and
- Seminary instructors and researchers.

It should be noted that the figures presented in this section do not include all the people eligible for the status of elites and top talents. Accordingly, they are limited to the people with the following characteristics:

- a. Olympiads gold, silver, and bronze medalists whose ID numbers have been recorded by the the National Elite Organization.
- b. The top ranks of national university entrance exam in the four main groups of "mathematics and engineering," "empirical sciences," "the humanities," and "arts," whose

ID numbers have been recorded by the National Elite Foundation.

**B1.** The ranks eligible to be covered by the foundation: 150-1 for mathematics and engineering, 100-1 for empirical sciences, 100-1 for the humanities, and 40-1 for arts.

**B2.** The ranks 1000-1 of the above groups.

### **The overall status of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and the Olympiad medalists: retention, migration, and return migration**

Analyzing the information received from the Office of Immigration and Passport showed that %56.6 of the "Olympiad medalists", %69.1 of "the people eligible to the support of the National Elite Foundation", and %78.3 of "the top ranks (1000-1) of national university entrance exam" during 2020-2001 live in Iran.

Among the investigated groups, %37.2 of the Olympiad medalists, %3.7 of the people eligible to receive the foundation's support, and %2.6 of the top ranks of national university entrance exam have returned to Iran.

Table 35- Status of stay, departure and return of the selected entrance exams (2001-2015) and Olympiads (2001-2012)

	Student Olympiads		Top ranks in the national entrance exam			
			Members of the National Elite Foundation (Rankings 1 to 150 for the entrance exam)		Ranks from 1 to 1000	
Total number of samples	2,765	100%	5,666	100%	53,926	100%
Number of people living inside	1,564	56.6 %	3,913	69.1 %	42,243	78.3 %
Number of people with an exit history	1,080	39.1 %	1,536	27.1 %	8,984	16.7 %
Number of people living abroad	1,029	37.2 %	1,443	25.5 %	8,309	15.4 %
Number of returned migrants	122	4.4 %	208	3.7 %	1,417	2.6%
Number of people with unknown residence status	172	6.2 %	310	5.5 %	3,374	6.3%

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)

### The age class of the Olympiad medalists and the top ranks of national university entrance exam migrants

The statistics analysis show that The majority (around %50) of the top ranks (ranks 150-1) in "mathematics/engineering" migrate after receiving their bachelor's degrees (23-22 years old). In general, %75 of them migrate after receiving bachelors or master degrees, and %25 migrate after receiving Ph.D. degrees. The same trend can be observed for the top 1000-1 ranks of the mathematics/engineering group.

Since most of the top ranks (150-1) in empirical sciences study in medical, they usually migrate after receiving their professional doctorate degrees at 26. On the other hand, a significant percentage

of the top ranks (below 1000) in the group of empirical sciences migrate before 25. Since the majority of them study in medical sciences, it seems that a considerable number (around %50) of them migrate before receiving their professional doctorate degree. It should be noted that the exit age of such students begins at 18 (immediately after receiving the results of the entrance exam). Moreover, it seems that migration after 30 is not significant in this group. This can be explained by the attractive job opportunities in the country and the inability to find desirable jobs with sufficient income in foreign countries, particularly in the case of clinical medicine.

In the group of humanities, the majority of migrations occur during or after the bachelor's programs. The statistics showed that the majority of migrants in this group leave the country after receiving their master's degrees. Almost the same trend can be observed for the top ranks in the humanities.

Migration among the art group starts from the early years after the university entrance exam and continues up to around 30.

- The exit age class of Olympiad medalists

There are considerable similarities between the exit age class of "Olympiad medalists" and the "top ranks in national university entrance exam," and the results are generalizable to this group. Moreover, a relatively similar exit age group was observed proportional to the correspondence between the field of the Olympiad and one's field of study in a university. In other words, the maximum exit age for the medalists of the biology Olympiad was 26 years since they usually study in medical sciences.








Chart 183 - Distribution of departure age of people covered by the National Elite Foundation by different educational groups

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)




Chart 184 - Distribution of departure age ranks 1 to 1000 entrance exams by different educational groups

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)




Figure 185 - Distribution of the departure age of the selected Student Olympiads  
Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)

## Migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalists

This section deals with the share of migration of the top ranks and Olympiad medalists from Iran. Like the previous sections, first, migration of the top ranks of national university entrance exam (i.e., the students eligible to the National Elite Foundation and the ranks 1000-1) and Olympiad medalists in terms of will be discussed. However, the following notes should be taken into consideration:

**a.** The statistics on the migration of two aforementioned groups have been partly missing for years before 2006 because the ID numbers of migrants had not been available, or their mobility data had not been recorded during those years.

**b.** In some parts of the bar graphs, years on the right (2011 and later) illustrate unreliable or less credible results because, as the figures presented the exit age models, migrants' age during this period does not still exceed the most frequent migration age for the members of that group. In other words, with an increase in time difference between the year of "obtaining top ranks in the university entrance exam or Olympiads" and the year of "obtaining the statistics", individuals have more opportunities to leave the country and vice versa. Accordingly, the migration percentages are less credible after 2012, and the top ranks may migrate during the next years when they are graduated.

## Migration among the top ranks of national university entrance exam (eligible to the National Elite Foundation) during 2015-2001

The statistics show that the highest migration rate (%68) for the top ranks in mathematics/engineering was in 2002. Moreover, this rate for empirical sciences was recorded in 2001.

The highest rate for humanities sciences (%24) and art sciences (%57) and was recorded in 2001.

Based on the data recorded by the National Elite Foundation in 2011-2001 (that are more credible) %59 of students in mathematics/engineering and around %30 of students in empirical sciences migrated to other countries. Moreover, %15 and %32 of students in humanities and arts sciences migrated during the same period.




Chart 186 - departure Status of people covered by the National Elite Foundation by different educational groups during the years 2001 to 2015

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)

## Migration of the top ranks (1-1000) of national university entrance exam during 2001-2015

The largest number of the top ranks (1000-1) in mathematics/engineering (%56) migrated from Iran in 2007. Similarly, the largest number of students in empirical sciences (%14) was recorded in 2006 and 2007. Moreover, the largest number of students in humanities and art sciences (%28 and %4, respectively) was recorded in 2007.

In general, %35 of the top ranks (1000-1) in mathematics/engineering migrated from Iran during 2012-2001. Moreover, the

average rates of migration for the top ranks in empirical sciences, humanities, and arts were %12, %7, and %29, respectively.

An investigation of the aggregate exit status of the top ranks in all fields of national university entrance exam indicates that around %59 of the top ranks (1000-1) who migrated to other countries were studying in mathematics/engineering. Moreover, the exit rates of students in art sciences, empirical sciences, and humanities were %12, %20, and %9, respectively.




Chart 187 - departure status of the ranks of 1 to 1000 entrance exams by different educational groups in the period 2001-2015

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)




chart 188 - The share of different educational groups from the departure rate in the ranks of 1 to 1000 in the entrance exams from 2001 to 2015

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)

### The exit status of Olympiad medalists during 2001-2012

The following Figure illustrates the migration of Olympiad medalists during 2012-2001. Accordingly, the highest migration rate in mathematics Olympiad medalists was recorded in 2003. Moreover, the highest migration rate (78%) was recorded in 2005.

The highest number of migrated Olympiad medalists in other fields are as follows: 83% of the medalists in the astronomy sciences Olympiad in 2004, 71% of the medalists in the computer sciences Olympiad in 2001, 71% of the medalists in the chemistry sciences Olympiad in 2001, and 71% of the medalists in the chemistry sciences Olympiad in 2001.




chart 189- Comparison of the departure rates of the top winners of the Olympiad in different educational groups in the period 2001-2012

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)



Chart 190- Average annual departure rate of Olympiad winners in all fields from 2001 to 2012  
 Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)

%61 of the medalists in the biology sciences Olympiad in 2005, and %29 of the medalists in the literary sciences Olympiad in 2001.

Moreover, a comparison of the exit rates of the medalists in the mathematics,


physics, chemistry, computer, astronomy, and biology Olympiads during 2012-2001 indicates that the largest exit rate (%59) for all fields was recorded in 2005.



## An outlook of the overall retention and migration status of the top ranks of national university entrance exam and Olympiad medalists

▪ In general, aggregating the top ranks of national university entrance exam (1000-1) in all fields during 2015-2001 indicates that %78 of them are residing in Iran, while %22 of them have migrated to other countries. Moreover, the top ranks of students in mathematics/engineering have migrated more considerably than the other students (around %12).


▪ Moreover, aggregating Olympiad medalists in filed studies during 12-2001 indicates that %57 of them are residing in Iran, while %43 of them have migrated to other countries. Moreover, it can be observed that the migration of the medalists in the mathematics Olympiad (%9) is more significant than other sciences.



Resident in the country	78
Leaving people in fields related to Mathematical and Technical Sciences	11.5
Leaving people in fields related to art	3.5
Leaving people in fields related to Experimental sciences	2.7
Returned people	2.5
Leaving people in fields related to human Sciences	1.8

Chart 191 - The overall situation of departure and retention of ranks 1 to 1000 in all groups of entrance exams from 2001 to 2015


Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)



Resident in the country	57
Departure of the winners of the Mathematical Olympiad	9
Departure of the winners of the Physics Olympiad	8.1
Departure of the winners of the Computer Olympiad	7.2
Departure of the winners of the Chemistry Olympiad	5.4
Departure of the winners of the Astronomy Olympiad	4.5
Returned people	4.4
Departure of the winners of the biology Olympiad	2.7
Departure of the winners of the the Literary Olympiad	1.7

Chart 192 - The overall situation of departure and retention of all groups of student olympiads from 2001 to 2012

Source: (Iran's National Elites Foundation, 2020)









## **Chapter 10**

**Policy recommendations for Iran**

# 10



## Policy recommendations for Iran

266

Iran is considered a sending, transiting, and receiving country for international migrants due to various political, economic, and social reasons and its special geopolitical status. Iran has indeed the characteristics of a sending country by several millions of Iranians residing abroad. At the same time, it has the characteristics of a receiving country and hosts a considerable population of Afghan refugees and documented/undocumented migrants. These characteristics and the fact that many Asian migrants try to migrate to Turkey and the European countries through Iran highlight the importance of developing migration policy framework, migration governance and reinforcing the country's institutional infrastructure.

Unfortunately, although Iran has faced the waves of international migration for a long time, it has not paid systematic and opportunity-based attention to the migration issues. Accordingly, the Iranian politicians and policymakers have usually viewed migration as a weakness or threat and still adopt a non-constructive and negative approaches towards this phenomenon. It should be noted that policy makers should implement effective policies to turn "brain drain" to "brain circulation" and benefit from the capacity of all highly- educated human resources both inside and outside of the country. In this regard, many countries worldwide are planning and implementing coherent programs to attract investors and creative and innovative human resources, exchanging students and graduates, involving their international diaspora, and empowering the circulation of the elite

approach to attain their ambitious goals in terms of development.

### International student mobility Policies

One of the areas for the competition of universities worldwide is "being international" for exchanging international students and the brain circulation to benefit from its financial and scientific advantages. To achieve these goals, policymakers should adopt policies to develop the national infrastructures in order to attract foreign students and re-integrate Iranian international students. However, the policies concerning the international mobility of students and graduates in terms of retaining, attracting, sending, and returning Iranian and foreign students have been passive in Iran.

The main strategies regarding Iranian highly- educated migrants is developing "brain circulation" program alongside considering the retaining policies. Regarding the large number of Iranian highly educated migrants in other countries, it is important to develop policies to enhance migrant' desire to return or benefit from their knowledge and experiences in foreign countries.

Improving the student exchange programs, particularly in the scientific and innovative areas and providing the opportunities of sabbatical leave abroad, can also help to strengthen the brain circulation and the transmission of new knowledge and ideas via circular and return migration (temporary or permanent). The flow of student mobility has become disorganized by the government and there

is lack of convenient programs and policies of brain circulation in the country.

A vital consideration in the field of student mobility is that students and graduates migrate from Iran without relying on any governmental program, well-organized policy, or monitoring official institutions. Many students apply for foreign universities based on personal tendencies because of facing some of the challenges in the country (i.e., political, economic, and social conditions). In addition to the aforementioned factors, the process of international students' mobility is somehow influenced by the financial profits of the institutions involved in their migration, which in some cases charge the students with illogical fees and provide them with inaccurate information, particularly concerning the employment capacity of the destination countries after graduation. Accordingly, useful information should be provided by credible non-profit organizations regarding the labor market of the destination countries.

Moreover, the approach taken by the country towards the recruitment of international students has still been primarily passive. For example, the majority of foreign students who study in Iran are the second and third generations of the Afghans who have been born in Iran and studied in Iranian universities. Considering the benefits of recruiting international students, such as increased job opportunities, the economic growth of the country, and the increased soft power of the students' countries of origin and due to the benefits arising from the foreign currencies received from the international students, Iran should adopt a policy to recruit and receive international students systematically. This option seems to be a convenient economic solution and can result in the optimal use of the higher education infrastructure due to the declined registration of students in Iranian universities and the disappearance of job opportunities.

It is also important to consider the issue of social integration after receiving international students to recruit even more students and get a higher share of international students. Some major factors that can facilitate the international students' social integration in Iran include enjoying the safety and convenient civil and social rights, having access to social services such as the banking and healthcare services, and accessing to job opportunities after or during education. It should be pointed out that governments tend to decide on such bonuses as providing temporary/permanent resident permits or employment certificates according to their objectives of recruiting international students and macro-scale policies. Accordingly, the selection of the policy approach of the country regarding the above issues should follow the main goals in the recruitment of international students and the number of international students that can receive resident permits in the country.

Finally, the establishment of an up-to-date database of Iranian international students and the foreign students in Iran is a main prerequisite, which may assist the governance of international student mobility. In other words, the lack of such a database will lead to major policymaking issues while benefiting from the capacity of the international students of Iran.

### **Labor-economic migration policies**

Nowadays, the policymaking and governance of various fields are conducted based on reliable data and information. Regulating and policymaking in the field of foreign nationals and migrants, particularly economic and workforce migrants, are deeply influenced by the macro-economic status of countries and the indices and out-flow of their labor forces. The migration programs and

policies need to encompass accurate data and information on labor force out-flows. Accordingly, investigating the structure of a labor market, analyzing the mid-term and long-term trends of the population growth, and investigating the quality and quantity of human resources at working-age are among the major requirements in labor migration policymaking. Moreover, the migrant statistics, migration channels, main destinations, and major employment categories are among the other requirements.

It should be mentioned that some important parts of the migration data and information in Iran are missing (e.g., the population of Iranians in foreign countries) or key data is never produced (e.g., the indicators of the migrants' labor market compared to those of native labor forces). Due to lacking reliable evidences and data, the convenient policies required in governing economic and labor migration in Iran.

### **Policymaking in the field of the Iranian migrants abroad**

Facilitating the laws of citizenship and naturalization to get the maximum benefits of the Iranians migrant' capacity

Although dual citizenship is a challenge in most countries and is not recognized officially by the governments, some countries have devised solutions to benefit from their dual citizens. The first solutions is implementing the effective citizenship model through which the preferred citizenship of a person is identified as his/her effective citizenship. In this model, no limitations are imposed on a person concerning his/her access to social/personal rights, and he/she enjoys similar rights while visiting the other

country. Of course, other models, such as issuing a citizenship card specific to the dual citizens to overcome the legal issues of that phenomenon. This is devising a kind of special citizenship for individuals who have dual or multiple citizenship and face problems in terms of their citizenship according to countries' laws. If Iran wants to benefit from the capacity of its diaspora, including the second/third generations of the migrants or individuals who have received the citizenship of another country, it should somehow convince them that their legal status is accepted and recognized by the country. Moreover, they should be informed that no direct or indirect criminalization is imposed against them.

### **Considering the regional and continental policies of the labor market**

Currently, a considerable number of Iranians are living in North America and Western Europe. Nevertheless, active and official migration interventions and these migrants' financial knowledge exchanges with Iran are barely possible due to strict policies on granting multiple-entry visas, economic sanctions and the limitations in the official financial transactions, and opposing policies of Iran and these countries. According to Iran's regional goals and active policies and its strategic approach of 'Looking at the East and Eurasia', regulating migration policies and exchanging human resources with regions with similar shared strategic and economic goals seems necessary. Developing conventions for exchanging the workforce independently or as the part of other economic agreements and granting particular professional scholarships according to the country's technological needs can be taken into serious consideration.

## **Establishing the center for the identification and prediction of the global and domestic labor markets**

Nowadays, the largest rates of unemployment are observed among the graduates of Iranian universities, particularly those with bachelor's degrees and the graduates of engineering and agriculture field of studies, due to the lack of incompatibility between the educational system and the business development programs. Such imbalance can be solved in the short-term perspective by adopting the policy of sending the Iranian workforce to other countries temporarily. The controlled exploitation of the global labor market can be seen as a way to mitigate the pressure of the domestic labor market. This center can help identify the characteristics of the target markets in terms of adjusting skills and capabilities of the domestic workforce, observing any changes in target countries' programs and policies, developing courses for the recognition of the required skills and documents by establishing formal communications with the labor markets of the target countries, devising the required agreements between the target countries and Iran to reduce the migration costs of the workforce and help them be integrated into the target market, establish links and communications with the country, and protect the rights of the Iranian migrant workforce.

## **Introducing the necessary incentives and designing active channels to send remittances and make investments in the country**

There is no specific program to benefit from the three major groups of Iranians migrant (including investors and entrepreneurs, expert and skillful workforce, and low-skilled and semi-skilled migrants).

Accordingly, some programs and activities are needed both from the government and the social institutions that should start for the above three groups from the early stages of migrating and selecting one's destination, supporting them in the receiving countries, maintaining relationships and links exploiting resources and networks while staying abroad, and creating convenient conditions and attractive options for their return or maintaining economic ties with them.

Although the crisis of foreign currencies devaluation in Iran has turned investment in Iran into a desirable undertaking, the introduction of incentives for investment in the supported parts of the Iranian society could be quite attractive for Iranian migrants; however, no effective measure has been adopted in this regard.

Pakistan is a country that has gained valuable experiences in this regard and has reduced some issues and the costs of sending remittances by establishing special monetary channels. Moreover, India has stopped receiving tax from its migrants' remittances, while Mexico has introduced the "special citizenship card" and the investment opportunities for the Mexicans who live abroad. Accordingly, both countries have endeavored greatly in the field and have gained much success. Moreover, the solutions introduced by Cuba in the form of the mechanisms to facilitate the transfer of remittances despite economic sanctions can also be valuable. Moreover, the emerging technologies such as the cryptocurrency can be regarded without any limitation for designing new options to exploit the migrants' money and investment.

Moreover, no significant step has been taken regarding the introduction of investment opportunities and the

establishment of conveniences for Iranian migrant investors. Of course, the provincial chambers of commerce are usually considered responsible for designing briefing programs and introducing them to the investors. However, the implementation of such programs has not been effective in exploiting the capacity of the migrant Iranians.

Getting remote access to the highly-educated and skillful migrant Iranians also requires the development of different options for the circulation or temporary/permanent return in various areas such as academics, research, businesses, and industries. The relevant policy options and the various programs used by different countries have been explained in the "Report on the Policies of Brain Circulation\*\*" Nowadays, the return program directed by the Vice-presidency of Science and Technology is performed as the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists, which has resulted in the return of 1989 highly- educated individuals to Iran.

### **The development of official channels for economic migration**

The limited official channels for planned economic migrations, particularly for the low-skilled workforce, results in irregular migrations or make international student mobility mostly for economic reasons among graduates or even the employed. Planning and designing channels for the temporary labor migration by governments, particularly during serious economic hardships, is a smart way to manage and control such migrations. Although the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour, and Social Welfare

in Iran has endeavored a lot over the past few years, it has not progressed. Due to the lack of an accurate prediction regarding the future of the labor market for all professions in the mid-term and the inability to identify the needs and characteristics of the global labor markets, the technical and executive capability to adjust and design convenient options and direct the surplus workforce to benefit from the global markets has not been actualized. Accordingly, many people who pursued better opportunities have made great financial losses due to their lack of information and following irregular channels. The mobility of the Iranian workforce to Iraqi Kurdistan has usually been unofficially. Although an agreement has recently been signed by the Iranian and Iraqi ministries of labor to facilitate the official mobility of the workforce, it has not been operationalized.

- Teaching the standards and procedures of the successful instances of the procurement of jobs on the global scale

The available statistics indicate that around 136 internationally authorized institutes for procuring jobs in Iran, which are active in sending the Iranian workforce to foreign countries. They have no offices in their target countries and sometimes are not equipped with the required specialized knowledge and qualifications in identifying the characteristics of the target labor market and accurately directing the workforce. Special standards have been defined for such international institutes by the IOM and the ILO, and some training workshops are held by the related office in the Ministry of Labor. Nevertheless, these institutes still work unprofessionally.

The institutes for the procurement of jobs should interact with large companies and international organizations and design

\* Sharif Policy Research Institute, 2017, brain circulation policies

convenient options for Iranian workforce migrants. Such options should be introduced to applicants after getting the confirmation of the Ministry of Labor, and the processes of adjusting capabilities, sending the workforce, and integrating them into the target society should follow. Nonetheless, none (except very few cases) of them are equipped with such capabilities. All of these processes need training and performance monitoring by the officials.

- The need to monitoring the contracts and activities of the migration agencies

The migration agencies sometimes impose significant financial and social losses on the applicants when they introduce unpromising migration methods and then leave the applicants alone after they arrive in the destination country. In such cases, the person does not attain any of his/her objectives regarding access to the labor market and the citizenship of the country. Such people are neither interested nor motivated to return, nor will they succeed in the destination country, which has not been selected appropriately in accordance with their conditions.

Monitoring the contracts and activities of these institutes, ranking them according to their customers' evaluation, and invalidating the certificates of the wrongdoers are some control and punishment measures that have to be pursued more seriously. Moreover, it would be helpful to assist them in designing useful processes for migrants and facilitating their employment, changing the model of their income, and improving their main processes.


Informing people of the capabilities of these institutions by ranking them, announcing their offenses and the related complaints, and clarifying the number of requests and successes of each case will be quite effective in reducing the issues in this field.

## Policymaking regarding the arrival of migrants in Iran

The foreign workforce arriving to Iran is usually undocumented with low levels of (or no) skill. They are deprived of many rights in Iran since they are undocumented and work illegally. Although no accurate information is available regarding their population in the country, their annual exit flow towards Afghanistan is recorded by the UN offices. The statistics indicate that although the exit flow is usually influenced by Iran and Afghanistan's economic and political conditions, an average of 500,000 Afghans return from Iran annually. Accordingly, if similar numbers of Afghans enter Iran each year, the circulation of at least 500,000 undocumented seasonal migrant workers can be estimated in the country. Of course, the repetition of this cycle over the past years indicates that the labor market in Iran and the Iranian employers are attracted towards employing a cheap and hard-working workforce.

Another portion of the foreign workforce in Iran concerns the migrants with passports and labor visas that have been provided to them from the provincial committees of the labor visas according to the Law of the Employment of Foreign Nationals in Iran. Over the past few years, the work cards for the documented foreign nationals have become common and cover a much broader spectrum of jobs. The Iranian stipulates the list of the approved professions for the foreign nationals, and the applicants for other jobs should receive work and resident permits from the provincial employment committees. However, the list of the approved professions has been updated over the past years. According to the director-general of employment in the Ministry of Labor, individuals who plan to work in a particular field are not given an employment certificate in another field





by force. Accordingly, the employment certificates are issued for the migrants selected by a particular employer.

The development of short-term, mid-term, and long-term programs for the employment of foreign nationals in Iran

Any market, including the labor market, is considered dynamic and progressive only if it experiences the dynamicity of imports and exports. Exporting human resources means transferring the surplus human resources into the global markets for different purposes such as investment, training, and the return on capital in the future. On the other hand, importing human resources is the procurement of the most valuable element in production from other markets by advantages such as the lower training costs. When the program for the industrial and economic advancement of a country is determined, the country's needs for short-term, mid-term, and long-term economic requirements in terms of the human resources and supplying them from inside or outside the country are identified. Such human resources can include low-skilled workers required in different areas such as construction (e.g., the Afghan nationals). In some other cases, such requirements can be manifested in the employment of the top-rank specialists or managers of leading companies to renovate industrial and service sectors. Moreover, some human resources with intermediate levels of skills may be required to work in ordinary jobs (e.g., in petrochemical plants). However, the outlook and perspective of the requirements of the Iranian labor market should be developed and presented clearly to the intended international labor market.

### **Establishing a constant official flow of seasonal workers between Iran and Afghanistan**

Although no thorough investigation has been made on the foreign workforce, particularly Afghans, in Iran, the preliminary studies indicate that the majority of the foreign nationals in Iran are employed in jobs requiring lower levels of skill. Accordingly, they are usually employed in sectors where the lowest percentage of unemployment is observed (the unemployment rate of the people under high school diplomas was below %10 according to the census in 2016). If the Iranian workforce is supposed to compete better with the cheap and hard-working foreign nationals (Afghans), the Afghan workforce should be recognized officially. Accordingly, they should be covered by insurance and other protective measures for the labor force to equal their Iranian counterparts in terms of the costs. In this way, such official recognition is advantageous for the Afghan workforce, the high costs of their illegal arrival in the country through dangerous routes would be reduced, the economic cycles formed around the undocumented migrants and the smuggling (e.g., the -6000billion IRR turnover of the smuggling of the Afghans in Iran) and relevant mischiefs and risks would be eliminated, and monitoring the labor market and the migrants' activities would be possible. If the seasonal foreign nationals are officially and legally recognized in Iran, instruments such as individual and group work visas can be considered without the reunification option or the establishment of transit channels for countries' Afghans' workforce.

### **Changing the law of employing foreign nationals in special professions**

Changing or abolishing the law passed in 2002, which aimed to specify the name of one's job on the employment cards and a circular passed in 2005-2004 to employ foreign nationals in particular jobs, can be regarded as an option. The above circular categorized some low-skilled occupations in four groups, and employers were only allowed to employ the foreign nationals in those groups. These guidelines are only applicable to the holders of the Amayesh ID cards and "family passports" (and not to the passport holders with valid visa). However, the law should be abolished since the law itself is not observed meticulously, and many foreign nationals are employed in positions other than the specified ones. That is because it is not applicable at the moment and is usually misrepresented in media.

There are no employment limitations in the case of foreign nationals who arrive in Iran with a passport and to perform a particular job. Therefore, the only conditions are that there should be an Iranian employer, and no Iranians can be available for that position. However, the second condition and the requirements for it to be presented to the provincial committees of the employment of foreign nationals make the migrants abandon the idea of receiving work permits according to their expertise. Accordingly, they decide to stay in Iran and choose a job from the list of authorized professions instead of returning to Afghanistan and attempting to get a passport and a work permit.

### **Deciding on entry and resident permit based on the employment permit (determining the type of the entry system based on the labor visa in Iran)**

The law of employing foreign nationals in Iran needs major reforms in terms of the general frameworks, charters, and administrative protocols. First of all, the criteria for receiving foreign nationals in Iran (whether it is based on employment or not) should be specified. The current procedures seem to be mainly based on employment-based methods. Of course, these procedures are activated after the reception of the foreign nationals for their access to the labor market instead of being applied during the reception and the provision of visas; this is one of the shortcomings of the system of labor visa in the migration system of the country. Accordingly, it appears that a foreigner arrive in the country first and then receives a work certificate or permit. On the other hand, a migrant is allowed to enter his/her destination based on an employer's request and the confirmation of this application in countries where the migration system is employment-based! One way to overcome this legal issue is to establish a market testing system.

### **Extending the duration of visas or defining the internship visas for international students after studying in a foreign country**

For the foreign nationals studying in Iran, no opportunity has been stipulated after

graduation to evaluate the Iranian labor market via the internship programs or any temporary one-year or two-year visas. This is considered both a hindrance against the employment of the foreign elite and specialists studying in Iran and depriving the country's labor market of the capacities of this group. Although the highest unemployment rate is observed among university graduates, particularly among the holders of bachelor's degrees, devising plans to benefit from the foreign specialists in Iran will be pretty effective. This need is not that much highlighted in a short time, but it can improve the prospects of the presence of international students in Iran and cover some of the needs of the Iranian labor market. In many countries such as the U.S. and Germany, internship or work visas are available 3-1 years after graduation. Such conveniences for the international students can allow them to evaluate the potentials of the Iranian labor market; on the other hand, Iranian employers and the labor market, in general, can benefit from the international students' expertise and capabilities. Such visas are currently provided to some elite foreign graduates in Iran, though its procedures are not thoroughly clear and well-thought.

#### **Opportunities for reception and residency for foreign entrepreneurs and investors**

In general, the statistics indicating the ease of doing business performance index in Iran is quite unacceptable; Iran ranked 125th out of the 190 countries evaluated by the World Bank in 2020. Such issues in terms of the ease of doing business are particularly challenging for foreign nationals. Accordingly, there are no incentives for foreign nationals' entrepreneurship in Iran, and they face numerous problems in registering companies in the country. Moreover, there are some indeterminacies in the case of receiving business permits by

foreign nationals in Iran.

Looking at the laws of receiving business permits in Iran shows that there is no legal limit for foreign nationals with passports and work cards to receive a business permit. However, field observations indicate that obtaining such permits by foreign nationals in Iran is sometimes impossible despite handing over the required documents. Moreover, a large market has been created where Iranian citizens receive a business permit and hand it over to the Afghan migrants. Such actions cause the foreign nationals in Iran to suffer financial losses and legal issues.

Countries around the globe adopt different policies for attracting investors and entrepreneurs from other countries based on their capacities and needs. One of the most recent positive and noteworthy steps taken in this regard is introducing a plan where foreign investors receive the -5year residency of Iran by making a -250,000dollar investment in the country. Moreover, foreign investors can receive mid-term residency permits in Iran by employing a certain number of Iranians. These investors or entrepreneurs can get permanent residency in Iran if they employ and invest more than the specified figures. Many Asian countries or neighboring Iran, such as India, China, and Turkey are currently being applied. It has also been implemented in European countries and can be used by the Iranian migration system too.

#### **Benefiting the capacity of international agreements to legalize the arriving currents of migrants**

One of the ways to face the issue of undocumented migrants is by signing bilateral agreements with such migrants' countries of origin to modify the arrival routes. Accordingly, the undocumented migrants are deported to their country of origin, and

a specific capacity for the migration of the high-quality workforce is assigned to it. This method can be implemented between Iran and Afghanistan; thus, the arrival of undocumented migrants is pursued more seriously, while the documented workforce can become legally available in the Iranian labor market on a contractual basis. An instance in this regard is the agreement signed between Iran and Australia through which the Australian migration system considered a specific capacity for the Iranian workforce by the return of the undocumented migrants.

### **The access of the migrant workforce to the social supports specified by the bilateral agreements**

Migrant workers face various obstacles in accessing the social supports in their destination countries. Including clauses concerned with social security in the bilateral migration agreements or implementing separate bilateral agreements or multilateral agreements on social security can extensively be helpful in the legal and effective coverage of the migrants and their families by the social security measures. This should be a part of more comprehensive frameworks, including measures such as passing and implementing international conventions and recommendations for the migrant workers and protecting them by bilateral/multilateral agreements on social cooperation. Moreover, coordinating the major principles such as the equitable treatment of the migrant workforce in terms of the domestic laws or the bilateral social security agreement or (if necessary) the passage of one-way actions to facilitate or accelerate the migrants' access to the social

support measures should be considered.

### **Facilitating the low-cost financial transactions of the foreign workforce in Iran**

One of the main programs of the destination countries to improve the migrants' labor market is to facilitate their financial transactions, particularly the remittances they send to their countries of origin. A significant part of the migrant workforce in Iran consists of the seasonal migrants are responsible for their families' livelihood in the countries of origin. However, the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran has limited the options for financial transactions with Iran. Accordingly, some initiatives should be considered to facilitate financial and official transactions to collect actual information about money transfer from Iran and benefit the government (not informal individuals and informal institutions) from the transaction fees. Options such as the money mail or getting assistance from the authorized currency exchanges with offices abroad.

### **Policymaking in the field of the forced migrations/asylum-seeking**

Nowadays, the number of refugees is increasing significantly. The unequal distribution of refugees worldwide has introduced the issue of forced migration as a significant challenge. Thus, the issue of policymaking in the field of forced migration is an important topic and requires careful consideration. In general, the national policies of countries on refugees are pretty different; the Convention on status of refugees (1951) specified a set of actions that governments have to perform to facilitate

the integration of the refugees. While some countries provide full rights and health/education services for refugees, others have limited access to such rights. In other words, the latter countries have handed over most of the social services to NGOs. Sometimes, the above limitations are caused by limited governmental capacity.

To grasp the opportunities and capabilities brought by the refugees and migrants, countries should adopt convenient policies and create environments, which make newcomers secure enough to invest in terms of the human resources, professions, and the societies that host them. These countries should devise policies according to which the refugees are entitled to the rights of employment, freedom of mobility, and protection according to the law. Furthermore, the international community should assist the hosting countries in investing in the services and public infrastructure of the vulnerable areas and increasing refugees' access to services. Public and private participation can be helpful in training jobs and skills that will be useful for both the receiving and the sending countries. This policy is adopted to reach a win-win situation for all countries. It provides equal opportunities for the migrants/refugees, the hosting countries, and the countries of origin to benefit from the advantages of international migrations. In general, the increased rate of forced migration in the absence of comprehensive policymaking and mismanagement can bring about numerous negative consequences.

In response to the increased flow of international migration, the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly passed the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016. The declaration aimed to save the

lives of refugees and migrants, protect the refugees' rights, and share responsibility between the refugees and migrants on a global scale. The UN members passed two global compacts based on this initiative: the global compact for migration and the global compact on refugees.

The Global Compact on Refugees is a framework to share predictable and equitable responsibilities. It also presumes that no sustainable solutions can be adopted in the case of refugees without international cooperation. The compact provides a plan for the governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders to ensure that the hosting societies are supported sufficiently and that the refugees can live fruitfully. Four major goals of the compact on refugees are as follows:

- Mitigating pressure imposed on host countries of refugees;
- Promoting refugees' self-confidence;
- Extending access to third countries; and
- Supporting and protecting refugees in terms of returning safely to their countries of origin (ibid.).

Within the framework of the goals of the Global Compact on Refugees, which has stipulated safe and regular migration, the general policies of Iran on forced migration/asylum-seeking are as follows:

- Due to the adoption of the Convention 1951 on the status of refugees in Iran, it is necessary to specify the process of asylum application and the related decision-making procedures. This would guarantee the refugees' access to international and humanitarian support in Iran.
- The Islamic Republic of Iran has been one of the major destinations of refugees in the past four decades by hosting millions of

them. Although international organizations such as the UN agencies, some governments, and INGOs have provided financial and non-financial help to Iran, the government in Iran has been responsible for paying the costs of hosting the refugees. The majority of such costs include education, healthcare, and hidden subsidies are paid by the Iranian government. It is necessary for the institutions and organizations involved in managing migrants and foreign nationals to receive a higher share of the international financial resources by exploiting the capacity of migration diplomacy and collaborating with the international organizations. Accessing sufficient financial resources will facilitate the refugees' access to services (e.g., healthcare and education).

- The return migration trend among the Afghan migrants in Iran has been slowed down due to the conditions of Afghanistan in terms of security and economics. It is essential for the country of origin (Afghanistan), the global community, and the international organizations to provide more considerable support to encourage the Afghans refugees' voluntary return.
- A primary requirement in policymaking regarding refugees is gaining access to up-to-date and accurate data on the status of refugees in the host country. At the moment, no detailed statistics are available regarding the status of refugees in Iran by their age groups, gender, geographical distribution, and their status in terms of economy, livelihood, etc. Accordingly, there is an emergent need for the establishment of the migration database to assist planning and policymaking in the field of refugees. Although the data related to the foreign nationals in Iran are available, the sorted statistics of refugees have not

been presented yet. On the other hand, the national censuses do not show the actual population of the foreign nationals, particularly the undocumented ones, in Iran.

- Due to the fragile security condition in Afghanistan in 2021, more and more Afghan migrants are predicted to arrive in Iran as the conflicts continue and more areas come under the Taliban's control. Moreover, Afghanistan's economy was influenced negatively by the coronavirus outbreak, and this has created several challenges for the Afghanistan government in providing job opportunities for its citizens; hence, the number of Afghan undocumented workforce in Iran may increase in the future.
- The Iranian citizens have registered their asylum applications in other countries. Some Iranians have received negative decisions to such applications and live illegally in their destination countries; Moreover, some others have changed their destinations. It should be noted that a considerable number of Iranian refugees are economic migrants. Accordingly, the approach towards this group of Iranian migrants should be changed to provide the grounds for their voluntary return.
- Due to the increased rates of Iranians' irregular migration to other countries over the past decade, some Iranian asylum-seekers migrate to other countries without having sufficient information on asylum-seeking risks. Accordingly, they suffer numerous issues caused by the smugglers, human trafficking networks, citizens of the destination countries, and other people they encounter on the way or in their destination. Accordingly, individuals should be more extensively informed of asylum-seeking risks.

## Policymaking in the field of return migration

The inseparable alliance between human resources and development is a significant topic; thus, countries assign not only significant importance to the retention of many countries, including the developing countries, but also a full-scale war and competition can be observed to attract them, particularly the developed countries. In this way, the issues of migration—especially the migration of students and the highly- educated people – have gained high priority in policymaking.

In general, there are three techniques to develop the top senders of migrants regarding their migrant populations: remittances, remote collaboration, and return migration. In this regard, return migration is the most popular strategy to reverse the brain drain phenomenon. However, policymaking in this field has been challenged by the uncertainties arising from the return process's vagueness and unpredictability. This is what makes policymaking for the return migrants quite tricky.

Iran has always experienced the migration of a considerable number of highly- educated people. However, no comprehensive or well-defined plan towards return migration had been adopted seriously and systematically before 2015. The "collaborating with the non-resident Iranian scientists and specialists" program was introduced in 2015 as a response to the return migration of some Iranians in abroad. Such migrations are usually the result of ties to one's family or friends and homesickness in foreign countries, and the governments' responses are not significantly effective. The conveniences provided by the

governments for the returned migrants are usually intended to facilitate their social and economic integration. Accordingly, the policies can only assist in retaining them and preventing their repeated migration. On the other hand, a repeated migration will arise if no such policies are adopted.

Based on some rather obvious reasons, it can be argued that the approach taken by the government in Iran, particularly over the past decade, has slowly moved replaced viewing the exit and migration of graduates as the "brain drain" with "return, remote collaboration, and brain circulation." Nonetheless, the reactive approach of the country is still unable to encourage a considerable number of highly- educated Iranian migrants to return. If the goal is to exploit the international Iranian diaspora's scientific, economic, and international capacity in other countries maximally, the country should leave its reactive approach aside and take up a more active approach. A country with such an approach is not satisfied merely by integrating the returned migrants; however, it makes endeavors to encourage the remaining migrants abroad. In this regard, the adoption of an active approach is a function of the following two factors:

1. Increasing the country's readiness to recruit the returned specialists; and
2. Arousing tendency to return in the migrant specialists.

To sum up, improving the status of return migration requires that the economic and social infrastructure of the country is improved, and the ground for exploiting the capacity and expertise of the returned

migrants is provided. That is because the specialists' return can only be fruitful and efficient when society is ready to receive them; if this is not the case, various challenges may arise. Countries that have no significant economic capacity and face major challenges in their labor markets in terms of employing specialists and highly- educated people are examples in this regard. That is because even the local people in such countries have limited or problematic access to the country's labor market or welfare system. The return migration of the specialists in these situations is not considered an advantage, but they are seen as a burden on the government and even the local communities. Accordingly, the important consideration is that providing services and adopting policies that encourage return migration should be adjusted with the institutional requirements and the needed resources to become efficient enough (Wahba, 2014).

Moreover, Iranians migrant have to be encouraged to return extensively. It should be noted that increasing the readiness of the country to recruit its migrant specialists can increase the tendency to migrate among the Iranian diaspora in foreign countries. However, a major challenge in this regard is the limited scope of the adopted programs and policies. Active countries in this area have various policies and programs that

can meet a broad spectrum of the needs and requests the migrant highly- educated people and extensively encourage them to return. Nonetheless, limited programs and policies have been adopted in this regard, and even these limited policies have not been communicated well. This is another major challenge for the country, which is associated with the country's broken ties with the communities of Iranian migrants. When a country has no relationship with its international diaspora, no credible and comprehensive data on its migrant specialists and highly- educated people can be obtained. Moreover, establishing relations and communicating the programs and policies aimed to encourage their return will be impaired seriously.

Thus, the country should maintain its ties with the Iranian migrants worldwide so that it can both observe their human, scientific, technological, and financial capacities and identify domestic needs. Accordingly, it can provide convenient grounds for exploiting the Iranians migrants' specialty and design extensive and comprehensive programs to encourage the return of the highly- educated Iranians. Finally, the government should maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of its policies and programs by communicating widely and accurately.







## References

## References of student mobility

1. The Islamic Azad University (2021). The statistics on the international students in the Islamic Azad University
2. Iran Migration Outlook (2020). The questionnaire of the tendency and decision to migrate among the students and graduates since 2013
3. The Institute for Research and Planning in Higher Education (2020). The statistics on the international students in Iran
4. Assomull, A., & Laad, S. (2020). Mapping global mobility trends in education. Education Investor Global.
5. Austrade-MIP. (2020). Iranian students in Australia. Retrieved from <https://austrade-mip.getoslo.com/>
6. Bista, K. (Ed.). (2018). International Student Mobility and Opportunities for Growth in the Global Marketplace. IGI Global.
7. Cheng, M. (2021). Shifting Trends in International Student Mobility: Embracing Diversity and Responding to Change. NAFSA
8. College Factual. (2021, May 17). <https://www.collegefactual.com/search/?cx=003938256103%4927586508Aifej5syvsws&3%Bie=UTF8-&sa=Search&cof=FORID3%A10&siteurl=&q=+massachusetts+institute+of+technology>.
9. IIE Open Doors. (2021, April 28). All Places of Origin - IIE Open Doors. IIE Open Doors / All Places of Origin. <https://opendoorsdata.org/data/international-students/all-places-of-origin/>
10. IIE, A. (2018). World on the move: Trends in global student mobility. IIE center for academic Mobility research & impact.
11. Institute of International Education. (2020). "International Students by Place of Origin, Selected Years, 20/2019 - 50/1949." Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange. Retrieved from <https://opendoorsdata.org/>
12. Lanvin, B., & Evans, P. (2014). The Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2014. Growing talent for today and tomorrow. INSEAD, Adecco, HCLI.
13. Lanvin, B., & Evans, P. (2016). The Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2017. Talent and Technology 2017.
14. Lanvin, B., & Evans, P. (Eds.). (2013). The global talent competitiveness index 2013. INSEAD.
15. Lanvin, B., & Evans, P. (Eds.). (2015). The global talent competitiveness index 16-2015. INSEAD.
16. Lanvin, B., & Evans, P. (Eds.). (2018). The Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2018: Diversity

for Competitiveness. INSEAD.

17. Lanvin, B., & Monteiro, F. (2020). Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2020: Global Talent in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.

18. Lanvin, B., Monteiro, F., Bratt, M., & INSEAD. (2019). Entrepreneurial Talent for Competitiveness. The Global Talent Competitiveness Index, 37-3

19. Lee, S. W. (2017). Circulating East to East: Understanding the push-pull factors of Chinese students studying in Korea. *Journal of studies in international education*, 190-170 ,(2)21.

283

20. Mercado, S. (2020). Covid19- and the future of international student mobility. ESCP Research Institute of Management (ERIM) Impact Paper No. -73-2020EN.

21. Migration Policy Institute. (2021, February 2). International Students in the United States. MigrationPolicy.Org. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/international-students-united-states2020->

22. National Science Foundation. (2020). National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Survey of Earned Doctorates.

23. Project Atlas. (2020). Project Atlas 2018: infographics. Retrieved from <https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Project-Atlas/Explore-Data/Infographics/Current-Infographics>

24. Skinner, M. (2018, October 16). India as a Destination: Ambitions and Challenges. WENR. <https://wenr.wes.org/09/2018/india-as-a-destination-ambitions-and-challenges>.

25. UIS. (2020). Outbound internationally mobile student by continent of origin. Retrieved from <http://data.uis>.

26. [unesco.org/#](http://unesco.org/#)

### References of economic and labor migration

1. ADBI,ILO & OECD,(2021). Labor Migration in Asia: Impacts of the COVID19- Crisis and the Post-Pandemic Future.

2. Alsahi, H. (2020). COVID19- and the Intensification of the GCC Workforce Nationalization Policies. Arab Reform Initiative, 10

3. Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2021). Statistics on Australia's international migration . retrieved from:<https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/migration-australia/20-2019>

4. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. (2020a). Retrieved from Australian government data portal: [https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/dba45e7c81-f44-4aa9-d-821b9a0a121017/resource/afbf44d080-6b48-d-1bffb093887-cega65/download/migration\\_trends\\_statistical\\_package\\_19\\_2018.xlsx](https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/dba45e7c81-f44-4aa9-d-821b9a0a121017/resource/afbf44d080-6b48-d-1bffb093887-cega65/download/migration_trends_statistical_package_19_2018.xlsx).


5. Australian Government department of Home Affairs. (2021b). Retrieved from Australian Government data portal: <https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/2515b21d0-dba-4810-afd-4ac8dd92e873e/resource/51db-4613b4-548c9f-aa155-07cab48d423/download/bp0014l-temporary-resident-skilled-visas-granted-at-30-09-2019-v100.xlsx>.
6. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. (2021c). Retrieved from Australian Government data portal: <https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/ab4-245863dea-4661-a-33471ee15937130/resource/04410b0-15cf-4151-0b26b0-eb0799ba126/download/bp0019l-temporary-entrants-in-australia-at-30-september-2019-v100.xlsx>.
7. BAMF. (2018). Retrieved from Federal Office Migration and Refugees: [https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht2018-.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=5](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht2018-.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5)
8. BATALOVA, J., FIX, M., & FERNÁNDEZ-PEÑA, J. R. (2021). The Integration of Immigrant Health Professionals.
9. Buchan, J., Charlesworth, A., Gershlick, B., & Seccombe, I. (2019). A critical moment: NHS staffing trends, retention and attrition. London: The Health Foundation.
10. Center for Global Development (2020). "Health Workers Are on the COVID19- Frontline. We Need More of Them"
11. Channel News Asia (2020). <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/covid-19-coronavirus-philippines-healthcare-nurses-worker-ban12639940->
12. Cometto, G., Scheffler, R., Liu, J., Maeda, A., Tomblin-Murphy, G., Hunter, D., & Campbell, J. (2016). Health workforce needs, demand and shortages to 2030: an overview of forecasted trends in the global health labour market. Retrieved from [https://www.who.int/hrh/com-heeg/Needs\\_demands\\_shortages.pdf](https://www.who.int/hrh/com-heeg/Needs_demands_shortages.pdf)
13. Dempster, H., smith, R. (2020). Migrant Health Workers Are on the COVID19- Frontline. We Need More of Them.
14. Department of Homeland Security, (2021). Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security: <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/entryexit-overstay-report>
15. Department of Homeland Security. (2020). Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security: <https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook>.
16. DESTATIS. (2020a). Naturalization statistics. Retrieved from Federal Statistical Office of Germany: <https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis//online/data?operation=previous&levelindex=2&step=1&titel=Statistics28%+tables29%&levelid=1582037814949&levelid=1582037810137>.
17. DESTATIS. (2020b). Statistics of foreigners. Retrieved from Federal Statistical Office of Germany: <https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/data?operation=statistic&levelindex=0&levelid=1582037803144&code=12521>
18. EUROSTAT. (2020). Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

19. Forbes. (2020). Solving The Covid19- Crisis Will Require More Foreign Health Care Workers. Retrieved from Solving the Covid19- Crisis Will Require More Foreign Health Care Workers
20. Gallup (2018). Potential Net Migration Index, Retrieved from Gallup website: [http://news.gallup.com/migration/interactive.aspx?g\\_source=link\\_news9&g\\_campaign=item\\_245204&g\\_medium=copy](http://news.gallup.com/migration/interactive.aspx?g_source=link_news9&g_campaign=item_245204&g_medium=copy)
21. Gencianos, G. (2021). Spotlight Migration and COVID19-: Implications on Rights-Based Labour Migration Governance and Universal Health Care.
22. Henley and Partners (2021). The Henley Passport Index: Q2021 2 Global Ranking, available at: [https://www.henleyglobal.com/storage/app/media/HPI/HENLEY\\_PASSPORT\\_INDEX\\_2021\\_Q2\\_INFOGRAPHIC\\_GLOBAL\\_RANKING\\_1\\_210415.pdf](https://www.henleyglobal.com/storage/app/media/HPI/HENLEY_PASSPORT_INDEX_2021_Q2_INFOGRAPHIC_GLOBAL_RANKING_1_210415.pdf)
23. Home Office. (2021a). Immigration Statistics. Retrieved from Home Office of the United Kingdom [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/988213/citizenship-datasets-mar2021-.xlsx](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/988213/citizenship-datasets-mar2021-.xlsx)
24. Home Office. (2021b). Immigration Statistics. Retrieved from Home Office of the United Kingdom: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/988210/entry-clearance-visa-outcomes-datasets-mar2021-.xlsx](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/988210/entry-clearance-visa-outcomes-datasets-mar2021-.xlsx)
25. Home Office. (2021c). Immigration Statistics. Retrieved from Home Office of the United Kingdom: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/987787/settlement-mar-2021-tables.ods](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/987787/settlement-mar-2021-tables.ods)
26. İçduygu, A. (2020). Stranded irregular migrant workers during the COVID19- crisis: The question of repatriation. COVID19- and the transformation of migration and mobility globally. August.
27. ILO (2020). Experiences of ASEAN migrant workers during COVID19-: Rights at work, migration and quarantine during the pandemic, and re-migration plans. ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.
28. ILO. (2021a). ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers Results and Methodology.
29. ILO. (2021b). ILO Monitor: COVID19- and the world of work. Seventh edition retrieved from [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_767028.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767028.pdf)
30. ILOSTAT. (2020). "COVID19-: Are there enough health workers?" International Labour Organization. 2020 IndexMundi. (2020). Physicians (per 1,000 people). Retrieved from <https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS>
31. IMF. (2021). Real GDP growth Annual percent change. retrieved from [https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP\\_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOORLD](https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOORLD)
32. IOM (2021). Labour mobility and skills in response, recovery and post covid19- pandemic policy brief 27 January 2021 retrieved from [https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/policy\\_brief\\_labour\\_mobility\\_and\\_skills\\_in\\_covid\\_time\\_final\\_final\\_0.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/policy_brief_labour_mobility_and_skills_in_covid_time_final_final_0.pdf)

33. IOM. (2020). Migrants and the COVID19- pandemic: An initial analysis. Retrieved from: <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs60-.pdf>
34. IRCC. (2021). Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. Retrieved from [canada.ca: https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics.html](https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics.html)
35. Kumar, C. (2021). A year on, migrants' vital contributions to the Covid19- response must drive lasting reforms, 05 March 2021 retrieved from <https://odi.org/en/insights/a-year-on-migrants-vital-contributions-to-the-covid-19-response-must-drive-lasting-reforms/>
36. Moroz, H., Shrestha, M., & Testaverde, M. (2020). Potential responses to the COVID19-outbreak in support of migrant workers.
37. OECD. (2019). Recent Trends in International Migration of Doctors, Nurses and Medical Students. In Recent Trends in International Migration of Doctors, Nurses and Medical Students. <https://doi.org/5571/10.1787ef-48en>
38. Popova, N., & Özel, M. H. (2018). ILO global estimates on international migrant workers: results and methodology. International Labour Office.
39. Ratha, D. K., De, S., Kim, E. J., Plaza, S., Seshan, G. K., & Yameogo, N. D. (2020). COVID19- crisis through a migration lens. Migration and Development Brief, 32. World bank
40. Schengen Visa Info. (2020). Retrieved from 2020 Country-Specific Schengen Visa Statistics: <https://statistics.schengenvisainfo.com/>
41. Shaffer, F., Rocco, G., & Stievano, A. (2020). Nurse and health professional migration during COVID19-. Professioni infermieristiche. (3)73
42. SKY News (2020). Coronavirus: BAME people make up %72 of all NHS and carer deaths with COVID19- / from: <https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-bame-people-make-up-72-off-all-nhs-and-carer-deaths-with-covid1977263-19->
43. Taylor, D. (2020, March 25). Retrieved from theguardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/25/covid-19-call-for-fast-track-registration-of-refugee-doctors-in-uk>
44. Taylor, D. (2020, March 25). Retrieved from theguardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/25/covid-19-call-for-fast-track-registration-of-refugee-doctors-in-uk>
45. Thevenot, S. (2020, April 10). Retrieved from CIC NEWS: <https://www.cicnews.com/04/2020/ontario-accepting-applications-for-internationally-trained-doctors-to-fight-coronavirus0414098-.html#gs.5jc6f8>
46. Triandafyllidou, A., & Nalbandian, L. (2020). Covid19- and the transformation of migration and mobility globally- " Disposable " and " essential. Changes in the global hierarchies of migrant workers after COVID19-, Geneva, IOM.

47. TURKSTAT. (2021a). Retrieved from Turkish Statistical Institute: [http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab\\_id=2763](http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2763)
48. TURKSTAT. (2021b). Retrieved from Turkish Statistical Institute: [http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab\\_id=2834](http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2834)
49. TURKSTAT. (2021c). Retrieved from Turkish Statistical Institute: [http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab\\_id=2339](http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2339)
50. U.S. Census Bureau. (2019). (2020 American Community Survey -1Year Estimates. Retrieved from <https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=United20%States&t=-B20%-20%0All20%available20%places20%of20%birth3%APopulations20%and20%People&tid=ACSSPP1Y2019.S0201&hidePreview=true>
51. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UNDESA). (2020). International migrant stock. Retrieved from [www.united-nation.org](http://www.united-nation.org): [https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa\\_pd\\_2017\\_migrant\\_stock\\_origin\\_destination\\_dataset.xlsx](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2017_migrant_stock_origin_destination_dataset.xlsx)
52. United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2020). Asia-Pacific Migration Report 2020: Assessing Implementation of the Global Compact for Migration (ST/ESCAP/2801).
53. Wallis, E. (2020, April 16). Retrieved from infomigrants: <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/24151/needed-migrant-medics-to-fight-covid-19-in-germany>
54. WHO (2018). International Platform on Health Worker Mobility: Evidence, Solutions and Instruments Meeting Report Geneva, Switzerland 13th - 14th September 2018.
55. WHO (5). (2019 ways to bridge the global health worker shortage. Shobana Kamineni
56. World Bank. (2020c). Potential Responses to the COVID19- Outbreak in Support of Migrant Workers. Retrieved from: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/428451587390154689/pdf/Potential-Responses-to-the-COVID-19-Outbreak-in-Support-of-Migrant-Workers-April2020-21-.pdf>
57. World bank, (2021). world bank remittance outflow and inflow matrix,. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>
58. World bank. (2020a). COVID19- to Plunge Global Economy into Worst Recession since World War II. Retrieved from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/08/06/2020/covid-19-to-plunge-global-economy-into-worst-recession-since-world-war-ii>
59. World bank. (2020b). COVID19- crisis through a migration lens. Migration and Development Brief, 32. World bank






**The references of the forced migration and asylum-seeking**

1. Statistical Center of Iran (2016). National population and housing census
2. The Center of Labor Market Statistics and Information (2005). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
3. The Center of Labor Market Statistics and Information (2006). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
4. The Center of Labor Market Statistics and Information (2007). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
5. The Center of Labor Market Statistics and Information (2008). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
6. The Center of Labor Market Statistics and Information (2009). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
7. The Center of Labor Market, Cooperatives, and Welfare Statistics and Information (2010). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Affairs
8. The Center of the Strategic Labor Market, Cooperatives, and Welfare Statistics and Information (2018). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Affairs
9. The Center of the Strategic Labor Market, Cooperatives, and Welfare Statistics and Information (2019). Human Resources Outlook. Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Affairs
10. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2011). The statistical outlook of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
11. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2012). The statistical outlook of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
12. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2013). The statistical outlook of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
13. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2014). The statistical outlook of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
14. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2015). The statistical outlook of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
15. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2016). The statistical outlook of the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.

16. Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare (2017). Investigating the characteristics and the status of foreign nationals in the country (based on the results of the national population and housing census in 2016). The center of strategic statistics and information. Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
17. The Center of Strategic Statistics and Information (2011). Investigating the characteristics and status of the foreign nationals in Iran (based on the results of the population and housing census in 2017). Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare.
18. Eurostat (2021). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data (rounded). Retrieved 16 May 2021. Available at: <https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>
19. Home Office Immigration Statistics (2021). Asylum applications, decisions and resettlement. retrieved 28 May 2021, Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/asylum-and-resettlement-datasets#asylum-appeals>
20. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2021, Internal displacement in a changing climate, available at: <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2021/>
21. International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2019) Returns to Afghanistan Joint IOM-UNHCR Summary Report, available at: [https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/iom\\_unhcr\\_2018\\_joint\\_return\\_repot\\_final\\_24jun\\_2019english.pdf](https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/iom_unhcr_2018_joint_return_repot_final_24jun_2019english.pdf)
22. IOM (2021 ,2020 ,2019 ,2018 ,2017 ,2016 ,2015). Weekly Report on Return of Undocumented Afghans, 2021-2015. Available at: <https://afghanistan.iom.int/pakistan-returns>
23. Jauhiainen, J., & Eyvazlu, D. (2018). Urbanization, refugees and irregular migrants in Iran, 2017. Turun yliopiston maantieteen ja geologian laitoksen julkaisu, 9.
24. Jauhiainen, J., & Eyvazlu, D.; Salavati, S. B. (2020). Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations; University of Turku.
25. Missing Migrants Project (2021). Total of deaths recorded. Retrieved 02 June 2021. Available at: <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>
26. OECD (2020). International migration outlook, 2020. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/migration/international-migration-outlook1999124-x.htm>
27. UNHCR (2018) Statistic, accessible at: <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/demographics>
28. UNHCR (2020a). Mid-Year Trends 2020. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/search?comid=56b086754&cid=49aea93aba&scid=49aea93a5c&tags=midyear>
29. UNHCR (2021c). Resettlement data finder: available at: <https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#YX0y>
30. UNHCR (2021e). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/unhcr-global-trends-2020-media-page60-be2dd14>
31. UNHCR Data Finder (2021). Refugee Data Finder. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/>



refugee-statistics/download/?url=1Ghh

32. UNHCR Operational Data Portal (2021). Country Overview: Iran. Retrieved 24 May 2021. Available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/irn>

33. Henley and Partners (2021). The Henley Passport Index: Q2021 2 Global Ranking, available at: [https://www.henleyglobal.com/storage/app/media/HPI/HENLEY\\_PASSPORT\\_INDEX\\_2021\\_Q2\\_INFOGRAPHIC\\_GLOBAL\\_RANKING\\_1\\_210415.pdf](https://www.henleyglobal.com/storage/app/media/HPI/HENLEY_PASSPORT_INDEX_2021_Q2_INFOGRAPHIC_GLOBAL_RANKING_1_210415.pdf)

34. UNHCR (2021d). Resettlement Data Finder. Retrieved 2 February 2021. available at: <https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#dJj>

35. OECD stat (Retrieved 19 April 2021). Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality. Available at: <https://stats.oecd.org/>

36. UNHCR (2021). Iran. Retrieved 25 May 2021. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/ir/voluntary-repatriation/>

37. UNHCR (2021b). Iran at A Glance. Retrieved 26 May 2021. Available at: [https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Iran20%at20%a20%glance\\_Feb202021%.pdf](https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Iran20%at20%a20%glance_Feb202021%.pdf)

38. Eurostat, (Retrieved 30 May 2021). Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded), available at: [https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr\\_eipre&lang=en](https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en)

39. Eurostat, (Retrieved 30 May 2021). Third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (rounded), available at: [https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr\\_eiord&lang=en](https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eiord&lang=en)

40. UNHCR Data finder, (Retrieved 30 May 2021). Resettlement Data, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html>

### References of the return migration

1. Al-Yasin et al., (2014). The drivers and obstacles of returning to Iran. Available in <http://bazgasht.info>

2. National Elite Foundation (2013). Looking at the experience of the country in interacting with the non-resident elite

3. Hajjehfroush (2020). Investigating the characteristics of different clusters of the graduates of Sharif University of Technology who migrated in the 1990s. School of management and economics. Sharif University of Technology.

4. Student News Network (2021). Over 2000 graduates of foreign universities have been

recruited in the Iranian universities. News code: 941788. Available in: 08x003<https://snn.ir/>

5. Iran Migration Observatory (2020). Iran migration outlook. Danesh Bonyan Fanavar. 304/810955

6. Iran Migration Observatory (2021). The policies of returning highly- educated migrants to the developing countries: the case study of Iran

7. Shirkhani M., Bayazidi r. (2018). Migration, the exiting human resources, and development: a comparison between Iran and Turkey. Journal of International and Political Approaches. ,(2)10 122-98

8. Salavati b. (2017). Factors affecting the migrant Iranians' migration and return

9. Sanaei a. (2019). Incentives and barriers in returning to Iran: the case study of the highly-educated Iranians in the U.S. Journal of the Parliament and Strategies. 324-290 ,(97)26

10. Mohammadi M. (2019). Investigating the causes of Iranian students' migration by applying the clustering technique. School of management and economics. Sharif University of Technology.

11. Vice-presidency for Science and Technology (2021). The statistics on the returned migrants via the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists

12. Iran Knowledge (2021). The statistics on the returned migrants via the program of cooperation with the non-resident Iranian specialists and scientists

**References for the Iranians'  
migration behavior**

1. National Elite Foundation (2020). Statistics of the migration of the top ranks of the university entrance exam and the students Olympiad medalists





# Appendices

## Appendix 1

Iran's rank in terms of receiving and sending migrants in the world

### Iran's rank among international migrant sending and receiving countries

Rank	Country	Major countries hosting international migrants	Rank	Country	Major sending countries of international migrants
1	USA	50,632,836	1	India	17,869,492
2	Germany	15,762,457	2	Mexico	11,185,737
3	Saudi Arabia	13,454,842	3	Russia	10,756,697
4	Russia	11,636,911	4	China	10,461,170
5	UK	9,359,587	5	Syria	8,457,214
6	United Arab Emirates	8,716,332	6	Bangladesh	7,401,763
7	France	8,524,876	7	Pakistan	6,328,400
8	Canada	8,049,323	8	Ukraine	6,139,144
9	Australia	7,685,860	9	Philippines	6,094,307
10	Spain	6,842,202	10	Afghanistan	5,853,838
11	Italy	6,386,998	11	Venezuela	5,415,337
12	Turkey	6,052,652	12	Poland	4,825,096
13	Ukraine	4,997,387	13	UK	4,732,510
14	India	4,878,704	14	Indonesia	4,601,369
15	Kazakhstan	3,732,073	15	Kazakhstan	4,203,899
16	Thailand	3,632,496	16	Palestine	4,022,791
17	Malaysia	3,476,560	17	Romania	3,987,093
18	Jordan	3,456,691	18	Germany	3,855,268
19	Pakistan	3,276,580	19	Myanmar	3,711,751
20	Kuwait	3,110,159	20	Egypt	3,610,461
		:			
23	Iran	2,797,235	54	Iran	1,325,113

Source: (UNDESA 2021)

## Appendix 2

The number of foreign nationals in Iran

Province	Total population	Total population of foreign nationals	Afghan nationals	Iraqi nationals	Pakistani nationals	Turkish nationals	Other nationals
Ardabil	1,270,420	74	35	14	0	5	20
Esfahan	5,120,850	186,390	183,124	2,211	296	15	744
Alborz	2,712,400	84,805	84,321	210	117	16	141
Ilam	580,158	1,734	29	1,694	0	0	11
East Azarbaijan	3,909,652	342	139	35	0	49	119
West Azarbaijan	3,265,219	951	107	702	4	83	55
Bushehr	1,163,400	30,286	29,691	143	164	1	287
Tehran	13,267,637	525,033	515,567	4,965	1,699	154	2,648
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	947,763	106	91	6	2	0	7
Southern Khorasan	768,898	5,075	5,045	16	4	0	10
Khorasan Razavi	6,434,501	232,671	219,442	6,400	1,744	17	5,068
North Khorasan	863,092	127	93	25	2	0	7
Khuzestan	4,710,509	11,432	6,290	4,972	23	1	146
Zanjan	1,057,461	201	40	17	1	9	134
Semnan	702,360	35,544	35,409	71	18	1	45
Sistan and Baluchestan	2,775,014	29,676	26,846	14	2,617	1	198
Fars	4,851,274	110,098	109,247	563	79	1	208
Qazvin	1,273,761	18,686	18,401	112	22	6	145
Qom	1,292,283	120,028	96,367	8,365	6,543	340	8,413
Kurdistan	1,603,011	450	18	424	0	0	8
Kerman	3,164,718	126,106	125,411	76	106	5	508
Kermanshah	1,952,434	883	47	830	0	1	5
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad	713,052	1,559	1,503	4	0	0	52
Golestan	1,868,819	18,782	18,273	54	14	1	440
Gilan	2,530,696	425	309	42	2	0	72
Lorestan	1,760,649	331	99	226	3	0	3
Mazandaran	3,283,582	2,749	2,623	56	14	0	56
Markazi	1,429,475	29,650	29,257	289	22	1	81
Hormozgan	1,776,415	26,107	24,195	97	730	2	1,083
Hamedan	1,738,234	444	217	187	2	2	36
Yazd	1,138,533	53,643	51,743	1,712	92	2	94
Total	79,926,270	1,654,388	1,583,979	34,532	14,320	713	20,844

Source: (Iran national statistical center, 2016)



## Appendix 3

The employment status of foreign nationals in Iran

Province	Number of employed foreign nationals	Number of unemployed foreign nationals	Employment rate of foreign nationals	Unemployment rate of foreign nationals
Ardabil	19	2	90.5	9.5
Esfahan	55,666	2,129	96.3	3.7
Alborz	28,975	1,160	96.2	3.8
Ilam	706	67	91.3	8.7
East Azarbaijan	149	8	94.9	5.1
West Azerbaijan	268	39	87.3	12.7
Bushehr	13,921	267	98.1	1.9
Tehran	182,730	4,203	97.8	2.2
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	35	9	79.5	20.5
Southern Khorasan	1,219	88	93.3	6.7
Khorasan Razavi	71,305	4,776	93.7	6.3
North Khorasan	40	6	87	13
Khuzestan	4,004	442	90.1	9.9
Zanjan	133	3	97.8	2.2
Semnan	11,656	835	93.3	6.7
Sistan and Baluchestan	8,877	1,033	89.6	10.4
Fars	36,386	1,065	97.2	2.8
Qazvin	5,914	179	97.1	2.9
Qom	28,080	1,372	95.3	4.7
Kurdistan	129	18	87.8	12.2
Kerman	43,328	1,054	97.6	2.4
Kermanshah	160	74	68.4	31.6
Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad	674	34	95.2	4.8
Golestan	6,323	453	93.3	6.7
Gilan	155	22	87.6	12.4
Lorestan	109	14	88.6	11.4
Mazandaran	1,268	66	95.1	4.9
Markazi	9,415	253	97.4	2.6
Hormozgan	9,926	332	96.8	3.2
Hamedan	122	8	93.8	4.2
Yazd	16,954	1,383	92.5	7.5
Total	538,646	21,394	96.1	3.9

Source: (Iran national population and housing center, 2016; Ministry of cooperative, labour and social welfare, 2017)

## Appendix 4

The number of Iranian first-registered asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Belgium	270	270	385	345	205	185	455	255	195	485	710	210
Bulgaria	NA	NA	25	25	60	100	165	450	80	35	80	40
Czech Republic	5	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	20	35	10
Denmark	320	650	505	550	365	275	2,755	315	135	195	135	80
Germany	1,170	2,475	3,350	4,340	4,425	3,195	5,395	26,425	8,600	10,855	8,405	3,120
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	5	5	0
Ireland	40	35	10	25	0	20	20	20	20	25	45	15
Greece	NA	NA	250	200	165	295	190	1,085	1,300	1,730	2,325	835
Spain	NA	45	55	60	60	40	80	65	60	60	180	25
France	195	405	185	225	165	175	265	400	390	605	520	310
Croatia	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	5	0	150	65	120	165	70
Italy	165	275	240	165	400	385	265	385	230	230	270	145
Cyprus	170	110	60	55	20	25	10	35	75	205	290	60
Latvia	5	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	5	0
Luxembourg	NA	NA	15	30	15	5	55	55	15	50	55	55
Hungary	NA	NA	NA	NA	55	250	1,780	1,255	90	30	20	5
Malta	0	0	5	0	0	10	5	5	0	5	10	0
India	500	775	930	835	605	495	1,890	885	725	1,870	1,535	370
Austria	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	730	3,375	2,395	950	1,050	655	305
Poland	5	0	5	15	0	5	0	10	10	30	35	10
Portugal	5	5	5	0	0	5	5	10	15	15	30	10
Romania	NA	NA	25	20	20	55	20	15	195	140	105	40
Slovenia	10	10	5	0	0	20	30	75	50	160	120	50
Slovakia	NA	5	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	15	45	15
Finland	NA	NA	NA	120	145	90	610	140	85	230	95	25
Sweden	1,140	1,185	1,115	1,540	1,015	795	4,265	930	900	1,095	985	580
UK	2,145	2,220	3,050	3,165	2,970	2,500	3,715	4,830	3,040	4,005	5,455	4,199
Iceland	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	10	20	15	30	35	15
Liechtenstein	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	550	415	340	430	250	95	1,305	110	85	110	70	45
Swiss	225	275	320	310	180	110	570	530	270	455	490	255
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,910</b>	<b>9,180</b>	<b>10,955</b>	<b>12,480</b>	<b>11,150</b>	<b>9,910</b>	<b>27,290</b>	<b>40,875</b>	<b>17,710</b>	<b>23,890</b>	<b>22,920</b>	<b>10,909</b>

NA: data is not available

Source: (Eurostat, 2021, Retrieved 01 May 2021)

Data for the UK in 2020: (Home office immigration statistics, Retrieved 28 May 2021)

## Appendix 5

First instance decisions on Iranian asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Belgium	745	405	200	300	490	620	320	110	560	345	395	310
Bulgaria	20	40	25	40	15	60	20	50	140	40	75	45
Czech Republic	5	5	5	10	5	10	5	5	0	5	20	10
Denmark	210	330	520	465	570	280	205	1,055	1,445	160	260	110
Germany	1,120	2,760	2,620	2,915	3,290	2,960	1,925	9,855	27,005	8,645	8,275	7,185
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	5	5	5	5
Ireland	55	20	35	20	15	25	25	25	10	10	15	20
Greece	330	75	115	235	140	370	145	300	630	695	680	1,245
Spain	70	30	55	45	10	45	20	35	60	20	125	50
France	125	265	185	235	275	190	225	250	550	535	590	295
Croatia	:	:	:	0	0	0	0	15	40	45	30	30
Italy	140	220	245	155	275	375	345	300	230	215	270	205
Cyprus	190	70	190	20	35	5	20	20	15	45	45	30
Latvia	0	0	5	15	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	5
Luxembourg	25	40	15	15	50	15	10	20	30	60	25	30
Hungary	20	55	20	30	10	25	60	205	125	60	40	15
Malta	0	0	5	0	0	10	5	10	0	0	0	0
India	540	830	1,140	1,225	1,170	580	410	830	1,535	730	955	840
Austria	255	415	445	550	750	280	475	640	1,900	3,040	1,095	390
Poland	5	5	10	10	5	10	10	10	15	20	40	25
Portugal	0	5	0	10	5	5	5	10	5	5	10	5
Romania	5	15	15	15	15	65	40	15	60	90	75	45
Slovenia	5	5	10	10	5	10	20	25	25	10	10	25
Slovakia	15	10	5	10	5	5	5	0	0	5	15	5
Finland	90	150	90	185	190	125	50	335	265	85	305	90
Sweden	845	1,175	1,210	985	1,095	545	390	1,425	2,280	2,045	1,195	1,025
UK	2,460	2,725	2,760	2,715	2,345	2,300	3,505	4,390	3,255	2,735	4,140	2,546
Iceland	0	0	5	5	5	10	5	10	0	15	25	20
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
Norway	605	665	485	395	320	105	105	795	355	110	75	65
Swiss	175	215	255	215	220	320	285	250	150	230	230	420
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,040</b>	<b>10,520</b>	<b>10,660</b>	<b>10,825</b>	<b>11,305</b>	<b>9,350</b>	<b>8,640</b>	<b>20,995</b>	<b>40,695</b>	<b>20,010</b>	<b>19,035</b>	<b>15,091</b>

Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 01 May 2021)

Data for the UK. in 2020: (Home office immigration statistics, Retrieved 28 May 2021)

## Appendix 6

Total positive decisions on Iranian asylum applicants in the EU28 & EFTA countries

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Belgium	95	55	50	165	200	315	225	65	460	265	295	140
Bulgaria	5	10	5	5	5	15	5	5	5	5	20	0
Czech Republic	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	130	210	250	270	300	70	110	390	550	65	60	10
Germany	600	1,475	1,430	1,660	1,945	2,125	1,585	5,850	15,145	2,715	2,090	1,800
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	5	0	10	5	15	20	25	20	10	10	15	15
Greece	30	30	10	10	25	120	55	160	380	460	400	570
Spain	10	5	10	5	5	15	5	15	5	5	90	5
France	55	185	125	130	155	130	135	150	195	175	155	85
Croatia	:	:	:	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	5	5
Italy	115	195	170	145	225	320	225	240	145	150	185	105
Cyprus	15	5	5	0	5	5	15	10	10	25	15	15
Latvia	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Luxembourg	5	15	5	10	35	10	0	20	25	60	20	20
Hungary	10	5	5	0	0	5	25	15	35	35	20	10
Malta	0	0	5	0	0	10	5	5	0	0	0	0
India	230	425	535	520	645	260	285	435	725	330	375	405
Austria	100	165	210	330	450	265	385	465	1,275	1,355	465	185
Poland	5	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	5	10	20	10
Portugal	0	5	0	10	5	5	5	10	5	0	5	5
Romania	0	0	5	5	10	5	5	0	10	20	30	20
Slovenia	0	0	0	5	5	5	20	10	5	5	10	10
Slovakia	10	5	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	25	50	40	120	95	85	40	210	140	35	95	35
Sweden	165	250	385	340	590	360	175	665	1,145	755	410	325
UK	465	850	1,280	1,425	1,310	1,265	2,005	1,705	1,560	1,210	2,780	1,386
Iceland	0	0	5	0	5	5	5	10	0	5	15	20
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Norway	170	135	135	125	100	45	45	505	220	45	30	30
Swiss	130	145	170	150	140	245	210	95	130	195	195	375
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,370</b>	<b>4,235</b>	<b>4,870</b>	<b>5,445</b>	<b>6,260</b>	<b>5,720</b>	<b>5,600</b>	<b>11,075</b>	<b>22,180</b>	<b>7,955</b>	<b>7,815</b>	<b>5,591</b>

Source: (Eurostat, Retrieved 01 May 2021)

Data for the UK, in 2020: (Home office immigration statistics, Retrieved 28 May 2021)

## Definition of Potential Net Migration Index

• **Definition of Potential Net Migration Index**

Potential Net Migration Index scores are the estimated numbers of adults who would like to move permanently out of a country if the opportunity arose

$$\text{Potential Net Migration Indexes (PNMI)} = ((A-B)/C) * 100$$

A: Number of people would to enter the country

B: Number of people who want to leave the country

C: Country population

• **Definition of Potential Net Brain Gain Indexes**

The Potential Net Brain Gain Indexes measures the potential for immigration among educated people and indicates a decrease or increase in the number of educated people in each country if barriers to immigration are removed

$$\text{Potential Net Brain Gain Indexes} = ((A-B)/C) * 100$$

A: Number of educated people would to enter the country

B: Number of educated people who want to leave the country

C: Population of educated people of the country

• **Definition of Potential Net Brain Gain Indexes**

This indicator indicates a decrease or increase in the youth population of each country if the barriers to immigration are removed.

$$\text{Potential Net Youth Migration indexes} = ((A-B)/C) * 100$$

A: Number of youth people would to enter the country

B: Number of youth people who want to leave the country

C: Population of youth people of the country